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Introduction
China is often singled out as one of the worst human rights violators
in the world today. Since 1990, there have been eleven attempts to censure
China before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, although
each has failed.1 Human rights groups regularly issue scathing reports
condemning China for widespread human rights violations. 2 Every year,
the U.S. State Department claims serious abuses, frequently describing the
situation as deteriorating. 3 U.N. bodies and officials, including the special
rapporteurs on the rights to education and religious freedom, have also
issued critical reports.4
On the other hand, the Chinese government regularly issues reports
chock-full of statistics showing considerable progress on a wide variety of
fronts, and proudly claims that Chinese citizens enjoy more rights than
ever before.5 While not denying that much remains to be done, the govern-
ment maintains its critics are biased, human rights are being misused for
1. Xinhua News Agency, Chronology of Defeats of Anti-China Human Rights Attempts
(Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/93203.htm.
Between 1982 and 1997, only twenty-two states were the subject of U.N. resolutions for
systematic violations of rights. Ron Wheeler, The United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, 1982-1997: A Study of "Targeted" Resolutions, 32 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 75, 81 (1999).
China is among a handful of the most frequently targeted countries for systematic gov-
ernment violations, a group that includes Iraq, Myanmar, Iran, Equatorial Guinea, and
Haiti, all of which were the subject of proposed motions in at least ten years between
1990 and 2004. Id. at 81, 88.
2. See, e.g., Human Rights Defenders in China, Human Rights Defenders, ("The
human rights situation in China continues to be grave. China has secured a prominent
position in the international arena.... However, this has not been accompanied by a
parallel improvement in human rights,"), available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/defend-
ers/hrdChina/hrdChina.htm; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2003: CHINA (2003)
(finding that "[s]erious human rights violations continued and in some respects the
situation deteriorated. Tens of thousands of people continued to be arbitrarily detained
or imprisoned for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, associa-
tion or belief .... Torture and ill-treatment remained widespread."), available at http://
web.amnesty.org/report2003/Chn-summary-eng (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
3. See discussion infra notes 418-421 and accompanying text.
4. See Philip P. Pan, U.N. Official Criticizes Education in China, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 2003, at A20; Abdelfattah Amor, U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Relig-
ious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
51/542 annex 1 (1996).
5. See Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040330/index.htm (Mar.
2004). China's various "white papers" on human rights and other topics are available at
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
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political purposes, and China is being subjected to a double standard.6
Many Chinese citizens feel the same way. They too see the human
rights policies of Western countries, particularly the U.S., as hypocritical
and hegemonic power politics. 7 Chinese citizens are particularly sensitive
about infringements on China's national sovereignty in part because of
decades of bullying by foreign imperial powers.8 But many also feel that
China today is being held to a different standard than are other countries.
The U.S. and other Western powers sit idly by while gross violations of
human rights occur in Burundi, Colombia, Nigeria, Uganda, India, Saudi
Arabia, and countless other countries, and yet are quick to criticize China
even though most Chinese enjoy more extensive freedoms and a better
standard of living than ever before. Behind the double standard, they sus-
pect, lies the desire of the U.S. and other developed countries to contain
China and prevent it from emerging as a rival superpower.
The very fact that government leaders and Chinese citizens feel China
is being held to a double standard, whether or not it is true, has several
negative consequences for human rights. The steady stream of criticism
leveled at Beijing has led to testy relations between China and U.N. rights
bodies, the U.S. and other countries, and international human rights
NGOs. The government is often quick to assume a defensive posture,
stonewalling or defending its record at length in the face of criticism rather
than exploring constructive ways to improve the current situation. 9 Beijing
has also been reluctant to allow visits by inspectors from the U.N. or other
countries, and has imposed restrictions on those visits it does authorize. 10
At times, the reaction has been even more hostile and antithetical to pro-
gress on rights issues. In response to the annual U.S. State Department
report, which the State Council has denounced as "an amateurish collec-
tion of distortions and rumors" driven by "anti-China forces who don't
want to see the existence of an increasingly wealthy and developed socialist
state,"" China now issues its own critical report on the rights situation in
6. See China Evades Human Rights Censure, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2004 (quoting
China's Assistant Foreign Minister, Shen Guofang, who accused the United States of
practicing "double standards").
7. See Students' Attitudes Toward Human Rights Surveyed, BBC SuMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, May 4, 1999, § 3. In a survey of 547 students from thirteen universities in
China, 82.2% claimed that for other countries to initiate anti-China motions before the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights constituted interference in China's internal affairs;
71.1% believed that the true aim of the United States and other countries in censuring
China was to use the human rights issue to attack China and impose sanctions on it,
with 68.9% maintaining that this constituted a form of power politics. Id.
8. See generally Imperialism in China Wordiq.com (discussing the history of West-
ern involvement in China), at http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Imperialism inAsia
(last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
9. See Reply of the Chinese Authorities to the Follow-Up Table, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/51/542 annex 2, (1996).
10. See Audra Ang, China Postpones U.N. Inspector's Visit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 17,
2004 (on file with author).
11. George Gedda, U.S. Won't Reproach China on Human Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 18224125.
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the United States. 12 In addition, China has cancelled bilateral dialogues
on human rights as well as programs on rule of law in response to the
attempts to censure it in Geneva.
Apart from the negative government reaction, the public's support for
international reform efforts has also been weakened. Many citizens are
suspicious about the motives of NGOs. Even reform-minded academics
often find that NGOs lack an adequate understanding of the situation in
China, and that their proposals for reform are out of touch with the
existing norms or simply infeasible given China's current conditions. Pub-
lic opinion about America, seen as the leader of Western critics, has under-
gone a dramatic shift in the last twenty years, from wildly supportive to
highly critical. 13 Sometime in this century China will emerge as a major
economic, political, and ultimately military power capable of challenging
U.S. hegemony. Instilling a feeling of resentment and hostility in Chinese
citizens who believe China is being treated unfairly diminishes the likeli-
hood of a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the superpowers.
The feeling that China is being subjected to a double standard has led
to a growing nationalism. 14 While nationalism may take the form of pride
in one's culture and country, in China nationalism is often based on a
more negative feeling of resentment. The resentment stems from a general
sense that China, this once great civilization, is being denied its rightful
place in the world. Ironically, applying a double standard to China feeds a
trend to emphasize the distinctiveness of China, and of Asian countries
more generally, as evidenced in the debate over Asian values. The growing
desire for Asian countries to affirm their unique identities and stake out
their own turf within the normative universe of human rights challenges
the fundamental pretense of universalism on which the human rights
regime is founded. 15
Is China subject to a double standard? I argue that it is, based on com-
parative empirical studies of rights performance, and offer several explana-
tions why. Part I provides a brief overview of China's official policy on
human rights and China's involvement in the international human rights
regime.
Part II examines China's performance relative to that of other coun-
tries, particularly other countries at its income level, in terms of physical
12. See, e.g., Information Office of the State Council of China, Human Rights Record
of the United States in 2001, available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20020313/
index.htm (Mar. 11, 2002).
13. See Zhao Xi, Jin Shinian Lai Zhongmei Guangxi Diaocha Zhong de Minjian Renzhi
[Public Opinion in Surveys on China-US Relations in the last 10 years], XIN ZHOUKAN [NEw
WEEKLY MAGAZINE], May 22, 2003, available at http://cul.sina.com.cn/s/2003-05-22/
34512.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
14. See generally PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA'S NEw NATIONALISM: PRIDE, POLITICS, AND
DIPLOMACY (2004) (discussing the role that Chinese resentment of Western criticism has
played in the resurgence of Chinese nationalism).
15. For other evidence of a growing nationalism that has led to conflicts between
Asian governments and international rights NGOs as well as between domestic and
international rights groups, see generally A COMPARATVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN
COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., forthcoming 2005).
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integrity rights; civil and political rights; social and economic rights and other
indicia of quality of life including poverty, infant mortality, life expec-
tancy, primary school enrollment, and government expenditures on educa-
tion, health and the military; quality of governance measured in terms of
regulatory effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption; law and order and social stability as reflected in crime rates and the
number of drug users, suicides, divorces and young mothers; women's
rights; and cultural or minority rights. Multi-country statistical studies are
used to place China within an overall comparative framework. While
China scores well below the average in its lower-middle income category on
civil and political rights, 16 it outperforms the average country in its income
class on virtually all other major indicators, supporting the claim that
China is subject to a double standard. 17
These studies are complemented by a more detailed discussion of par-
ticular issues in each area to provide a more complete picture of the rights
situation in China. To be sure, there are still many people living in relative
and absolute poverty, concerns about the rights of laborers, migrant work-
ers, women, and minorities, as well as shortcomings in criminal justice and
the rule of law, widespread corruption, and a host of other good govern-
ance issues. The government has acknowledged these shortcomings, and
continues to take steps to address them. 18 However, as the more detailed
discussion demonstrates, most of these issues are factually, legally, politi-
cally, economically, and normatively contentious, and defy easy solution,
especially for such a large developing country as China. Not surprisingly,
and with some considerable justification, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) government has expressed impatience with the international human
rights community for failing to appreciate the complexity of the issues, for
discounting the progress China has made in improving people's living stan-
dards and expanding citizens' freedoms while exaggerating the severity of
its problems by focusing on the relatively few cases involving political dis-
sidents, and for attempting to impose simplistic solutions that are norma-
tively biased toward liberalism and likely to be counterproductive given
China's history and traditions, level of economic development and current
legal and political institutions.
Part III considers several reasons why China seems to be held to a
higher standard than other countries. 19 Some critics argue the attention
paid to China is warranted because, given China's huge population,
addressing problems in China will benefit so many people. However, India
has a population nearly as large as China. And yet, despite a human rights
16. See infra Table 5.1.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., FM Spokesman on China's Efforts To Promote Human Rights, PEOPLE'S
DAiLY (China), Nov. 21, 2000, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2000/Nov/
4323.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
19. I do not discuss the possibility of racism as an explanatory factor for the double
standards, because racism would not explain why China is subject to such intense criti-
cism and not other Asian or predominantly non-white states. Nevertheless, I do not
mean to exclude racism as a possible contributing factor.
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record that falls short of China's on many indicators, India has not received
anywhere near as much critical scrutiny as China.
A second, more likely explanation is that the international human
rights community remains biased toward civil and political rights, the area
in which China is the weakest, and, conversely, the one area where India
outperforms both China and other countries at its income level. Third,
and related, nondemocratic countries are held to higher standards than
democratic countries. Accordingly, China is judged more harshly whereas
India and other democratic countries with poor rights records tend to be
given the benefit of the doubt, receiving the equivalent of a "get-out-of-jail-
free" pass.
Fourth, China is singled out because of its geopolitical importance.
China's status as a member of the Security Council and its increasing eco-
nomic clout distinguish China from other poorer, less politically powerful
countries with weak human rights records. For some, China has assumed
the role played by Russia during the Cold War-the evil empire that must
be opposed at every turn. There is therefore some support for the popular
view that criticism of China for human rights is part of a grand strategy to
contain China and prevent it from assuming its rightful place as a world
leader, although for the most part criticisms of China are motivated by a
genuine commitment to the normative superiority of democracy and rights
for everyone.
Fifth, and related, China presents a normative challenge to the human
rights regime. Unlike Japan, which during its economically powerful years
did not attempt to challenge the Western powers, China is likely to take
advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to defend
and advocate, even in the face of Western opposition, rights policies and a
normative vision of the world at odds with current rights policies based on
secular liberalism. There are already signs of this approach in China's sup-
port for Asian values. The deeply felt sense among Chinese that theirs is a
great civilization increases the likelihood that an economically, politically
and militarily powerful China will play a significant role in determining the
nature of the international order and the future human rights regime.
Given the deeply entrenched view that even universal rights are contingent
on local circumstances, China is unlikely to attempt to impose its own
particular solutions to complex issues on other countries. However, rights
advocates may fear a shift in the normative orientation toward a more flexi-
ble, contextualized approach, with greater toleration for nonliberal, com-
munitarian or collectivist approaches to rights issues.
Still another reason for the double standard is that much of the report-
ing on China by the general media and human rights monitors tends to
focus on particular horrific cases of human rights violations. The empha-
sis on individual cases, especially heart-wrenching cases that are not repre-
sentative of the system as a whole, creates a misleading impression of how
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serious the problems are. 20 In addition, reporting on China frequently suf-
fers from a number of other shortcomings that provide fodder to those
seeking to portray China as a malevolent evil empire, including the failure
to place China's record within a comparative context and in particular to
compare China to other countries at a similar level of economic develop-
ment. Given the importance of wealth to virtually every type of right, mea-
suring the rights performance of a lower-middle income country such as
China against the benchmark of a rich country like the U.S. makes about
as much sense as comparing a piano to a duck. 21
On the other hand, the government has largely ceded the public rela-
tions battlefield to international NGOs by failing to hold public trials or
restricting access to trials, by failing to publish judgments in controversial
cases, and by refusing to allow independent monitors access to prisons and
other sites to investigate allegations of abuses. The lack of transparency,
combined with the egregious nature of some violations, leads people to
suspect the worse, and fuels images of China as a repressive totalitarian
state.
20. The media's negative reporting on China resembles media coverage elsewhere.
Reporters tend to emphasize murders by strangers and violent crime, even though most
murder victims know their killers and most crimes are property crimes. See Sara Sun
Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003
UTAH L. REv. 413, 425 (2003); Philip Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5
BUFF. CriM. L. REv. 427 (2002). As a result, the public often exaggerates the seriousness
of crimes and the likelihood of being a victim of violent crime. Politicians then respond
to the public's misinformed demands to crack down on crime with harsher punishments
and other confrontational measures.
Nevertheless, the public has a better sense of the situation in its own country than in
other distant countries. Thus, "normal" negative reporting on events in China will cre-
ate a more negative impression in the minds of American citizens or others not familiar
with China because they lack the counterbalancing positive, less-newsworthy exper-
iences from everyday life. The negative impact is likely to be even greater when the
reports tap into long-held stereotypes, often favored by editors eager to peddle papers.
Cf. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Percep-
tions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21,
34-35 (2002) (complaining that the Western media paid more attention to the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) than the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and that coverage of the ICTR was more critical; the
author argued that "the most important reason why the ICTR receives a steady stream of
criticism and critical reporting is the stereotypical, biased, and long-standing negative
image and neglect of the African continent in the global media," complemented by "a
mixture of ignorance, misunderstanding, and calculated editorial decision making by
the editors of various global media").
21. Wealth is highly correlated with social and economic rights (r=.92); good gov-
ernance indicators such as government effectiveness (r-.77), rule of law (r=.82), and
control of corruption (r=.76); civil and political rights (r-.62); women's rights (r=.93);
and even physical integrity rights though to a lower degree (r= -.40). Randall Peer-
enboom, Show Me the Money- The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights Perform-
ance in Asia, 15 DUKE INT'L L. J. (forthcoming 2005) (showing the relationship globally
and for Asia and other regions, and citing other studies that show wealth is statistically
significant for various rights even after controlling for other factors).
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I. China and the International Human Rights Regime: Engagement
and Resistance
China has ratified over twenty human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), 22 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 23 the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 2 4 the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (CAT), 25 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 26
along with its two optional protocols. It has signed but not ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 27 and has
opposed the International Criminal Court along with the United States,
Israel, and a handful of other states.
China has actively participated in the international human rights
regime in other ways as well, submitting reports, participating in the draft-
ing of new instruments, engaging in numerous multilateral, regional, and
bilateral dialogues on rights issues, and hosting a number of important
regional and global human rights meetings.2 8 Notwithstanding sover-
eignty concerns, China voted in favor of sanctions against apartheid in
South Africa. 2 9 It has also allowed a limited number of visits from interna-
tional rights monitors, including the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion and Belief, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education. In participating in the inter-
national rights regime, China has, like other countries, sought to promote
and protect its own national interests.30
22. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
23. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
24. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
25. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
26. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
28. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. VIII (International Exchanges and Cooperation
in Human Rights).
29. See, e.g., P.T. Bangsberg, Singapore Seeks To Forge Closer South African Ties, J.
COM. (1994) (discussing China's position as "a steadfast supporter of the anti-apartheid
movement"). China has also participated in U.N. peacekeeping missions in East Timor,
Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Haiti. Despite widespread criticisms of Chi-
nese policing, Chinese police have participated in UN missions to train police in other
countries. See China Shows Off Its Haiti-Bound Peacekeepers, STRAIT TIMES INTERACTIVE,
Oct. 1, 2004 (on file with author).
30. See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
COMPLIANCE (1999). Kent's impressively detailed study of China's interactions with U.N.
human rights organs shows how, over time, China learned the rules and how to manipu-
late them to achieve its ends, and how it used its political and economic power to defeat
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Domestically, rights are now firmly entrenched in political and legal
discourse. The 1982 constitution sets out the usual litany of civil and
political rights as well as some social and economic rights such as free
access to medical care.3 1 Although claims based directly on the constitu-
tion are generally not justiciable,3 2 numerous laws and regulations have
been passed to further specify and give legal effect to most rights. In 2004,
the constitution was amended to provide expressly that "the state respects
and safeguards human rights," indicating perhaps a greater commitment to
effective realization of the rights provided by the constitution.
3 3
The most recent White Paper announces the government's official
position:
China holds that the development of human rights is an important mark of
the continuous progress of the civilization of human society, and an impor-
tant part of the progressive current of world peace and development. Full
realization of human rights is the common goal of countries throughout the
world as well as an important target for China in her efforts to build a mod-
erately prosperous society in an all-round way, as well as her "peaceful rise"
in the world. China will, as always, devote herself to promoting the human
rights cause, actively carry out exchanges and cooperation with the interna-
tional community according to the provisions of the Constitution of China
and the need for modernization of the country, and make her contributions
to promoting the healthy development of the international human rights
cause.
34
More specifically, the government's official human rights policy rests
on several pillars. First, although some and perhaps most rights are univer-
sally valued at least to some extent when stated at a high level of abstrac-
tion, their interpretation and implementation depends on local
circumstances, including the level of economic development, cultural prac-
attempts at censure. Kent argues that China improved with respect to procedural com-
pliance but showed less progress with respect to substantive compliance. She often
treats this as a problem of cognitive learning or lack of internalization of norms. Id. at
8. However, in many cases there may be a legitimate difference of opinion over the
substantive norms and how they are to be interpreted and implemented. In other cases,
it may not be cognitive deficiencies as much as a hard-headed calculation of what is in
China's interests. Overall, the picture that emerges is of China complying when it can
and it is in its interest to do so, but resisting otherwise. When not in its interest, China
uses whatever techniques are at its disposal to resist, including procedural ploys, politi-
cal pressure, economic pressure, and normative arguments. Whether China is signifi-
cantly different in that regard from other countries is doubtful. See also ROSEMARY FOOT,
RIGHTS BEYOND BORDERS: THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY AND THE STRUGGLE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CHINA (2000) (discussing the relationship between China's perceived national inter-
ests and its response to international human rights pressure).
31. XIANFA [P.R.C.] [Constitution, 19821 ch. II.
32. See Shen Kui, Is it the Beginning of the Era of the Rule of the Constitution? Reinter-
preting China's "First Constitutional Case," 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 199, 208 (2003).
33. See Academics Hail China's Constitutional Amendment on Human Rights, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Mar. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WL 72818153.
34. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. VIII (International Exchanges and Cooperation
in Human Rights).
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tices, and fundamental values that are not the same in all countries. 35 This
is unimpeachable as a descriptive claim and as a legal claim. International
law itself ties some rights to local levels of development. This is most nota-
ble in the ICESCR, which provides that economic rights may be achieved
progressively consistent with a country's level of development. 36 Limita-
tion clauses that allow for restriction on rights in certain circumstances
also inevitably introduce local factors. In addition, domestic legal doc-
trines "localize" international law in various ways, including through the
principle that international law and domestic laws should be interpreted
harmoniously, and general jurisprudential principles that require judges to
apply local customs and norms. While the moral relevance of local circum-
stances is often contested, the real issue is not whether local circumstances
are normatively relevant, but which circumstances are relevant in which
cases, as implied by the notion of a margin of appreciation afforded coun-
tries on rights issues. 37
Second, while rights may be interdependent, they must be prioritized,
and the international human rights community and Western countries
inappropriately privilege civil and political rights over other rights, includ-
ing economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as collective rights such as
the right of development. In China, given its current level of economic
development and huge population, subsistence is the most fundamental
right.38 Moreover, stability is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all rights.
The need to ensure economic development and stability justifies limita-
tions on the exercise of civil and political rights. This view is widely sup-
ported by Chinese citizens, and by the majority of citizens in poor
developing countries around the world.39
35. See Information Office of the State Council of China, Human Rights in China: Pt.
Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities (1991) ("no country in its
effort to realize and protect human rights can take a route that is divorced from its
history and its economic, political and cultural realities"), http://www.china.org.cn/e-
white/7/7-L.htm..
36. ICESCR, supra note 22, at art. 2.
37. See Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving
Debates about "Values in Asia," 14 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003).
38. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. I (The People's Rights to Subsistence and
Development).
39. For several studies that show the high value assigned to order in China and the
limited demand for democracy, see RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH
TowARD RULE OF LAW 53-54 (2002). See also Pew Global Attitudes Project, What Do
Asians Think About Their Own Lives?, in WHAT THE WORLD THINKS IN 2002 (2002), availa-
ble at http://international.ucla.edu/asia/news/02pewpolla.asp (recording that 60-84%
of Indonesians, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Chinese identify economic difficul-
ties as their number one concern, with 37% of Indonesians, 44% of Indians, 57% of
Filipinos, 3l1% of Vietnamese, and 18% of Chinese claiming difficulties in affording ade-
quate food); Yun-han Chu et al., Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan, 12 J. DEMOCRACY
122, 127 (2001) (noting that in a 1998 survey 65% of Koreans claimed economic devel-
opment was more important than democracy, and that in a 1999 survey only one out of
seven chose democracy); COMISION DE PROMOCION DEL PERU, LATINOBAROMETRO, OPINION
PUBLIco LATINOAMERICANO, 2002 (2002) (finding that more than twice as many Latin
Americans would choose development over democracy, while 50% agreed or strongly
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The third pillar of China's human rights policy is the perception that
the international human rights regime assumes a liberal democratic frame-
work and emphasizes implicitly and in some cases explicitly individual
autonomy to a degree not found in other traditions, including China's.
Greater weight should be placed on the interests of groups within society,
society as a whole, and the State. Moreover, the emphasis on rights should
not obscure the importance of duties and the responsibilities of individuals
toward others.40
Fourth, international human rights, and the ability of individuals to
raise claims based on such rights or the international community to pres-
sure China to change its ways, are limited by sovereignty. Accordingly,
China, like other countries, has made a number of reservations when rati-
fying rights treaties that prevent the submission of disputes to arbitration
or the International Court of Justice, or that deny individuals standing to
raise complaints under the treaties.4 1 China also made a reservation to
Article 20 of CAT that would have allowed the Committee to conduct inves-
tigations, including visits. 4 2 However, China has extended an offer to visit
to the Special Rapporteur for CAT. Unfortunately, the visit was cancelled
in 2003 due to fears that the mission would be compromised by Beijing's
unwillingness to allow free access to prisons without advance notice.
China is by no means alone in objecting to the ever-increasing reach of
the international human rights regime into domestic affairs. Nor does
China object to all attempts to monitor and improve the rights situation in
China. Indeed, it would be hypocritical for China to participate in the con-
demnation and sanctioning of other states for violating human rights and
yet assert that the U.N. and other countries are interfering in China's
domestic affairs when they do the same. However, China continues to
insist that dialogue on rights issues be carried out on the basis of equality
and mutual respect, and that states refrain from coercive intervention
except in cases of widespread and systematic violation of rights that char-
acterize failed states torn by ethnic strife and genocide.
43
agreed with the statement that they would not mind having a nondemocratic govern-
ment if it could solve economic problems), available at http://www.latinobarometro.org/
Upload/prensa2002.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2004). More than twice as many Chinese
felt that economic development was more important than democracy, according to data
from a nationwide survey conducted by Tianjian Shi in 2002. E-mail from Tianjin Shi
(Aug. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
40. While there is more truth to these points than often allowed by the regime's
harshest critics, the question remains whether the limitations on civil and political
rights are indeed necessary, proportional or permitted under any reasonable interpreta-
tion of international law or even PRC law. See discussion infra Part II.B.6.
41. See ICERD, supra note 23, P.R.C. reservation to art. 22, http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/treaty2asp.htm (Feb. 5, 2002); CEDAW, supra note 24, P.R.C reserva-
tion to art. 29(1), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-coun-
try.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2004).
42. See CAT, supra note 25, P.R.C reservation to art. 29(1), Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations, http://
www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-reserve.htm (Nov. 2, 2004).
43. See Information Office of the State Council of China, Human Rights in China
supra note 34:
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Fifth, other states often use human rights as an excuse for strong-arm
politics and to interfere in China's domestic affairs. 4 4 Again, this is unde-
niably true to some extent, as demonstrated by even a cursory glance at the
dismal history of the United States' linkage of human rights to Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status, access to the WTO, intellectual property
rights, market access, and the valuation of Renminbi. 45 Time and again
the U.S. threatened to deny China MFN status allegedly because of human
rights violations, only to back off once China agreed to amend its intellec-
tual property rules or to provide greater market access for foreign compa-
nies. In 2004, the U.S. again sponsored a motion to censure China for
China is in favor of strengthening international cooperation in the realm of
human rights on the basis of mutual understanding and seeking a common
ground while reserving differences .... Therefore, the purpose of international
protection of human rights and related activities should be to promote normal
cooperation in the international field of human rights and international har-
mony, mutual understanding and mutual respect. Consideration should be
given to the differing views on human rights held by countries with different
political, economic and social systems, as well as different historical, religious
and cultural backgrounds. International human rights activities should be car-
ried on in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences,
mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding and cooperation.
China has always held that to effect international protection of human rights,
the international community should interfere with and stop acts that endanger
world peace and security, such as gross human rights violations caused by
colonialism, racism, foreign aggression and occupation, as well as apartheid,
racial discrimination, genocide, slave trade and serious violation of human
rights by international terrorist organizations. These are important aspects of
international cooperation in the realm of human rights and an arduous task
facing current international human rights protection activities.
44. See id.:
China has firmly opposed to [sic] any country making use of the issue of human
rights to sell its own values, ideology, political standards and mode of develop-
ment, and to [sic] any country interfering in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries on the pretext of human rights, the internal affairs of developing countries
in particular, and so hurting the sovereignty and dignity of many developing
countries. Together with other developing countries, China has waged a reso-
lute struggle against all such acts of interference, and upheld justice by speaking
out from a sense of fairness. China has always maintained that human rights
are essentially matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a country. Respect
for each country's sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are univer-
sally recognized principles of international law, which are applicable to all fields
of international relations, and of course applicable to the field of human rights
as well .... Using the human rights issue for the political purpose of imposing
the ideology of one country on another is no longer a question of human rights,
but a manifestation of power politics in the form of interference in the internal
affairs of other countries. Such abnormal practice in international human
rights activities must be eliminated. ...
•.. Hegemonism and power politics continue to exist and endanger world peace
and development. Interference in other countries' internal affairs and the push-
ing of power politics on the pretext of human rights are obstructing the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
45. See e.g., Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469 (2000) (discussing the linkage of most favored nation status
with China's human rights record).
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human rights violations during an election year in which President George
W. Bush was under severe pressure domestically to "do something" about
the rising trade deficit with China and the "outsourcing" of jobs. 46 In con-
trast, there was no motion against China in 2002 and 2003, when the need
for China's support in the U.S.-led global "war on terror" and in preventing
North Korea's development of nuclear weapons overrode other concerns. 47
Nor was there a motion in 1998, when Clinton was emphasizing construc-
tive engagement in contrast to the Republican position of confrontation
and containment, and China signed the ICCPR and ICESCR. While Euro-
pean and Asian countries generally have favored constructive dialogue with
China, the U.S. has oscillated between confrontation and engagement
depending on domestic politics and changing U.S. interests.
The sixth pillar is that many of the countries that criticize China for
human rights violations have their own human rights problems. China
and other Asian governments are right to point out that Western countries
have committed atrocities in other countries in the past and have their own
human rights problems. On the other hand, two wrongs do not make a
right. That the U.S. or any other country has problems of its own does not
justify human rights violations in China or excuse China from meeting its
obligations under PRC and international law. Each country must be held
accountable for its human rights violations and take the necessary steps to
stop such violations.
At the same time, the images of American soldiers abusing Iraqi pris-
oners 48 played into the hands of PRC propagandists seeking to deflect
attention from China's problems by highlighting the violations of others,
while fueling a popular backlash against American hypocrisy. Already sus-
picious of American motives and tired of U.S. moralizing, many Chinese,
like others around the world, felt the U.S. forfeited whatever little remain-
ing moral authority it might have once enjoyed to preach to other countries
about human rights violations. As with the television evangelist whose
flock deserts him after he turns up unexpectedly as the male lead in a
video of a drunken orgy in a shady brothel, U.S. actions have led even some
46. P. Parameswaran, Biggest U.S. Union Demands Trade Sanctions Against China,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 17, 2004. The United States was also upset over the failure
of China to make good on certain commitments negotiated the year before, and thus
wanted to send the signal that such "backsliding" would not be tolerated. See id.
47. The U.S. could not sponsor a motion in 2002 when it lost its seat on the Human
Rights Commission, although it could and did cosponsor a number of other resolutions
with its allies. While the government expressed disappointment that it was unable to
persuade its allies to put forth a motion, it is hard to believe that the United States could
not have managed to persuade a single friendly state to take the lead had it really wanted
to spend the political resources to do so. This is especially true given the close coopera-
tion between the U.S., the E.U., and other Western countries in the past, even allowing
that European states have been less keen on such high profile motions since 1995. In
any event, that no country was willing to sponsor a motion, even though many regularly
vote in favor of U.S.-sponsored motions, suggests some degree of political expediency
rather than pure principled commitment on the part of Western allies.
48. See, e.g., Christopher Cooper & Grege Jaffe, Under Fire: At Abu Ghraib, Soldiers
Faced Pressure to Produce Intelligence, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2004, at Al (discussing the
torture of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers).
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of the most ardent Chinese rights advocates to give up on the United States
and look elsewhere for role models. Although some have praised the U.S.
for exposing the problems and promising to hold those responsible
accountable, others ask how, in a country with a free press, widespread
torture could have gone unreported by the mainstream media for so long
despite several reports from human rights agencies and complaints from
Iraqis of abuse. Still others ask why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and others in the chain of command are still in power, and wonder whether
the U.S. will hold senior leaders accountable under standards that U.S.
officials have claimed apply to other countries, including the newly devel-
oped command and responsibility theories developed by the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Skeptics doubt
that the U.S. will apply the same standards to the U.S. soldiers that it advo-
cates for others, pointing out that prior to 9-11 the U.S. criticized China for
secret trials and other countries for military tribunals and yet has argued
such methods are justified when it comes to U.S. national security interests
and the war on terror. Early reports on disciplinary proceedings against
the U.S. soldiers responsible for prisoner abuse are not encouraging. Some
of the first soldiers to be held accountable will be tried by military courts
under the lesser of two forms of court-martial, which provides a maximum
penalty of one year in prison.49 Rightly or wrongly, these and other short-
comings in the U.S. on human rights issues lead many Chinese to feel that
China is subjected to a double standard.
II. Survey of Rights Performance
A. Physical Integrity Rights and Derogation of Rights in Times of
Emergency
As indicated in Figure 1.1, China received a level-4 ranking on the
Political Terror Scale (PTS) based on both Amnesty International and State
Department reports. 50 Level-4 indicates extensive political imprisonment
or a recent history of such imprisonment. Unlimited detention, with or
without a trial, for political views is accepted and "extended to large num-
bers." Execution, political murders, disappearances, brutality and torture
are "a common part of life." Despite its generality, terror affects those who
interest themselves in politics or ideas.
This ranking puts China in the unsavory company of such notorious
rights violators as Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, India, Sudan, and Indo-
nesia. Even North Korea and Cambodia received a better level-3 ranking
49. For instance, military policeman Specialist Jeremy Sivits was tried under a pro-
ceeding known as a special court-martial. The maximum penalties under such a proce-
dure are one year of confinement, a reduction in grade, forfeiture of pay for twelve
months, and a fine, along with discharge from the army for bad conduct. However,
Sivits could have been tried in a general court-martial, where he would have faced stiffer
penalties, including a longer term of confinement and a dishonorable discharge. See
Dexter Filkins, Guard's Abuse Trial to Be Public in Iraq; Arab News Organizations Will Be
Invited to Cover Court-Martial Starting May 19, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 11, 2004, at 1.
50. See infra Figure 1-1.
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based on Amnesty International reports. By way of comparison, few coun-
tries receive the worst level-5 rating. Examples include Afghanistan,
Colombia, with its ongoing war against drug lords, and Nepal, where the
government is currently fighting a civil war against Maoist rebels.
5 1
Does China merit such a dismal rating? Unlike the situation in some
of the other level-4 countries, there are very few if any politically motivated
extrajudicial killings or disappearances in the usual sense. The 2004 U.S.
State Department report did note that some dissidents without family
members were detained or committed to psychiatric wards, which the
report claimed amounted to disappearance. 5 2 However, commitment to
psychiatric wards is a far cry from the kind of widespread disappearances
that plagued Latin American countries where large numbers of people were
sent off to prisons to be tortured, many of them ending up dead in
unmarked mass graves.
China also imposes more capital punishments than any other nation,
and indeed more than the rest of the world combined. While Amnesty
International reported 1,639 confirmed death sentences in 2003, 53 one
National People's Congress (NPC) delegate suggested the number may be
as high as 10,000 per year. 54 Citing due process concerns, the U.S. State
Department suggests that the executions may in some cases border on
extrajudicial killings.5 5 Whatever the shortcomings in due process, a prob-
lem the government acknowledges and is seeking to address, 5 6 describing
the executions as extrajudicial killing is a stretch of the normal application
of that term as used in judging the rights performance of other countries.
One wonders whether the State Department would describe the executions
of criminals in the U.S. as extrajudicial killings given the various due pro-
cess failures that have contributed to numerous documented cases of inno-
cent people being executed, and to a disproportionately high rate of
51. Mark Gibney, Political Terror Scale Scores 1980-2003, at http://www.unca.edu/
politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney-docs/pts.xls (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2003: CHINA
(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm (Feb. 25,
2004).
53. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2004: CHINA (2004), available at http://
web.amnesty.org/report2004/chn-summary-eng (last visited Nov. 7, 2004). The report
also refers to an estimate based on unspecified internal Chinese Communist Party docu-
ments that on average 15,000 people per year were killed in the four years from
1997-2001, although this figure includes people killed during police operations includ-
ing pursuit and apprehension. The accuracy of the estimate is hard to evaluate without
knowing more about the inputs and assumptions that were relied on in coming up with
the final tally, or the source of the numbers.
54. Robert J. Saiget, China Executes 10,000 People a Year: NPC Delegate, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRESSE, Mar. 15, 2004, 2004 WL 73189726.
55. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
56. In response to due process concerns, China's Supreme Court is considering
revoking its delegation over final review to lower level courts. John Ruwitch, China Con-
siders Move to Regulate Executions, REUTERS NEWS, Mar. 10, 2004. Whether requiring
Supreme Court review would reduce significantly the number of capital sentences is
doubtful however. Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire: Well-Intentioned
but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in
China, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 991, 1050-51 n.10 (2004).
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executions of poor African American men, which have led the U.N. Special
Rapporteur and even the U.S. Supreme Court itself to describe the process
as arbitrary and racially discriminatory. 5 7
Torture remains a serious problem for a variety of reasons, despite
being prohibited by PRC law and considerable efforts to stamp it out.5 8
The scope of the problem is difficult to quantify however. The Supreme
People's Procuracy has acknowledged about 400 cases per year during the
1990s.5 9 Reports from human rights organizations and the overseas Falun
Gong organization describe torture as widespread and systemic,60 but
Amnesty International also describes torture in the United States as wide-
spread and systemic. 6 1 While relying on reports from the Falun Gong
organization is likely to present a false impression of the scope of the prob-
lem, 62 official reports surely understate the number of incidents of torture.
In recent years, the government has adopted various measures to address
the problem, including strengthening its anti-torture laws, increasing the
penalties for abusing detainees, restructuring police departments, requir-
ing prison guards to take professional exams every five years, appointing
section-level officers based on open competition, limiting who can be taken
to the police station for questioning and the length of the interrogations,
firing incompetent police and prosecuting more aggressively cases of abuse
of police powers. The government's 2004 Human Rights White Paper
notes that in 2003 the procuratorate prosecuted 259 cases of illegal deten-
tion, twenty-nine of illegal search, fifty-two of extorting confessions by tor-
ture, and thirty-two of abusing prisoners or detainees. 63 Nevertheless,
despite the recent progress, much remains to be done.6 4
China's poor PTS score may also reflect concerns with arbitrary deten-
tion. Human rights organizations have criticized as arbitrary, and called
57. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions, U.N. ESCOR Human Rights Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 34, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3 (1998) (citing U.S. Supreme Court opinions). In response,
U.S. legislators declared that such monitoring constituted U.N. harassment. Betsy Pisik,
Human Rights Probes Irk U.S., WASH. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at Al.
58. Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1094.
59. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ToRTURE-A
GROWING SCOURGE IN CHINA-TIME FOR ACTION (Feb. 2001) (describing the patterns of
torture), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA170042001english/$File/
ASA1700401.pdf..
60. Id. at 2.
61. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL 1, 17, 26, 43
(1998).
62. See Patsy Rahn, The Falun Gong: Beyond the Headlines, 17 CULTIC STUD. J 168,
170 (2000).
63. Information Office of the State Council of China, supra note 5, ch. III (judicial
Guarantee for Human Rights). See also Chan Siu-sin, Officers To Be Held To Account Over
Deaths of Detainees, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at 6 (discussing China's
tougher punishment of police brutality).
64. For recommendations, see Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra
note 56, at 1075-1103. See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, IMPUNITY FOR TORTURERS CON-
TINUES DESPITE CHANGES IN THE LAW (2000) (discussing ways the Chinese government
can continue to improve its human rights record).
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for the elimination of, all forms of administrative detention.65 In fact,
China employs several different types of administrative detention, some of
which exist in other countries. The various forms include: (i) administra-
tive detention up to fifteen days under the Security Administrative Punish-
ments Regulations; (ii) education through labor (ETL) (often referred to as
"re-education through labor," which has received most of the international
media's attention); (iii) detention for education used to detain prostitutes
and their clients; (iv) compulsory drug treatment; (v) forced detention in
psychiatric hospitals; (vi) detention of juveniles who commit criminal
offenses in juvenile centers, or of juveniles who commit lesser offenses in
work-study schools; and (vii) "stop and question" proceedings whereby
suspects may be detained for questioning for up to forty-eight hours.
66
Administrative detention is intended for minor offenses. Accordingly, it is
meant to be a lighter form of intervention with a greater emphasis on reha-
bilitation than the more punitive formal criminal law system. Supporters,
most of whom advocate significant reforms, argue that eliminating admin-
istrative detention will harm most of those the reformers are trying to help
by pushing many marginal offenders into the harsh and decidedly
unfriendly penal system, forcing them to live with hardened criminals, and
causing them to be stigmatized as convicts.
One of the main criticisms of the various forms of administrative
detention is that the failure to provide prompt judicial review of the deten-
tion decision violates international law. Article 9(4) of the ICCPR provides
that "[alnyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful."6 7 Although China has not yet rati-
fied the ICCPR, it has signed it, and is thus obligated not to act in ways that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. The U.N. Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention has objected to ETL because only an inde-
pendent judicial body can make the decision to deprive people of their
personal liberty.6 8 However, in some civil law countries, such as France
65. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE-A GROWING SCOURGE IN CHINA, supra note
59, at 42.
66. In June 2003, the State Council issued a regulation that put an end to detention
for repatriation, which was aimed at migrant workers. One of the more well-known
forms of administrative detention-shelter and investigation-was eliminated in con-
junction with revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law in 1996, although the revisions to
the CPL essentially incorporated the central aspects of shelter and investigation. See WEI
LUO, CHINESE LAw SERIES, VOLUME 3: THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND THE
CRIMINAL COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2000).
67. ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 9(4). The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
declared that authorities should not delay for more than a few days before bringing
detainees before a judge. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Art. 9) CCPR General Comment 8, 16th Sess., 1 2
(1982). It should be noted that the General Comments and case holdings of the ICCPR
Committee are non-binding.
68. The Working Group suggested that the Administrative Committee's review
would suffice if the Committee provides "safeguards equivalent to those of a court." U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report on the Visit to the People's Republic of
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and Switzerland, prosecutors rather than judges review the decision to
arrest and detain. The European Court of Human Rights has found that
this satisfies Article 5(3) of the European Convention, which requires that
the authorities immediately bring an arrested or detained person before a
tribunal empowered to exercise judicial functions. 69 Under PRC law, an
Administrative Committee made up of civil affairs, public security, and
labor officials decides whether to detain someone under ETL. In practice,
however, public security officers dominate the decision-making process.
Although Chinese citizens do not have habeas corpus rights, they can
challenge detention decisions through a number of channels, including
administrative litigation in a court before a judge, and administrative
reconsideration. They can also challenge detention decisions through
administrative supervision, and a system of letters and visits whereby dis-
gruntled citizens write letters to or visit judges, government officials, peo-
ple's congress delegates, or virtually anyone else they think may assist
them, including Party officials. Critics note that these channels are poor
substitutes for prompt judicial review, are ineffective and expensive, and
that detainees are often ignorant of their rights or lack the financial
resources to exercise them. Furthermore, in some cases the authorities
may abuse the detainees if they try to avail themselves of their legal rights.
The government has attempted to respond to these concerns by strengthen-
ing administrative reconsideration of public security decisions. Regula-
tions effective January 1, 2004 clarify the legal rights of detainees and
others to challenge public security decisions.70
While providing detainees the right of habeas corpus is desirable and
would bring the legal system more into line with international standards,
whether it would result in much relief for those detained is highly ques-
tionable. Chinese judges do not want to coddle criminals. On the con-
trary, most judges share the prevailing society-wide belief in the need to be
tough on criminals. Accordingly, the custodial judge's review in China
may be nothing more than a rubber stamp, as it is in other countries.71
China, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 8, 1 96(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.2 (1998).
However, the Group noted that the Committee did not currently provide such safe-
guards, and recommended review by a judge, perhaps according to the simplified proce-
dures set out in the CPL. Id. at ' 98.
69. Huber v. Switzerland, 188 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1990).
70. See Gongan Jiguan Banli Xingzheng Anjian Chengxu Guiding [Ministry of Public
Security Regulations for the Procedures for Administrative Reconsideration Cases Handled
by the Public Security] (effective Jan. 1, 2004) (on file with author).
71. See Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1015. Empiri-
cal studies show that, in England, detention is almost always authorized, and the idea of
a custody officer as an independent check has proven chimerical. Id. at n.85 (citing
ROBERT REINER THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE 181 (3d ed. 2000)). One study found that
detention was refused in only one case out of 4,246. Id. In France, authorization for
detention is granted routinely unless there is clearly no legal basis. Jacqueline Hodgson,
Suspects, Defendants and Victims in the French Criminal Process: The Context of Recent
Reform, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 781, 796-97 (2002). Furthermore, in France, the trans-
mission by police to procureur is given by phone or fax and is characterized as communi-
cation of information that does not require a response. Id. at 797. In Japan, judges
refused a prosecutor's request for detention only 110 times out of 77,545. Peerenboom,
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Judicial approval of detention decisions is even more likely in China given
the emphasis on social stability, rising crime rates, and the high propor-
tion of crimes committed by nonresidents.
Human rights groups also object to long pretrial detention under both
administrative detention procedures and the criminal law. In general, civil
law systems tend to allow longer periods of detention while the investiga-
tion is being carried out. As a result, supporters of the inquisitorial system,
with its emphasis on truth but long detention periods and limited role for
defense counsel, complain about what they see as a bias toward the adver-
sarial approach or even an American approach on the part of the ICCPR
Committee and human rights organizations. 7 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme
People's Procuracy has criticized public security officers for violating even
the generous deadlines for detention in the PRC, citing more than 300,000
cases between 1998 and 2002. Accordingly, on November 12, 2003, the
Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuracy, and the Ministry
of Public Security jointly issued the Notice on the Strict Enforcement of the
Criminal Procedure Law, and on the Conscientious Prevention and Correc-
tion of Excessive Detention. 73 The notice emphasized that procuratorates
below the provincial level must obtain the next higher level's permission
for any extension. The notice also encouraged judges to complete their
trials in a timely manner. Lower-level courts must obtain the High People's
Court's approval of all one-month extensions. The notice also warns
against attempts to circumvent the law, such as changing jurisdictions, or
withdrawing charges and then rearresting someone.
To facilitate implementation of the new rules, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate has set up special telephone lines and e-mail sites for filing
reports on extended detention by procuratorial organs. 74 More than
25,000 people subject to extended detention were released in 2003. 7 5 Not-
withstanding such changes, detainees may still be legally detained for
extended periods under the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). 7 6
Another major complaint about both administrative detention and the
formal criminal process is the lack of due process rights. Administrative
Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1015 n.85 (citing DAVID T. JOHNSON,
THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE 62 (2002)). Judges also denied the prosecutor's request for
an arrest warrant on average only once every 1233 times. Nevertheless, the low percent-
age of refusals does not mean that the process is entirely useless or ineffective. The
procedure's existence itself may send a signal to prosecutors that arbitrary arrests are
unacceptable and thus may cause prosecutors to exercise more self-restraint. Peer-
enboom, supra note 56, at 1015 n.85.
72. See ERIKA FAIRCHILD, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 125-27 (1st ed.
2000); Hodgson, supra note 71 (noting that in France, detention for up to two years is
possible for those subject to imprisonment or a fine of 25,000FF or more, and up to four
years for the most serious offenses).
73. Information Office of the State Council of China, supra note 5, ch. III (Judicial
Guarantee for Human Rights).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. For a discussion of deadlines in the PRC, see Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into
the Fire, supra note 56, at 1020.
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detainees are entitled to some due process protections, though they do not
enjoy all of those provided under the CPL. However, in practice, many of
the due process rights provided by the CPL to criminal defendants are not
honored.7 7
One proposal for reform would do away with administrative detention
as such, bringing offenses now subject to administrative detention into the
formal criminal process. However, as this would result in a huge influx of
cases into an already overburdened criminal justice system, most offenses
would be subject to simplified and summary procedures recently intro-
duced into the formal criminal system. Similar to plea-bargaining in other
countries, these procedures require a confession in exchange for leniency.
Unfortunately, like plea-bargaining, the need to confess to obtain leniency
diminishes significantly the value of the various rights and procedural pro-
tections afforded to the criminally accused, as the accused must forego
such rights in the rush to cut a deal with the police and prosecutors.
There are undeniably serious due process concerns both in adminis-
trative detention and formal criminal cases. However, it is important to
distinguish between arbitrary detention in a procedural and in a substan-
tive sense. Administrative and criminal detentions are rarely arbitrary in
the sense that substantive grounds are lacking for arrest and conviction.
Nevertheless, human rights reports often depict the detentions as arbitrary
because they allegedly involve persons engaging in political activities, usu-
ally peacefully, that many would claim are protected by domestic and inter-
national law. Such detainees then are characterized as political prisoners
of conscience, another key component of the PTS index.
Although human rights organizations regularly highlight the use of
administrative detention to detain political dissidents, academic experts
have noted that the purpose of administrative detentions has changed over
the last two decades, and that ETL and other forms of administrative deten-
tion are used primarily to deal with petty criminals.78 In fact, less than 1%
of those subject to ETL could be considered political prisoners, excluding
Falun Gong disciples charged with violations under the generally applica-
ble criminal laws. Even if one includes all Falun Gong cases, the percent-
age of political prisoners subject to ETL is only around 2%.79
Similarly, there are at most 500-600 prisoners serving sentences for
the now repealed crime of counterrevolution. 80 While many rights organi-
zations continue to press for their release, whether someone convicted
under a valid law at the time should be released if the definition of the
crime is changed or the crime is repealed is controversial. Such a person
77. Id.
78. See Chen Ruihua, Laodong Jiaoyang De Lishi Kaocha Yu Fansi [Survey of and
Reflections on the History of ETL], in LIXING YU ZHIXU: ZHONGGUO LAODONG JIAOYANG
ZHIDU YANJIU [RATIONALITY AND ORDER: RESEARCH ON CHINA'S EDUCATION THROUGH LABOR
SYSTEM] 1, 9, 13 (Chu Huaizhi et al. eds., 2002).
79. Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1000 n.34.
80. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
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would not be released under U.S. law.8 1 In this case, most if not all of
those convicted for the crime of counterrevolution would also be guilty
under the new crime of endangering the State that replaced the old crime
of counterrevolution. In fact, endangering the State may actually be easier
to prove as there is no requirement to show subjective intent as in the case
of counterrevolution. While counterrevolution was a frequently invoked
charge in the politicized Mao era, accounting for almost 60% of the crimes
in some years, today endangering the State accounts for less than 0.5% of
crimes.8 2
In addition, Amnesty International claims "scores of people" are still
imprisoned for Tiananmen-related activities, although it has identified only
fifty of them.83 The head of Human Rights in China estimated that num-
ber to be about 130, while acknowledging the true number is unknown. 84
The U.S. State Department Report, citing unspecified "credible sources,"
suggested the number of people still in prison "for their activities during
the June 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations" may be as high as 2000 ,85
although that seems highly unlikely as few people were given sentences of
fifteen years or more and of those, some would have been released on
parole. Of course, the government claims that they are not imprisoned for
their political views but for violating generally applicable criminal laws
such as attempting to overthrow the State or disturbing public order. 86
Accepting their characterization as political prisoners and the highest of all
the guesstimates of their numbers, they would constitute about 0.1% of the
total prison population of 2 million, keeping in mind that China's incarcer-
ation rate is much lower than that of many other countries, particularly the
United States (184 per 100,000 for China versus 701 for the United States).
Simply put, politics is generally not an issue in most criminal cases.
To be sure, there are many problems with both administrative detention
81. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW 121 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that the United
States' common law rule states that someone whose conviction is final is not released if
the criminal statute on which the person is convicted is subsequently repealed).
82. Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and Its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J.
AsiAN L. 1, 67 (2000).
83. Amnesty International, The Shadow of Tiananmen, WIRE (Amnesty Interna-
tional's monthly magazine), June 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/June
2004/China (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
84. See Sharon Hom, Executive Director of Human Rights in China, Testimony Before
the United States Congressional-Executive Commission on China (June 3, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/060304/hom.php (last visited Nov. 8,
2004).
85. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52. Several pages later, the report states that
Amnesty International has identified 211 persons still in prison or on medical parole,
and rather unhelpfully "identifies" the credible source for the higher 2000 numbers as
"other NGOs." Id.
86. Some protesters burned vehicles and destroyed property, and some assaulted
and killed soldiers and police. Therefore it is possible that some could still be in prison
for such offenses, although most would have been released by now except for those held
for the most serious offenses, for which some would have been sentenced to life in
prison. Amnesty International is careful not to label all of those in detention for
Tiananmen related offenses as prisoners of conscience. See Amnesty International, The
Shadow of Tiananmen, supra note 83.
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and the formal criminal system.8 7 I do not mean to trivialize Falun Gong
or political dissident cases. These cases may severely harm individuals,
may involve gross injustices, or may deter others from exercising their legit-
imate rights provided under PRC and international law.,, However, we
need to have some sense of the size of the problem. Taking China's popula-
tion of 1.3 billion as the basis, and erring on the high side by assuming as
correct the overseas Falun Gong organization's estimate of 20,000 prison-
ers of conscience, the total rate of detention would be 0.0015%.89 Twenty
thousand likely overstates the actual number by four to five times, even
accepting a liberal definition of "political prisoner." But even assuming
20,000 such prisoners, this seemingly "large number" is relatively small
given the size of the total population. It is difficult to see how China can be
described as a country in which execution, political murders, disappear-
ances, brutality, and torture "are a common part of life," as required for a
level-4 PTS rating.90
1. Martial Law, Strike Hard at Crime Campaigns, and Terrorism
The ICCPR, which China has not yet ratified, allows for the declara-
tion of a state of emergency only when the life of the nation is
threatened. 91 Principle 39 of the non-binding Siracusa Principles inter-
prets "threat to the life of the nation" to mean that a danger (i) is actual or
imminent, (ii) is exceptional, (iii) concerns the entire population, (iv)
threatens the whole or part of the State's territory, and (v) threatens the
population's physical integrity, the State's political independence or territo-
rial integrity, or the organized life of the community. 92 Even then, states
cannot derogate from all human rights. Derogation is not allowed with
respect to the right to life, the protection against torture and cruel and
inhuman punishment, the right not to be held in servitude or slavery, the
right not to be imprisoned because of inability to fulfill a contract, recogni-
tion as a person before the law, or freedom of thought, conscience, and
87. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its December 1997 visit report
recommended that the government amend its Criminal Procedure Law to state expressly
that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It also recommended that the
government define precisely the crime of "endangering national security," and incorpo-
rate in the criminal law an exception to the effect that the law will not regard as criminal
any peaceful activity in the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. See U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
supra note 68, at 109. See also Peerenboom, supra note 56, (discussing the problems
with the Chinese administrative detention policy).
88. Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1000 n.34. Of
course, the authorities and others who feel the restrictions are justified would see the
fact that many others are deterred from such behavior as desirable-one of the main
purposes for the punishments is to deter what they see as unacceptable behavior.
89. This figure includes prisoners of conscience of all stripes in all forms of
detention.
90. See infra Figure 1.1.
91. ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 4.
92. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 3, 7 (1985).
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religion.93
Global practice, however, is considerably different. Countries gener-
ally react to threats to security by restricting rights.94 The "margin of
appreciation" afforded countries is greatest when it comes to national
security.95 In upholding the British government's derogation of due pro-
cess rights as necessary to control civil strife in Northern Ireland, the
ECHR stated:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for
"the life of [its] nation", to determine whether that life is threatened by a
"public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to
overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact
with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in prin-
ciple in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the
presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations
necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15 § 1 [of the European Human
Rights Convention] leaves those authorities a wide margin of apprecia-
tion .... It is certainly not the Court's function to substitute for the British
Government's assessment any other assessment of what might be the most
prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism.96
The Court also noted that it must not base its decision on twenty-twenty
hindsight, but must consider the government's decisions and actions in
light of the circumstances at the time.9 7
A wide margin of appreciation does not mean unlimited discretion, of
course, and a major concern of China's critics was the country's handling
of the Tiananmen Square crisis. China declared martial law in parts of the
country in 1989. Critics argue that the peaceful student demonstrations
were not an adequate ground to declare martial law. But even if martial law
was justified, critics argue that the decision to use force to clear the square
in Tiananmen was not justified, and that excessive force was used. The
disclosure of recent documents revealed differences of opinion among gov-
ernment leaders, although the final decision was made after lengthy discus-
sion in which all sides had an opportunity to present their views. 98 The
93. ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 4(2) (prohibiting the derogation of rights from arts.
6, 7, 8 (1 1-2), 11, 15, 16 & 18).
94. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REv.
455, 460 (2003) (noting that Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War;
that during World War I, 2200 people were prosecuted and more than 1000 convicted
under the Espionage and Sedition Acts; that the right of habeas corpus was suspended
and martial law imposed in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor; and that during the McCarthy
era, the Supreme Court in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
415 (1950) upheld a federal law that required labor union members to sign an oath
swearing they were not members of the Communist Party and did not believe in the
overthrow of the United States).
95. See generally HowARD CHARLES YouRow, THE MARGIN or- APPRECIATION DOCTRINE
IN THE DYNAMICS oF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (discussing the
development and evolution of the margin of appreciation doctrine that grants govern-
ments greater leeway when complying with international human rights standards).
96. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 78-79, 82 (1978).
97. Id. at 82.
98. See THE TIANANMEN PAPERS 318-64 (Andy Nathan et al. eds., 2001).
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announcement was then made by Li Peng, as Premier and head of the State
Council, in accordance with constitutional requirements. Today, public
opinion remains divided in China about the government's policy regarding
Tiananmen, in contrast to the nearly universal condemnation abroad.
Some Chinese citizens see the government's response as excessively brutal
but necessary to regain control and ensure an extended period of stability
that has lasted until today, allowing China to progress economically while
keeping the lid on social unrest from those who have lost out in the transi-
tion to a market economy. 99 They note that the students and other demon-
strators had been repeatedly warned to leave the square and yet refused to
do so despite being fully aware that martial law had been declared and
military troops were prepared to clear the square by force if necessary.
Others, led by those who participated in the demonstrations or lost loved
ones, continue to call for justice and a reversal of the government's verdict
on Tiananmen as political turmoil that disrupted social order and eco-
nomic development. However, the government has refused to reconsider
its official position. 10 0
A second area of concern for critics has been the cyclical campaigns to
"strike hard" at crime (yanda) which, although not involving a formal dec-
laration of emergency, have led to human rights abuses and the curtail-
ment of rights for the criminally accused. Government officials and court
leaders consistently emphasize that the strike-hard campaign should be
executed in accordance with the law. Nevertheless, the endless campaigns
no doubt put pressure on police officers to make additional arrests, on
prosecutors to prosecute more often and charge more serious crimes, and
on judges to convict and issue heavier sentences within the range permit-
ted by law. Goaded on by a public widely supportive of the war on crime,
police, prosecutors, and judges, in their zeal to strike hard at crime, some-
times exceed the limits imposed by law.1 1
A third area of concern is that the "war on terrorism" may be under-
mining progress on rights in China, as it has elsewhere. China beefed up
its anti-terrorism laws by amending the Criminal Law in 2001.102 Beijing
99. See Richard Spencer, Tiananmen: Victory for Capitalism, SPECTATOR (London),
June 12, 2004, available at http://www.spectator.co.uk/article.php?table=old&section
current&issue=2004-06-12&id=4707&searchText (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
100. Although the government's refusal is primarily driven by domestic political con-
cerns, one complication is that reversing the official verdict might give rise to issues of
civil and criminal liability for former state leaders such as Li Peng and strengthen the
hand of those who are trying to have them tried abroad under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) or controversial international laws providing for universal criminal jurisdic-
tion. See Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical"
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L.
REv. 473, 473-74 (2002) (discussing the filing of an ATCA action naming former state
leader Li Peng as the defendant).
101. Amnesty International, China: 'Striking Harder' Than Ever Before, Jul. 6, 2001,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA170222001 (last visited Nov.
8, 2004). For similar complaints in the United States, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 61, at 3 (claiming that the war on crime has contributed to more aggressive
policing).
102. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2003: CHINA, supra note 2.
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has identified the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist
organization, citing more than 200 violent incidents in Xinjiang between
1990 and 2001, which resulted in 162 deaths and 440 injuries. 10 3 In a
move that human rights groups have criticized, the United States sup-
ported the designation of ETIM as a terrorist organization, with the U.N.
Security Council following suit.10 4 In December 2003, Beijing added to
the list the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the East Turke-
stan Information Center (ETIC), and the World Uighur Youth Congress
(WUYC), as well as eleven individuals. ETIC and WUYC are based in Ger-
many. All four groups openly advocate for East Turkestan's independence,
although they generally do not endorse violence, at least publicly. 10 5 How-
ever, ETLO members have been involved in bombings and shootouts,
according to the U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Office.
Human rights groups have accused China of taking advantage of the
recent global concern with terrorism to restrict the rights of Uighars and
Tibetans. While it is clear that there have been a number of arrests in
recent years, the details are often murky, with even the basic facts fre-
quently contested. 10 6
For instance, Uighar Shaheer Ali was sentenced to death in March
2003 for the "illegal manufacture, trading and possession of weapons and
explosives," separatism, and "organizing and leading a terrorist organiza-
tion," namely ETIM and the East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah.' 0 7 The
court claimed Ali's organization took part in a beating, smashing, and loot-
ing incident in Yining on February 5, 1997. However, Amnesty Interna-
tional claims that independent eyewitnesses reported the incident was a
peaceful demonstration calling for equal treatment for Uighars that became
violent after security forces used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the
103. Information Office of the State Council of China, 'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces
Cannot Get Away with Impunity, 45 BEIJING REV., Jan. 31, 2002, at 15.
104. Colin Mackerras, Why Terrorism Bypasses China's Far West, AsiA TIMES, Apr. 23,
2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD23Ad03.html.
105. THE U.S. STATE DEP'T COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
2001, at 17 (2002) (describing ETLO as a cause for concern, along with the East Turke-
stan Islamic Party, which was founded in the early 1980s with the goal of establishing
an independent state of Eastern Turkestan and advocates armed struggle). See also
David S. Cloud & IanJohnson, Friend or Foe, in Post-9/11 World, Chinese Dissidents Pose
U.S. Dilemma- Uighur Nationalists Have Peaceful, Violent Wings; Deciding Who Is a
Threat- 'Omar Is Not a Bomb Thrower', WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at Al (noting that an
ETIM member acknowledged the group's ties to Osama bin Laden and the group's use of
violent means to overthrow the PRC government).
106. See, e.g., Ethnic Tension Rising in Southern Xinjiang, Says Official, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Aug. 2, 2004 (reporting an increase in ethnic and religious tensions in southern
Xinjiang and the arrests of seventy-five people, including eight for endangering the state,
and others for other offenses including "illegal religious activities"), available at 2004
WL 88218144.
107. Amnesty International, China: Further Information on Fear of Forcible Return,
Oct. 24 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170372003?open&of=
ENG-393 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). See also Executed Uyghur Refugee Left Behind Tapes
Detailing Chinese Torture, RADIO FREE ASIA, Oct. 23, 2003, http://english.epochtimes.
com/news/3-10-24/11841.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
Cornell International Law Journal
protesters. 10 8 In an interview, Ali claimed he was a member of the Eastern
Turkestan Islamic Reform Party, which he described as a nonmilitant
organization.10 9 He also claimed he was repeatedly tortured while in
custody.
Wang Bingzhang, a U.S. based dissident, was sentenced to life impris-
onment by a Shenzhen court after being convicted of espionage and lead-
ing a terrorist group. The Guangdong High Court upheld the judgment.
The Shenzhen court's judgment and the official press reported in detail the
evidence against Wang.11 0 The judgment presented a lengthy review of the
evidence, including witness testimony, documents from the National
Security Bureau, and Wang's own publications and Internet writings, to
show that Wang received payments for providing military secrets to
Taiwanese intelligence organs, advocated terrorism through publications
and on the Internet, plotted to blow up the PRC Embassy in Thailand, and
planned an explosion in China on a national holiday.111
The case attracted the interest of the international community when
Wang was apparently abducted from Vietnam along with Zhang Qi and
Yue Wu, both of whom were later released by PRC authorities. Beijing
claims PRC security officers rescued Wang after he was kidnapped. The
U.N. Commissioner on Human Rights stated that his disappearance, arrest
and imprisonment violated international standards." 2 Wang went on a
hunger strike to protest extended periods of solitary confinement and
political education sessions three times a day. 1 13
In a case that has led to considerable criticism abroad, Tibetan Lob-
sang Dondrub was executed for a series of bombings in Sichuan in 2002,
while Buddhist teacher Tenzin Deleg was sentenced to death with a two-
year reprieve. 14 The court found Lobsang Dondrub guilty of incitement to
split the country and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and
108. Amnesty International, No Justice for the Victims of the 1997 Crackdown in Gulja,
ASA 17/011/2003, Feb. 4, 2003 (also citing unconfirmed reports that police fired into
the crowd, and tortured and killed some of those citizens detained in relation to the
incident).
109. Amnesty International, No Justice for the Victims of the 1997 Crackdown in Gulja,
supra note 107.
110. Wang Bingzhang Convicted of Terrorist Activities and Espionage, XINHUANET, Feb.
10, 2003, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-02/10/content_722148.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004).
111. The court's judgment is available at http://www.cdjp.org/wbz/panjueshu.htm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2004). See also Hunger Strike Helps Improve Conditions for Jailed
Chinese Dissident- Report, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 27, 2004 (discussing Wang's jail
conditions).
112. Phillip P. Pan, China Tries Dissident out of View; Permanent Resident of U.S. Held
as Spy, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at A8.
113. US Resident Jailed in China Threatens Hunger Strike, BBC MONITORmNG INTERNA-
TIONAL REPORTS, Dec. 11, 2003.
114. See Horn, supra note 84; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, The
Execution of Dobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts and
the Debate on Legality, Feb. 10, 2003, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/lobsang.php
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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Tenzig Deleg guilty of incitement to separatism. 1 15 PRC authorities claim
that both defendants confessed to the crimes. However, Tenzig Deleg
denies having confessed and reportedly shouted his innocence at trial
before being silenced. 16 Lobsang Dondrub reportedly also refused to con-
fess. Longsang Dondrub was executed immediately after the Sichuan High
Court upheld the Intermediate Court's verdict, even though Beijing offi-
cials had promised a U.S. government delegation that the Supreme Court
would review the case." 7 Other due process concerns included allega-
tions that the defendants were not allowed to choose their own counsel and
that they were tortured during the investigations. Critics of the decision
note that Tenzig Deleg has a history of social activism, including renovating
monasteries and establishing charitable organizations for orphans and the
elderly, and is a staunch supporter of the Dalai Lama, but that he has no
record of political protest. A government spokesperson responded to for-
eign criticism by claiming that the case was handled according to law and
that courts in any other country would punish criminals who undermine
state security and engage in terrorism." 8
B. Civil and Political Rights
During the Mao era, Chinese citizens were afraid to discuss political
issues with their family members, much less in public with foreigners.
Today, political discussion is commonplace whenever friends and col-
leagues meet socially, while visitors are often surprised at how readily even
first-time acquaintances are to criticize the government, disparage top lead-
ers or call for faster political reforms. Academics regularly publish works
that criticize the government and call for greater democratization and polit-
ical reforms. Legal scholars and government officials continue to press for
constitutional reforms including greater judicial independence. The
media, forced to respond to consumer interest as a result of market
reforms, are ever more critical and free-wheeling.
At the same time, the government continues to impose-in some cases
ruthlessly and with little regard for legal niceties or international opinion-
severe limitations on civil and political freedoms when the exercise of such
rights is deemed by the government to threaten the regime and social sta-
bility. The lines of what is permissible and what is not are clear and fixed
in some areas, but vague and fluid in others. The time, place and manner
of expression are as important as the subject matter. What may be toler-
ated in some circumstances may be subject to greater restriction when
there are certain aggravating factors present, such as attempts to organize
across regions or to hook up with foreign organizations.
115. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, supra note 114, at 2.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Lisa Rose Weaver, China Defends Tibetan Execution, Jan. 28, 2003 (quoting Chi-
nese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/28/china.execution/index.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2004).
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Accordingly, China receives a very low score on civil and political
rights-ranking in the lowest 10% of all countries on the World Bank's
voice and accountability index.119 The voice and accountability scale
includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political
process, civil liberties and political rights, including the right to participate
in the selection of government representatives and the independence of the
media. 120 As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, China scores poorly relative to
many countries in Asia and elsewhere, and even does poorly relative to its
level of economic development, as Table 5.1 shows.t 2 1
A closer examination of law and practice with respect to discrete civil
and political rights reveals that the government is faced with difficult
issues in several areas. First, however, a methodological note of caution:
obtaining reliable, comprehensive information about many civil and politi-
cal rights cases is difficult. Reports from human rights organizations and
foreign government entities often provide a wealth of valuable information,
frequently obtained under difficult circumstances that prevent more in-
depth investigation. Nevertheless, the reports generally suffer from a cur-
sory or one-sided presentation of facts, the lack of citation to sources for
factual claims, reliance on hearsay evidence and unconfirmed information,
and no or little legal analysis, with citations to relevant PRC or interna-
tional law as rare as a snowman in the tropics. Most reports dismiss sum-
marily the arguments of the government and prosecutors about violations
of PRC law, underestimate the complexity of the legal issues involved, and
assume an expansive and liberal interpretation of civil and political rights
that is often contested as a matter of international law. They rarely attempt
to place the individual cases selected within a broader comparative, histori-
cal, economic, or political context or include any statistical analysis that
would give any indication of the representativeness of the cases. In short,
many of the reports are more advocacy for a particular viewpoint than an
impartial legal analysis of the merits of the decision.
On the other hand, although Supreme Court regulations require that
most trials be open to the public and that courts publish judgments, politi-
cally sensitive cases are often closed to the public or are limited to a few
observers, on the grounds that they involve state secrets and issues of
national security. Nor are court judgments and documents submitted by
the procuracy and defense counsel readily accessible, and in some cases
they are not accessible at all. The facts as reported in those judgments that
are available are often dramatically at odds with the facts as reported by
human rights organizations or defense counsel, or subject to very different
interpretations. Several cases involve serious due process concerns,
119. See infra Figure 2.1.
120. The following data is obtained from DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MAT-
TERs III: GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FROM 1996-2002 (2003), available at http://info.world
bank.org/governance/kkz2002/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
121. See infra Figure 2.1 & Table 5.1. East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage
generally outperform the average country on good governance indicators except for civil
and political rights. See Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 21.
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including allegations of torture and forced confessions, which undermine
the credibility of the prosecutors' claims and the courts' judgments. As a
result, it is at times all but impossible to verify the facts and to assess the
merits of the court's judgment as a matter of international and domestic
law.
Nevertheless, by piecing together data from various sources on con-
tested cases, and studying a number of cases with uncontested facts, there
is sufficient information to obtain a reasonably accurate view of where the
limits of freedom exist in practice. Given the size and diversity of China,
reliance on a small number of select cases inevitably gives rise to questions
about representativeness. Accordingly, I provide summary results of sev-
eral cases for each type of right and for particular issues to establish the
boundaries of individual freedom in practice today.
1. Freedom of Thought: State Sponsorship of Ideological Orthodoxy and
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
The government unapologetically endorses socialism, including in the
preamble to the constitution, which guarantees adherence to the four cardi-
nal principles: the leading role of the Party, adherence to socialism, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong thought, now buttressed by the "Three Represents." The Three Rep-
resents are Jiang Zemin's attempt to update socialism in accordance with
today's market economy by shifting the focus away from the proletariat to
the "advanced productive forces," including the private sector and entrepre-
neurs, in order to develop an "advanced and modern culture" and serve the
fundamental interests of the broad majority of citizens. 122 Whereas Jiang's
formulation highlights that some will lose out in the transition to the mar-
ket economy, the Hu and Wen regime, perhaps in an effort to distinguish
itself from the Jiang regime, have paid attention to social injustice and the
needs of the least well-off in society. Significantly, however, the focus of
both regimes is on the interests of the majority of the people, which the
Party will continue to determine and serve, not on the rights of the individ-
ual interpreted as a countermajoritarian trump on the interests of society
as a whole. Although the rhetorical commitment to socialism remains,
socialist ideology is now less coherent, more widely contested, and much
less of a factor in everyday life. 123
The government has also promoted the development of a socialist spir-
itual civilization, consisting of attacks on wholesale westernization and
bourgeois liberalism, combined with blatant appeals to nationalism, cele-
bration of the importance of culture and art, praise for Confucianism, and
exhortation of citizens to ask not what the nation can do for them but what
they can do for the nation and their fellow citizens. Party efforts to bring
about this new socialist spiritual civilization have been largely unsuccess-
122. See generally XANFA [P.R.C.] [Constitution, 1982] preamble.
123. See generally PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TowARD RULE OF LAw, supra
note 39, 188-238.
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ful. While many Chinese respond to the nationalist component of the spir-
itual civilization plank, few take seriously the emphasis on socialism.
Appeals to Confucianism have also failed to take hold, in part because
of the contested nature of Confucianism, which has been interpreted to
support both liberal and authoritarian positions. Accordingly, the govern-
ment is reluctant to appeal to Confucianism given efforts by some New
Confucians to appeal to parts of the vast Confucian corpus to support
democracy and human rights. Conversely, reformers are wary to make too
much of Confucianism given that historically it was undeniably sexist, elit-
ist, and inegalitarian, and failed to provide popular sovereignty or protect
even the most fundamental civil and political liberties such as freedom of
thought and speech. Thus, legal reformers wondered whether Jiang's
endorsement of rule of virtue (dezhi) signified a retreat from rule of law
and a return to rule of man (renzhi), although official statements are une-
quivocal that the emphasis on virtuous officials is meant to supplement
rather than to replace rule of law. With its Confucian overtones, the rule of
virtue policy is another in a long string of campaigns to change the moral
character of citizens and officials. Addressed to citizens, it is an attempt to
fill the moral and spiritual vacuum that exists with something other than
materialism and money-worship. Addressed to officials, it is an attempt to
reduce corruption and create an honest corps of public servants.
China's educational policies continue to call for mandatory classes in
politics and morals. When challenged by the Special Rapporteur on educa-
tion, the government spokesperson replied that all governments inculcate
political and moral values through the education system. 124 China is no
different. A heated dispute also arose over religious education, as China
prohibits religious schools and teaches atheism in school.' 2 5
Mindful of a long history of religious movements toppling dynasties,
growing problems with "cults" around the world, and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in recent years, China imposes content-based as well as
time, place, and manner restrictions on religious beliefs and practices. 126
Freedom of religion is confined to five recognized religions-Buddhism,
Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism-and registered places of
124. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, U.N. ESCOR
Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/G/
16 (2003).
125. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
126. Cf. Theo van Boven, Advances and Obstacles in Building Understanding and
Respect Between People of Diverse Religions and Beliefs, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 437, 442 (1991)
(estimating that in the 1980s, twenty-five "regional or civil wars were based to a signifi-
cant degree on disputes evolving at least in part from religious beliefs"). See generally
MARIA HsLA CHANG, FA1UN GONG, THE END OF DAYS (2004) (discussing the Falun Gong
movement and the government's legal response); Anne S.Y. Cheung, In Search of a The-
ory of Cult and Freedom of Religion in China: The Case of Falun Gong, 13 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'YJ. 1, 13-17 (2004); Carolyn Evans, Chinese Law and the International Protection of
Religious Freedom, 44J. CHURCH & ST. 749 (2002) (discussing the Chinese government's
official policy toward religion).
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worship. 12 7 All religious groups are required to register with the State
Administration of Religious Affairs. Proselytizing by foreigners is not
allowed, although in practice individual foreign citizens need not hide their
faith, and foreigners may preach in registered churches or at the invitation
of registered social groups.128 Mormons and Jews are also allowed to
practice.
The government claims that there are more than 100,000 venues for
religious activities, and a 300,000 member clergy. 1 29 In addition, there are
more than 3000 national and local religious organizations, plus seventy-
four religious colleges and schools. 130 Each religion is allowed to publish
its own books and magazines. There are 30 million printed copies of the
Bible.' 3 ' The government provides funding to build and maintain places
of worship, supports members of the clergy, offers preferential tax treat-
ment to registered religious groups, and pays for trips to Mecca for some
Muslims.
In addition to restricting belief to the five authorized religions, the gov-
ernment has imposed content-based restrictions on "cults" and abnormal
religious beliefs and practices. The crackdown on Falun Gong has received
the most attention abroad, largely because of the tireless if one-sided efforts
of the overseas Falun Gong organization. 13 2 The government has justified
the ban by citing the sect's increasingly political agenda, organized demon-
strations including one in which more than 10,000 people suddenly sur-
rounded Zhongnanhai (the seat of the government), 133 and the deaths of
more than 1,600 adherents, including the self-immolation of five people,
one of them a twelve-year old girl.' 34 Senior government leaders were
apparently divided on how to deal with the sect, with some arguing for
prosecution of particular individuals for violation of generally applicable
criminal laws rather than an outright ban on the group. Whatever the mer-
its on the substantive issue, the crackdown led to serious due process viola-
tions, including torture and deaths while in detention. 13 5
The government has also outlawed a number of other sects, claiming
their leaders lack theological training, preach the coming of the apocalypse
or Holy War, exploit members for financial gain, or commit other viola-
tions of generally applicable laws such as rape, assault, and tax fraud.
13 6
127. Evans, supra note 126, at 758.
128. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
129. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. II (Civil and Political Rights).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Rahn, supra note 62, at 170.
133. Id. at 178.
134. PEERENBOOM, CHINA's LONG MARcH TowARD RuLE OF LAW, supra note 39, at 91,
93.
135. For a more extensive discussion, see id. at 91-101; CHANG, supra note 126, at
124.
136. See Joseph Kahn, Violence Taints Religion's Solace for China's Poor, NEW YORK
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at Al (describing violence between religious sects and abusive
behavior on part of sect leaders).
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The government has defended the policies by citing similar restrictions on
cults in other countries.' 3 7 Unfortunately, international law provides little
useful guidance in distinguishing normal from abnormal religious activi-
ties and legitimate groups from cults. 1
3 8
The government's response to unapproved "house churches" has not
been uniform. Some have been closed, while others are allowed to operate,
depending on their size, relationship to the official church, links to foreign
organizations or other organizations, and their general capacity to foment
social unrest.13 9 Catholic priests aligned with Rome have run into
problems because of conflicts over issues where the views of the Pope con-
flict with government policy, most notably with respect to family planning,
birth control, and abortion. Authorities have also reportedly forced
Catholics in Hebei, where more than half of China's Catholics are located,
to follow the Patriotic Church or face fines, job losses, detention, or the
removal of their children from school. 140 Leaders of Protestant house
churches have also been detained. 14 1
Buddhism is increasingly popular in China, and generally accepted by
the government, although the government remains concerned that Bud-
dhist beliefs and practices will support a movement for independence in
Tibet. Buddhism and politics were fused historically in theocratic Tibet
and remain closely aligned today. Tibetan Buddhists outside of the
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) enjoy greater freedom, and even in
Tibet religious practices are generally accepted provided they do not serve
as a base for political opposition. 142 Accordingly, the government contin-
ues to oversee the daily operations of major monasteries, and to insist that
Party members and senior government employees adhere to atheism and
not support the Dalai Lama. In addition, Tibetan monks and nuns have
been sentenced on charges of endangering the State, separatism, and
undermining the unity of nationalities.' 43 Human rights groups protest
that they are being detained for nonviolent political practices. The Tibet
Information Network (TIN) estimated that the Chinese government has
imprisoned approximately 150 Tibetans on political charges, 75% of
137. Evans, supra note 126, at 762-63.
138. The international human rights regime and national governments have struggled
over how to distinguish normal from abnormal religious activities and legitimate groups
from "cults." PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH ToWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
95-96. Evans, supra note 126, at 763-65.
139. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Barry Sautman, "Cultural Genocide" and Tibet, 38 TEX. INT'L LJ. 173, 208-14
(2003).
143. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52. China forbids hate speech. Articles 149 and
250 of the Criminal Law prohibit "incitement of national enmity or discrimination" by
any organization or individual. See United Nations, Committee on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Starts Adopting Conclusions on Report of China, Aug. 8, 2001, http://
www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/8A6FCEB51AD7895EC1256AA30029F7D5?
opendocument (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
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whom are monks or nuns. 14 4 In a public relations disaster, the authorities
replaced the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama to be the eleventh reincarna-
tion of the Panchen Lama with their own candidate.
1 45
The government has also taken steps to ensure that Islam does not
become a source for political instability. The government has prohibited
the teaching of Islam to children under eighteen, and prevented preaching
by imams whose sermons are considered too fundamentalist. Further-
more, the government has limited the construction of mosques in areas of
unrest, although it continues to support their building and renovation in
other areas. 1 4 6 In a case that has come to symbolize government oppres-
siveness abroad, Rebiya Kadeer, a businesswoman and provincial delegate
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee whose social
activist husband had sought political asylum in the United States, was sen-
tenced to eight years in prison in March 2000 for providing state intelli-
gence to foreigners. The state secrets were reportedly disclosed in local
newspaper articles discussing the treatment of Uighars. Beijing recently
announced a reduction in her sentence, with possible further reductions
for good behavior. 14 7
Another case that has caught the world's attention involves Uighar his-
torian Tohti Tunyaz, who was sentenced to eleven years for inciting separa-
tism and illegally acquiring state secrets after returning from Ph.D. studies
at the University of Tokyo. 1 4 8 The state secrets appear to be fifty-year old
documents obtained for research purposes from a librarian in Xinjiang.
Tohti is also accused of writing and publishing The Inside Story of the Silk
Road, which allegedly advocates "ethnic separatism." However, Japanese
scholars have denied that Tohti ever published such a book.1 4 9 In 2001,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee declared that Tohti was arbitrarily
detained, and that the sentence violated the right to freedom of thought
and speech. 150
2. Freedom of Speech: Criticism of the Government
The 1991 Human Rights White Paper noted that according to the con-
stitution, citizens have the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding
any government entity or official and the right to expose any government
entity or official for violation of law or dereliction of duty. 15 1 In practice,
however, there are limits.
144. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
145. Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 22.
147. Rare Sentence Reduction for Leading Uighur Activist in China, AGENCE FRANcE-
PRESSE, Mar. 3, 2004, 2004 WL 72209995.
148. Japan Ignores Tokyo University Student Jailed in China, AsilAN PoLrnc~A NEws,
Sept. 23, 2002, 2002 WL 23806790.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Information Office of the State Council of China, 1991 White Paper: Human
Rights in China, ch. II (The Chinese People Have Gained Extensive Political Rights),
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-1l.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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One clear line in the sand is advocating the overthrow of the CCP or
the government, whether by violent or nonviolent means, even if the actual
threat is minimal or nonexistent, although again aggravating circum-
stances are usually required. For instance, Luo Yongzhong was sentenced
for three years for inciting subversion for publishing on the Internet arti-
cles calling for the overthrow of the Party and criticizing the Three Repre-
sents and the government's handling of the Tiananmen incident. 15 2
Similarly, Wang Zechen was sentenced to six years for subversion for
attempting to establish a Liaoning branch of the banned China Democratic
Party, attacking the Party as a dictatorship, and advocating the end of the
single party system and the establishment of a multiparty system with sep-
aration of powers. 15 3 In court, Wang did not contest the facts but argued
the acts were legal. In another case, He Depu was sentenced to eight years
in prison for collaborating with the banned China Democracy Party, post-
ing essays on the Internet that incite subversion, and signing an open letter
calling for political reforms. 154 According to his wife, he shouted calls for
democracy and criticisms of the one-party system at his hearing. 155
Another controversial case raises the issue of how clear and present
the danger to the State must be before triggering the State's criminal justice
machinery, and shows that the government, wary of student activism,
closely monitors attempts to establish student organizations for political
purposes. In 2003, Yang Zili, Xu Wei, Jin Haike and Zhang Honghai, four
of the eight members of an unregistered group of students and recent grad-
uates called the New Youth Study Group, received eight to ten years for
subversion. 15 6 According to the judgment of the Beijing Intermediate
Court, 15 7 the purpose of the group was to "actively explore ways of improv-
ing society." The articles of the group and related documents included
ideas for expanding the size and influence of the group through publica-
tions and Internet postings, as well as rules on membership and dues.
Apparently, the group planned on setting up branches in Xian and Tianjin,
though there does not appear to be any evidence that branches were actu-
ally set up. The court judgment relied heavily on the testimony of other
members of the group, one of whom was cooperating with the Ministry of
National Security, and two others who, under repeated questioning from
security officers and the threat of criminal prosecution for their own
involvement, signed damaging statements claiming that the group opposed
152. Luo Yongzhong Inciting Subversion Case, (Changchun Intermediate Ct., Oct. 14,
2003), at http://171.64.233.179/articles/luo/luo001.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
153. Wang Zechen Subversion Case (Anshan Intermediate Ct., Sep. 4, 2002), at http:/
/www.bignews.org/200202904.txt.
154. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders Concerned About Health of Cyberdissident He
Depu, Reporters without Borders, Mar. 2, 2004 (reporting that He, in ill health, might
not be able to survive the eight-year jail term), at http://www.rsf.fr/print.php3?idarti-
cle=8475 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
155. Id.
156. Judgment of the Yang Zili, Xu Wei, Jin Haike, Zhang Honghai case (Beijing First
Intermediate Ct., , May 28, 2003), at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/
01/200401311031.shtml.
157. Id.
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socialism and sought to overthrow the Party and establish a liberal democ-
racy.15 8 The reports accused Zhang Honghai of wholesale rejection of the
Party, Yang Zili of advocating liberalism and opposing single party social-
ism, Xu Wei of advocating an uprising by farmers and the use of violence if
necessary to change the system, and Jin Haike of describing the political
system as authoritarian and advocating the overthrow of the Party. The
court also cited articles written by the defendants, some posted on the web
and others not published, which showed that they were not happy with the
current political situation and allegedly demonstrated their intent to over-
throw the government. 159 However, the court did not discuss in detail the
content of the publications or cite passages to support these conclusions,
other than to note that publications by Yang Zili described democracy in
China as fake democracy, and called for an end to "old man politics.' 160
On appeal, defense counsel for Xu Wei pointed out that four of the
founders were Party members, and that the members voluntarily termi-
nated the group. 16 1 He portrayed the members as patriotic citizens whose
only goal was to improve society. 16 2 He also noted that the group raised
just a couple hundred RMB in dues, and lacked the wherewithal to over-
throw the State. 16 3 The defendants and their lawyers also contested the
evidence by the procuracy, claiming statements were taken out of context
and the meaning twisted, and that the witness testimony was given under
pressure, inconsistent and inaccurate. 164 The defendants further objected
that the court refused to consider exculpatory evidence. 165 Two of those
who wrote reports along with other members of the group were not allowed
to testify on appeal. 16 6 Citing inconsistency with other evidence, the Beij-
ing High Court also refused to recognize letters from the three members
who had written reports, two of which were in the possession of the Inter-
mediate Court during the first trial, denying that the group ever sought to
overthrow the Party or the government.' 6 7 After repeating the Intermedi-
ate Court's evidence and findings in full, the High Court summarily dis-
missed the defendants' arguments that there was insufficient evidence of
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Xu Wei's statement is available at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/
2003/11/200311120832.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Philip P. Pan, A Study Group Is Crushed in China's Grip, WASH. POST, Apr. 23,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=
article&contentld=A34768-2004Apr22&notFound=true (last visited Dec. 24, 2004).
According to the news report, the four defendants claimed that they were physically and
psychologically abused while in detention. Other due process concerns involved the
lengthy detention before trial. The defendants were detained on March 13, 2001, and
formally arrested on April 20, 2001. The intermediate court met three times to decide
the case on September 28, 2001, April 4, 2003, and May 28, 2003. The defendants were
in custody therefore from March 2001 until May 2003.
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subjective intent to overthrow the government as well as insufficient evi-
dence of inculpatory objective acts. 168 The courts did not expressly
address the issue of advocacy of violent versus nonviolent proposals to
change the government. Nor did the courts address the issue of the likeli-
hood that the defendants' acts would lead to the overthrow of the
government.
Agitating for a reversal of the Tiananmen verdict may also land one in
trouble. The government detained the leader of the Tiananmen Mothers,
Ding Zilin, along with two other members of the group, although they were
subsequently released. 169 Social activist Hu Jia was also temporarily
detained for planning a demonstration to commemorate Tiananmen.' 7 0 In
some cases, however, the punishment may be more serious, particularly if
there are other allegations or aggravating circumstances. 1 71 Three years
after being detained, Huang Qi was finally sentenced to five years for incit-
ing subversion for managing a website where he posted articles on
Tiananmen, Falun Gong and the banned China Democratic Party. 17 2 The
Intermediate Court decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it
expressly rejects the argument raised by Huang Qi that his actions were
protected by the right of free speech, arguing that the right does not extend
to defamation or spreading rumors to incite subversion and undermine
state interests or national security. Second, the court rejected the prosecu-
tor's charge that Huang was trying to "split the nation" by posting articles
calling for Xinjiang independence on the ground that the articles were
posted by others on Huang's site.
Although the media regularly carries exposes on corruption, the gov-
ernment has imposed limits on stories involving high-level officials, for
which approval must be obtained. Li Zhi, a government official in Sichuan,
was sentenced to eight years for subversion after posting an article on the
Internet and in chatroom discussions exposing corruption at high levels of
the government, and for contacting foreign dissidents. 17 3 An Jun, who
168. Id. at A20.
169. China Releases Three Arrested Members of "Tiananmen Mothers", AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Apr. 2, 2004, 2004 WL 74808742. Apparently they were sent T-shirts from
Hong Kong with the logo "Tiananmen Mothers". More seriously from the government's
perspective, the Human Rights Commission had received a videotape of their testimony
regarding their efforts to have the government reassess Tiananmen. Id.
170. Hu is known for his work on AIDS issues and the environment, as well as his
support for the release of the "Stainless Steel Mouse" for Internet violations. AIDS
Activist Released After Hunger Strike, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 6, 2004, 2004 WL
75172723.
171. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52 (noting that a petition signed by 192
people calling for political reforms and a reassessment of Tiananmen led to the arrest on
subversion charges of at least six of the signatories).
172. The Judgment of Huang Qi Case (Chengdu Intermediate Ct., Feb. 23, 2003), at
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/05/200305171038.shtml. Huang's
appeal apparently was also rejected. Amnesty International, Continuing Abuses Under a
New Leadership-A Summary of Human Rights Concerns, ASA 17/035/2003, Oct. 1, 2003,
at 8.
173. See Yang Ming, Sichuan Government Official Li Zhen Sentenced to Eight Years for
Exposing Corruption on Internet, EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at http://www.epoch
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founded an anti-corruption NGO that attracted more than 300 people, was
also sentenced to four years for exposing corruption. 1 7 4
Individuals who have reported classified information about SARS and
AIDS have also been detained for revealing state secrets, among other
charges. The government detained Wan Yanhai, head of the Beijing-based
AIDS Institute, for one month for revealing state secrets when he posted
information about HIV deaths on his website.17 5 Henan health official Ma
Shiwen was also detained for revealing state secrets, though he too was
subsequently released without standing trial. 1 76 Acknowledging the scope
of the AIDS problem, the government has recently adopted new policies on
AIDS, devised a long-term plan for treatment and prevention, and begun to
provide free medical treatment and testing. 177 AIDS victims may also be
able to use the legal system to fight discrimination in employment and else-
where. In a related case, a person infected with Hepatitis B recently won an
administrative litigation suit when he was denied a post as a civil servant
because of his disease. 1 78
3. Freedom of the Press
Chinese citizens now have greater access to a wider variety of informa-
tion and cultural products due to changes in technology including the
Internet and satellite television; markets reforms that have forced newspa-
pers, television stations and book publishers to respond to consumer
demands; and the rise of a small number of independent publishers and an
even smaller underground press. Nevertheless, the government continues
to maintain tight controls on what gets published.
The list of sensitive topics that are off limits or require prior approval
varies from time to time, and is enforced with varying degrees of strictness.
Topics in the last two years have included the government's handling of
SARS; the prosecution on corruption charges of successful business people
like Zhou Zhengyi and Yang Bin; financial information such as speculation
about the appreciation of the Renminbi or the selling of stocks by govern-
times.com/gb/3/12/11/n427422.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004); Sichuan Interneter Li
Zhi Arrested, BBC, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/
09/200309242141.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
174. Well-Known Anti-Corruption Activist An Jun Sentenced to Four Years This Morning
for Subversion, XIAOCANKAO DAILY NEws, Apr. 19, 2000, http://www.bignews.org/
20000419.txt (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
175. Amnesty International, Continuing Abuses Under a New Leadership, supra note
172.
176. Murie Dickie, China Frees Aids Official, FIN. TIMES (USA), Oct. 20, 2003, at 5.
177. See Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. I (The People's Rights to Subsistence and Devel-
opment); CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, DEFUSING CHINA'S TIME BOMB:
SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF CHINA'S HIV/AIDS RESPONSE, (Bates Gill et al. eds, 2004)
(discussing China's progress in recognizing its AIDS problem), available at http://
csis.org/china/040617_ChinaAIDSTimebomb.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
178. The Judgment of Song Yue case (Wuhu Intermediate Ct., at http://
www.yecao.net/Html/20044324116-1.Html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). While the plain-
tiff won the suit in that the court quashed the act to deny him employment, the court
could not order the defendant to provide a job as the post had already been filled. Id.
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ment agencies; and exposes about former government officials who go into
business or become lobbyists. 179 Oftentimes, the media will be allowed to
discuss a topic until the government or the courts have taken a final posi-
tion, as in the "BMW case," where a rich and well-connected plaintiff
crashed into a crowd after a dispute;180 the Liu Yong case, where a former
NPC delegate depicted as a mafia boss was sentenced to death;1"" and the
Sun Zhigang case, where a college student was beaten to death while in
administrative detention.18 2 All three cases were widely debated on the
Internet and covered in the press, leading to a central level investigation in
the BMW case, 183 a highly unusual retrial by the Supreme Court in the Liu
Yong case, 184 and the elimination of detention and repatriation in the Sun
case. 185
Discussion of popular books may also be restricted, such as The Chi-
nese Peasant Report, detailing the plight of farmers today, or the Heart of
Girls, which described the sexual awakening of a teenager and was consid-
ered pornographic. Other books and magazines may also be subject to
censorship, removal from shelves, or confiscation at customs. However,
the widespread if illegal practice of selling "book numbers" and leasing out
publication numbers for magazines allows many publications to slip past
the censor. Banning books now often simply results in increased demand,
with books reportedly banned still readily available even in major Beijing
bookstores or in small street stalls. In one interesting case that shows how
efforts to implement rule of law are paying dividends even in politically
sensitive cases, a lawyer won an administrative litigation suit challenging
Customs' confiscation of a book on the Yanan period published by Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong. 186
However, in other cases, exceeding the bounds of permissible coverage
has resulted in confiscation of publications, closure of the paper, or
arrests. In 2001, authorities confiscated an edition of the Securities Market
Weekly containing an article about Li Peng getting rich.187 Recently editors
of the widely popular muckraking Nanfang Zhoumo were arrested on
179. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 15-16; China Information Center, The
Chinese Authorities Issue "Ten Forbiddens" for the Media, Apr. 22, 2004 (listing the ten
topics that the Chinese government warned the media not to discuss), at http://
www.cicus.org/news/newsdetail.php?id=2159.
180. See generally Christopher Bodeen, China's 'BMW Collision Affair' Draws Out
Anger, Suspicions Against Newly Wealthy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 6, 2004 (discussing the
confrontation between a wealthy Chinese woman and a peasant farmer).
181. See generally Chinese Agency Gives Details of Alleged Crime Boss' Trial, Execution,
BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Dec. 23, 2003, (discussing the unusual court procedure).
182. Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1005 n.50.
183. 'BMW Case' Reinvestigation Ends, Chinadaily.com.cn, at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/28/content_318657.htm (Mar. 28, 2004).
184. See Chinese Agency Gives Details of Alleged Crime Boss' Trial, Execution, supra note
181.
185. See Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1047 n.188.
186. The case report can be found at http://www.szonline.net/Channel/2003/
200306/20030603/Preview_20030603_1.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
187. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2003: CHINA AND
TIBET 216, 218 (2004).
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embezzlement and bribery charges. 188 According to one report, thirty-nine
reporters were imprisoned in 2000.189 Foreign reporters have also been
harassed or detained for covering sensitive stories such as the plight of
North Korean refugees.
The government has clearly struggled over how to manage the poten-
tial risks caused by increasing numbers of Internet users. The government
regularly blocks sites, regulates Internet cafes, holds servers and Internet
companies responsible for content published on their sites, and prosecutes
individuals who post articles that the authorities find go too far in criticiz-
ing the government or that reveal information deemed to be state secrets.
All of the top ten sites for the topics "Tibet," "Taiwan China," and "Equal-
ity" were blocked, as were eight of the top-ten sites for "Democracy" and
"Chinese Dissidents," and six of the top-ten sites for "Freedom China" and
"Justice China".190 A much lower percentage of the top 100 sites were
blocked for these topics: 20-45% with the exception of over 60% of the top
sites for "Tibet. 191 Similarly, 20-25% of the top 100 URLs were blocked
for "Hunger China," "Famine China," and "AIDS China."'192 Interestingly,
the authorities blocked a lower percentage of Chinese URLs for these
topics.193
Several foreign news URLs are also regularly blocked, including BBC,
CNN, Time Magazine, and PBS, although other foreign news sites are avail-
able. Recently, the government issued new regulations that limit access to
chatrooms. The rules only permit websites to run news forums about a
subject if the mainstream state-run media has already covered the story. 194
The arrests of Liu Di, Du Daobin and others for Internet postings have
been the subject of much public debate. Liu Di, the "Stainless Steel
Mouse," is a student at Beijing Normal University. She was detained and
then released months later for operating a popular Web site and posting
satirical articles about the Party, as well as articles calling for the release of
Huang Qi. 195 Her arrest led to two online petitions signed by over 3000
people.
Du Daobin was arrested for posting twenty-eight articles on the
Internet, including some that opposed limitations on democracy and civil
liberties in Hong Kong, and for receiving funding from foreign organiza-
188. Elaine Kurtenbach, Chinese Experts Urge Retrial of Editors, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 9, 2004.
189. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 15 (citing Committee to Protect
Journalists).
190. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering in China, IEEE
INTERNET COMPUTING (March/April 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=399
920. Ironically, this site was not accessible when I tried from Beijing on April 19, 2004.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Peter Morris, China Cracks Down on Chat Rooms on Eve of NPC, ASIA TIMES, Mar.
4, 2004, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FC04Ad03.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
195. Philip P. Pan, China Releases 3 Internet Writers, but Convicts I Other, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2003, at A14.
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tions. 196 His arrest led to a petition, signed by over 100 writers, editors,
lawyers, philosophers, liberal economists and activists, calling for a judi-
cial interpretation to clarify the crime of subversion. 19 7 Citing the non-
binding and decidedly liberal Johannesburg Principles, the petition argued
that seeking change through peaceful means should not constitute incite-
ment of subversion, and that the government should not rely on subversion
charges to restrict critical discussion of government shortcomings, main-
tain the reputation of the ruling regime, enforce ideological controls, or
even prevent instability. 198 After the petition, Du was convicted of inciting
subversion, but his three-year sentence was commuted to four years of
probation. 199
Although China has passed a number of regulations regarding
Internet activities, convictions for posting articles on the Internet are gener-
ally based on generally applicable criminal law provisions. Posting on the
Internet, which reaches a diffused and unidentified audience, serves there-
fore as a triggering or aggravating factor: the same speech that would be
tolerated in a different forum even though in violation of the criminal law
results in arrest and detention when posted on the Internet. Sentences are
usually in the two to four year range.
4. Pornography
Although the government periodically supports campaigns against
pornography, it is readily available in books, magazines, DVDs and on the
Internet. Suggesting a less than wholehearted commitment, China blocks
just 13% of the 752 sites generated by a search for "free adult sex," whereas
commercial filters used by Saudi Arabia and other countries block
70-90%.200 The government's approach is to focus on producers and dis-
tributor rather than users. Thus, a court fined and sentenced to three years
defendants who operated a website containing pornographic pictures,
novels, and movies. 20 1 The defendants had set up web advertisements for
foreign advertisers and received commission payments. The court found
that posting pornographic material online was criminal and that obtaining
income from foreign advertisers was considered "spreading pornography
for profit."20 2
196. Security Official Confirms Chinese Man Arrested for Internet "Subversion", BBC
MONITORING AsIA PACIFIC, Feb. 17, 2004.
197. Chinese Internet Dissident Found Guilty of Subversion, but Given Probation,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 11, 2004, 2004 WL 82445473.
198. For the text of the petition, see Petition for Judicial Interpretation of Anti-Subver-
sion Law, Laogai Research Foundation, http://www.laogai.org/news/newsdetail.php?
id=2044 (June 6, 2004).
199. Id.
200. Zittrain & Edelman, supra note 190, at 71 (concluding that the Chinese govern-
ment has not relied on commercial filtering programs to block access to pornographic
websites).
201. An excerpt of the court's judgment is on file with the author.
202. Id.
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In contrast, the government has tolerated watching pornographic mov-
ies in one's own home. In a much publicized case, a Shanxi couple was
awarded damages after police stormed into their bedroom while they were
watching an adult movie, and a scuffle broke out between the husband and
police, resulting in injuries to the husband. 20 3
5. Freedom of Assembly
As of 2002, there were more than 133,000 social organizations, includ-
ing 111,000 private nonprofit corporations. 20 4 Although all social groups
are legally required to register, there are also reportedly as many as one to
two million unregistered "NGOs.'' 205 Social organizations are subject to
various degrees of supervision and control, with the government again
imposing both content and time, place and manner restrictions. Some
groups are not allowed to register, including the China Democratic Party
and Falun Gong. The founders of the China Democratic Party Xu Wenli,
Wang Youcai, and Qin Yongmin were sentenced on subversion charges in
1998 to thirteen, twelve, and eleven years respectively. 20 6 Wang and Xu
have since been released on medical parole and are in the United States. 20 7
The government requires prior approval of all demonstrations.
Approval is not possible in some cases, such as Falun Gong protests, and is
difficult to obtain in other cases, such as for protests of government takings
and relocations, treatment of HIV patients, and labor disputes. In practice,
however, numerous demonstrations never receive prior government
approval. In 2003 alone there were almost 60,000 demonstrations, many
of them not approved, involving more than 3 million people.208 In most
cases, the protesters are allowed to demonstrate provided the demonstra-
tion is peaceful, orderly, and limited in size and duration. The government
often responds to labor demonstrations by pumping in funds to pay off the
protestors, although authorities have also arrested a number of the leaders,
particularly when the demonstrations are cross-regional. China ratified
the ICESCR with a reservation that provisions regarding unions and strikes
be interpreted consistently with PRC laws.209 Labor unions remain tightly
203. Couple Watching Porno DVD Case Continues, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Dec. 22,
2002, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-12/22/content_666765.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
204. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Josephine Ma, Three Million Took Part in Surging Protests Last Year; Beijing Is
Warned That the Rise in Social Unrest Is Now a Conspicuous Problem, S. CHINA MOaRNING
PosT, June 8, 2004, at 5 (citing an Outlook Magazine article which quoted the Ministry of
Public Security Statistics and noted that a significant number of the protests had turned
violent); Murray Scot Tanner, Shades of Tiananmen: Protests Now Flourish in China, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 3, 2004 (noting that police records recorded an increase in the
number of demonstrations from 8700 in 1993 to 32,000 in 1999, and then to 40,000 in
2000).
209. See United Nations Treaties Collection, Declarations and Reservations, available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4-asp.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002).
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controlled and marginally effective, often serving as a bridge between
workers and the State or management. Many foreign investors have
opposed the formation of strong unions within their companies. PRC law
does not recognize the right to strike, although work slowdowns and
strikes do occur. 210
6. Assessing Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights
The government does not tolerate much dissent in public and imposes
numerous restrictions on the exercise of civil and political rights. Are such
restrictions consistent with international law? More importantly, are they
justified? Unfortunately, international law is less determinative on many
more issues than often assumed. Human rights groups and activists within
China often invoke liberal principles or interpretations that are not
accepted as a matter of international law.2 11 For instance, the Johannes-
burg Principles cited by the petitioners in the Du case have not been
adopted in whole by any country, with the possible exception of Peru.212
Incorporating the contemporary U.S. standard, 213 Principle 6 states that
expression may be punished as a threat to national security or public order
only if a government can demonstrate that: (i) the expression is intended to
incite imminent violence; (ii) it is likely to incite such violence; and (iii)
there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the
likelihood or occurrence of such violence.2 14 However, in general, national
security restrictions require a showing of a serious potential harm but a
lesser degree of imminence and likelihood than restrictions for public
order. Although the distinction between violence and nonviolence is an
important factor to consider, clearly nonviolent acts, such as injecting a
210. See generally Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: Labour Unrest
and the Suppression of the Rights to Freedom of Association and Expression, Apr. 30, 2002
(discussing the growing number of work-related protests and demonstrations in China).
211. See Sautman, supra note 142, at 177-96 (discussing the lack of a foundation in
international law for the concepts of "cultural genocide" and "ethnocide" on which the
Tibetan tmigre ideology is based and arguing that claims of cultural genocide and
ethnocide are inapposite legally and empirically).
212. See Dr Frances D'Souza, Brief Background to the Johannesburg Principles, Hong
Kong Journalists Ass'n (discussing the 2000 Lima Principles, which were "similar to the
Johannesburg Principles, but adapted for the unique conditions that prevailed in Peru
following Fujimori's departure and the revelation of massive government repression,
detention of political prisoners, routine torture and corruption on a national scale"), at
http://www.article23.org.hk/english/research/johan and lima brief.doc (last visited
Jan. 17, 2005); Human Rights Groups Worry Hong Kong Government Will Limit Access to
Information, Clearwisdom.net (noting that "Regina Ip, Secretary for Security in Hong
Kong... said that the Hong Kong government's definition of state security met stan-
dard of the International Human Rights Agreement, whereas there was no country in the
world that had accepted the Johannesburg Principles") (emphasis added), at http://
clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2002/12/8/29498p.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
213. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
214. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment: Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expres-
sion- Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Abid Hussain, Pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights Resolution 1993/45, U.N. ESCOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39
(1996).
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virus into a country's national defense computer system, may endanger the
State. Similarly, while a clear and present danger is more threatening than
a vague and distant danger, a state need not wait until the last minute to
take steps to protect national security or public order.2 1 5 Countries differ
over whether violence must be likely and imminent even for public order
restrictions. Some countries require only that the speech will likely lead to
a violation of law or breach of the peace, while others (often former British
colonies) require an even lesser showing that the comments are likely to
incite ill-will or contempt for the government.2 16
Rather than a bright line test based on the distinction between vio-
lence and nonviolence, restrictions on rights are subject to a balancing test.
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee, the ECHR, and other bodies apply a
three-part test. To be valid, the restriction must (i) be prescribed by law;
(ii) serve a legitimate purpose; and (iii) be necessary (in a democratic soci-
ety). 2 17 While this analysis is intended to be conducted on a case-by-case
basis in light of the particular circumstances at the time, it is useful to
apply this test generally to the restrictions on civil and political rights in
China. A case-by-case approach tends to "skew" the results toward greater
civil and political rights, as it is always difficult to see how the actions or
words of a particular individual could possibly constitute a threat to the
more powerful state or have much of an impact on a society of 1.3 billion
people. Conversely, a wider perspective that considers the range of threats
from a variety of different sources tends to support more conservative solu-
tions. A broader approach will usually reflect a more utilitarian concern
for aggregate social benefits whereas a case-by-case approach fits more eas-
ily with a moral absolutist or deontological approach that sees rights as
trumps of social interests.
Not surprisingly, China and other Asian countries that have adopted a
more restrictive interpretation of civil and political rights generally defend
their positions not by arguing the specifics of individual cases but by point-
ing to larger empirical trends, and in particular the records of other devel-
oping countries that have adopted a restrictive approach to civil and
political rights, as opposed to those that have adopted a more liberal
approach. Thus, they point out that the East Asian countries that have
succeeded in maintaining stability and social order, achieving economic
growth, reducing poverty, and improving people's living standards, have
adopted a restrictive approach to civil and political rights, whereas other
countries in East Asia and elsewhere that have adopted a more liberal
approach, at least during their period of rapid economic development, have
215. Cf. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (rejecting "any principle of govern-
ment helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to
its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy."). On the rise of the doctrine of preemption
as a form of self-defense, see generally W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Assess-
ing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 82 (2003).
216. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION MANUAL § 6,
art. 19 (1993), available at http://www.article19.org/docimages/811.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2004).
217. ICCPR, supra note 27.
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generally not managed to achieve political stability, economic growth, or
the same level of achievement on other measures of rights and human well-
being. On the other hand, rights activists rely heavily on particular cases,
often involving egregious violations or especially vulnerable or sympathetic
defendants.
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. The latter tends to underesti-
mate the importance of stability and social order to economic growth and
the protection of human rights. The former runs the danger of justifying
any and all restrictions in the name of political stability, social order and
economic growth. Many people believe, for instance, that democracy is not
appropriate for China at this stage and that given the potential for instabil-
ity, the government is justified in limiting certain civil and political rights
in the name of social order (and, because social chaos would undermine
economic growth, in the name of development). Yet, they also believe that
the government unduly restricts civil and political rights. A more balanced
approach is needed, one that moves beyond these general arguments to
consider specific instances of restrictions, while at the same time bearing
in mind that developing countries such as China face a number of threats
to social order and political stability that wealthy, politically stable coun-
tries do not face. Thus, China is likely to reach a different balance given
the horrific consequences for everyone were China to become unstable or
were Cultural Revolution-like social chaos to reoccur.
The first prong of the three-part balancing test requires that the gov-
ernment actions be prescribed by law. In China's case, the constitution,
laws, and administrative regulations provide ample grounds to restrict por-
nography, religious practices, demonstrations, criticism of the government
and the Party, and to justify the confiscation of property, the assessment of
fines, administrative detention, and criminal punishments. Whether the
laws are clear enough to prevent citizens from unexpectedly running afoul
of them is however an issue in some cases, given the broad and vaguely
stated provisions on state secrets, subversion, and endangering the State.
However, it is unlikely that most people convicted in the cases discussed
earlier were unaware that they were crossing the line given previous convic-
tions for similar behavior, though many clearly felt that their actions
should not have been considered illegal. Nevertheless, a judicial interpreta-
tion of subversion and related charges, and a narrower definition of "state
secrets," would go a long way toward clarifying the scope of impermissible
activities and expanding the range of legitimate activities without detri-
ment to state interests.
A separate but related issue is whether the procuratorate in these cases
laid out with sufficient detail the alleged acts constituting the offense or the
precise threat to national security. The danger of relying on broad allega-
tions of subversion or endangering the State is readily apparent in this era
of heightened sensitivity to terrorism. Yet in several of the cases, there was
little analysis of specific statements in the articles alleged to be evidence of
subversion.
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As for the second prong, the restrictions generally serve a legitimate
purpose on their face, such as national security, public order, and morality.
However, in cases critical of government AIDS policies, the number of capi-
tal punishment cases, or exposure of corruption, the restrictions appear
only to serve the interests of the ruling party or to protect the reputation of
particular officials rather than to protect national security or the interests
of the nation. The tendency of governments around the world to rely on
broad state secret laws and vague references to national security to cover
up government mistakes has been exacerbated after 9-11, and should be
resisted in China and elsewhere. 2 18 Moreover, by invoking a broad state
secret law, the government prevents defendants from relying on the truth of
their criticisms to establish a defense: the mere disclosure of damaging
information is sufficient to find wrongdoing.
The final prong is usually the most crucial in evaluating the legitimacy
of restrictive policies. The requirement of "necessity" as interpreted by the
ECHR and other bodies does not mean the restriction is "indispensable,"
although it must be more than merely "reasonable" or "desirable. '2 19 As
noted, the ECHR affords countries a margin of appreciation in deciding
what is necessary, with the widest margin in the areas of national security
and morality. In addition to being necessary, the restriction must also be
proportionate, while some jurisdictions such as the United States apply a
higher "least restrictive" standard for limitations of fundamental rights.
The UDHR2 20 and other international documents require the restric-
tions to be necessary for democratic order, even though democracy is not
required under the ICCPR. Some of the arguments for free speech in a
democracy may not apply in a socialist state, although many of the same
arguments would apply at least to some degree. For example, the argument
that political speech, including criticism of the government, deserves spe-
cial protection in a democracy given the need for citizens to elect their lead-
ers may be weakened, whether in the context of prior restraints on free
speech or post-speech regulations.
In most cases, however, the difference will be between liberal and non-
liberal positions. Thus, the liberal emphasis in other countries on auton-
omy, individualism and self-development will lead to different outcomes
than in China.2 2 1 Not everyone assigns the same value to civil and political
freedoms relative to social order. Social order ranks much higher in the
normative hierarchy of most Chinese than it does in the normative hierar-
218. Thomas Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States:
Beyond the Balancing Test, in CAMPBELL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 31, 59 (2003), available at http://www.
maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/opengov/Chapter%202.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2004).
219. See YOUROW, supra note 95.
220. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
221. Randall Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights? Toward a Theory of
Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 57 (1993). See also Joseph
Chan, Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism, 52 PHIL. E. & W. 281 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between individual autonomy and Confucianism).
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chy of many Westerners, in part because stability is more precarious in
China. 2 22
But even accepting such differences, are the restrictions imposed by
China necessary? To some extent, the response turns on assessments of
China's stability. Ironically, the argument of many liberal critics that
China is very unstable tends to undercut their opposition to restrictions on
civil and political rights. 223 China clearly faces a number of threats to sta-
bility, including increasing rural poverty, rising urban employment, a weak
social security system, and a rapidly aging population that has pushed the
elderly into the streets to protest for retirement benefits. In addition, China
has a looming banking crisis that could put an end to the economic mira-
cle, leading to further unemployment and more unrest.224 The desire for
greater autonomy if not independence among many Tibetans and Xinji-
angese, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and the difficulty
of separating Buddhism and politics in Tibet also present risks that cannot
be dismissed, even if they should not be exaggerated.
More generally, authoritarian regimes are particularly stable in the
$3,000 to $4,000 per capita (PPP) range, more so than any other range
except where per capita income is less than $1,000.225 However, the likeli-
hood of a transition to democracy increases when per capita income is
between $4,000 and $6,000, with the tipping point at which a regime is
more likely to be democratic than authoritarian being $4,115.226 In 2001,
China's per capita income was $4,020.227 Thus, China is just beginning to
outgrow a highly stable period for authoritarian regimes, and likely will
become increasingly unstable as pressure grows for political reforms.
Another test applied by some courts to assess the justifiability of
restrictions on rights is to multiply the probability or likelihood by the
degree of harm to calculate the expected danger or threat.2 28 With one-
fifth of the world's population, almost half of whom are living on less than
$2/day, and a history of chaos as recent as the Cultural Revolution, the
consequences of instability for China, the region and the world would be
severe. Adopting this measure virtually assures a wide margin of deference
to restrictions in the name of public order.
In practice, the balance reached by the government seems to be that
individuals are generally free to pursue their own interests, engage in relig-
ious beliefs, or criticize the government as they like, provided their acts are
222. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOwARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
549 n.32 (citing numerous surveys and polls for China and other Asian countries).
223. See generally GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (1st ed. 2001)
(discussing the Chinese government's instability and predicting its likely collapse).
224. Id.
225. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49
WORLD POL. 155, 161 (1997).
226. Id.
227. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2003, at 239 (2003), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indi-
cator/ctyf_CHN.html.
228. See Blanton, supra note 218.
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not combined with any of the aggravating circumstances discussed above
that increase the likelihood of unrest. While acknowledging the possibility
of instability, many of the decisions fail to provide any discussion of how
the particular acts in question will lead to instability or endanger the State.
A more considered analysis of the nexus between the acts and disruptions
of the public order or harm to the State would expand greatly the range of
civil and political rights without harming national security or state inter-
ests. It is difficult to see how either a broader categorical approach or a
narrower case-specific analysis could justify the tight limitations on discus-
sion of issues of legitimate public concern such as constitutional reform,
medical crises, corruption, government takings, and rising income gaps.
After all, these issues are widely discussed anyway. Moreover, whatever the
outcomes on the substantive merits, the many due process violations even
under China's own laws are clearly inconsistent with the efforts to imple-
ment rule of law and should be rectified.
C. Social and Economic Rights: Poverty, Health, and Education
China defends its human rights record by pointing to a stunning rise
in wealth that has lifted over 150 million people out of poverty in less than
a decade and improved the quality of life of hundreds of millions more.
With a 2001 GDP per capita (PPP) of $4020, China, though growing, is a
lower-middle income country. An official average annual growth rate of
8.2% from 1975 to 2001 and 8.8% from 1999 to 2001 has resulted in
steady progress in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP)
Human Development Index (HDI), from 0.52 in 1975 to 0.72 in 2001.229
The Index measures life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, school enroll-
ments and standard of living. As Figure 3.1 indicates, China does much
better relative to other countries on the HDI than it does on the index for
civil and political rights. As expected given the high correlation between
wealth and social and economic rights (r=.92), 230 China outperforms low-
income India on all measures, including infant mortality, life expectancy,
and primary school enrollment, as indicated in Table 2.1.231 Most nota-
bly, China's high score on the UNDP poverty index (26) relative to its
already relatively high HDI ranking (104) indicates that China has done
quite well on tackling extreme poverty given limited resources. 232 Thus,
although nearly half of the Chinese population lives on less than $2 per
day, the actual standard of living in China, as measured by the Human
Poverty Index, exceeds countries with higher incomes such as Iran and
South Africa.233
229. UNDP, Human Development Index, available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/
indicator/indic 4 1_1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
230. Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 21.
231. See infra Table 2.1.
232. The Human Poverty Index-1 (HPI-1) quantifies poverty in terms of life expec-
tancy, access to food and water, and education as measured by literacy rates.
233. See infra Table 1.1. Like other socialist countries, China was more successful
than the average country at its income level in alleviating poverty and improving human
development even before implementing economic reforms. However, like other socialist
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To be sure, economic growth in China has not benefited everyone
equally. There is wide regional variation, and a growing income gap. The
Eastern coastal region is much wealthier than the rest of the country, and
rural areas are poorer than cities, 2 34 although the number of poor
urbanites has also grown dramatically. According to the UNDP, in 1998,
the share of national income or consumption of the poorest 10% was 2.4%,
and 5.9% for the poorest 20%, whereas the share of the richest 20% was
46.6%, and 30.4% for the richest 10%.235 By 2003, the share of the top
20% had risen to 51%.236 Meanwhile, 16% live on less than $1/day, while
4.6% live below the national poverty line.23 7 One-fourth of the population,
or over 300 million people, lacks sustained access to an adequate water
source. 2 38 In addition, 9% of the population is undernourished, and 10%
of children under five are underweight for their age. The rapid growth has
also taken its toll on the environment. China's growth has been fueled by
energy consumption three times less efficient than the world's average.2 39
Even with increases in the income gap in recent years, China is still
roughly on par with the United States and other Asian countries such as
Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, and considerably
more egalitarian than Zimbabwe, South Africa, Chile, or Nicaragua, as indi-
cated in Table 3.1.240 Moreover, the process of modernization inevitably
involves a period of urbanization where rural residents are moved into cit-
ies and rural incomes lag behind urban incomes. In a country as large as
countries, China was not able to sustain the growth that is necessary if not sufficient to
maintain improvement in human development. Thus, while economic reforms and the
transition to a market economy have resulted in a deterioration on some measures such
as income equality or led to worse conditions for some people and created new
marginalized groups, on the whole economic reforms have led to improvements for the
vast majority of Chinese citizens on virtually all main human rights indicators. Moreo-
ver, while one can always question whether the government is using the increased wealth
in the most effective way to address the many problems that still exist, China continues
to outperform the average country in its income bracket on most indicators.
234. Allen T. Cheng, Rich-Poor Gap Among the Worst, Study Finds, S. CHINA MoRING
POST, Feb. 26, 2004, at 7 (reporting that a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
poll found urban incomes to be 2.8 times higher than rural incomes, although the actual
gap is even greater if subsidies for medicine and education for urban workers are
included).
235. UNDP, supra note 229, at 284 (citing survey data from 1998). Unfortunately,
data reported varies by year depending on availability, with the year not clearly indi-
cated in some cases. While the World Bank estimates the Gini coefficient in 2002 to be
40.3, the official PRC press has reported higher numbers of 42.4 in 1996 and 45.6 to
45.8 from 1998 to 2000. See Li Heng, How Wide Is the Gap of China's Individual Income?,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2001, at http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200108/31/
eng20010831_78962.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
236. China's Reforms Cause Dramatic Widening Gap Between Rich and Poor, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRESSE, Mar. 9, 2003, at 2003 WL 2747580 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
237. UNDP, supra note 229. See also Jonathan Watts, China Admits First Rise in Pov-
erty Since 1978, GUARDIAN (London), July 20, 2004 (noting that more than 800,000 farm-
ers slipped below the national poverty line in 2003), 2004 WL 85579874.
238. UNDP, supra note 229, at 223.
239. Jiang Wen-ran, Perilous Prosperity Shafts China's Heartland, TAIPEI TIMES, Apr. 20,
2004, at 9.
240. See infra Table 3.1.
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China, the process will take several generations to reach a stable equilib-
rium. Rising urban income equality is also inevitable, and up to some
point desirable, in transition economies because wage liberalization and
market determination of wages create incentives for efficiencies in compa-
nies. Privatization and foreign investment also lead to higher wages and
greater wealth for some. 24 1 In the meantime, the government has
responded to growing inequality both in the countryside and cities by issu-
ing a steady stream of legislation to improve social welfare, strengthen job
training and creation programs, ease restrictions on migrant workers and
enhance their rights to education and medical treatment, reduce the tax
burden on farmers, stimulate growth in Western and Central regions,
tighten labor safety rules especially in the mining industry, and improve
environmental protection.2 4 2 Perhaps more importantly, the government
has given substance to the commitments and promise of these new regula-
tions by increasing spending. For instance, the government spent some 70
billion yuan in 2003, an increase of almost 20% over 2002, on the "three-
stage guarantee" for laid-off workers that provides a basic living allowance,
unemployment insurance, and then a subsistence allowance if the person
still cannot find employment. 243 The government also allocated an addi-
tional 4.6 billion yuan to subsidize job creation.2 44 There were 29.33 mil-
lion retirees from enterprises covered by welfare, an increase of 41% over
2002. Nearly sixty million people have been covered by the rural old-age
insurance scheme, and almost 1.4 million farmers received pensions.
245
Although these increased expenditures will not put an end to the problems,
and will benefit different groups disproportionately, with former state-
owned enterprise (SOE) employees better taken care of than others,2 4 6 they
do demonstrate the commitment of the new leadership to pay attention to
social justice issues.
Most Chinese citizens also enjoy greater access to medical care, better
health, and longer lives. From 1949 to 2001, life expectancy doubled,
reaching 70.6 years. 247 The population with access to essential drugs
241. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 66 (1996)
(discussing how structural economic changes can positively affect a nation's more effi-
cient sectors and workers).
242. See, e.g., Cui Ning, Chinese Education Goes Global, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 22, 2002
(stating that the Chinese government is investing in education programs for its coun-
try's poor); Kimberly Song, Chinese Farm Firms Are Likely To Sprout from State Funding,
AsIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2004 (stating that the government plans on phasing out
taxes on some farmers); Conference Shapes 'Green' Blueprint, CXN MEDIA, Nov. 5, 2002
(discussing China's ambitious new environmental policies).
243. STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, 2004 GOVERNMENT WORK REPORT (2004).
244. Id.
245. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, ch. IV (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
246. Dorothy Solinger, Path DepenA~ncy Re-Examined: Chinese Welfare Policy in the
Transition to Unemployment, COMP. POL. (forthcoming 2005).
247. UNDP, supra note 229, at 247. In the 2004 White Paper, the government
claimed that the number of people covered by medical insurance increased by 14.95
million between 2002 and 2003. According to the report, 108.95 million people now
have medical insurance coverage. Information Office of the State Council of China, Pro-
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reached 80-94%; 77-79% of one-year olds are immunized against tubercu-
losis, measles, and other illnesses. In 2000, 86% of pregnant women had
access to health care, and maternal mortality dropped from 61.9 per
100,000 in 1995 to 53 per 100,000 in 2001, although in some rural areas
the rate can be as high as 400 per 100,000.248 The percentage of women
giving birth in hospitals was 72.9%, up 15 percentage points from
1995.249 Efforts to encourage breastfeeding also paid dividends, with 54%
of urban mothers and 72% of rural mothers breastfeeding for four months.
All are significant improvements.
However, China is poor, and spends only $205 per capita on health.
In 2000, public health expenditure was 2.0% of GDP, while private health
expenditure was 3.4% of GDP. 250 There are still problems with Hepatitis-
B, tuberculosis, and lack of potable water, as well as new medical issues
such as an upsurge in AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, obesity, death
by traffic accidents, and mental illness. Medical treatment in the country-
side in particular leaves much to be desired. Access to medical care has
deteriorated for those without personal or family resources, and adequate
facilities are not available in some areas even for those who could afford to
pay for treatment. Moreover, with longer life spans and demographic
changes due its to one-child policy, China is facing the problems associ-
ated with aging, including more people suffering from chronic ailments, a
lengthening of the course of diseases, and constant increases in medical
and pharmaceutical costs. All of these issues have an enormous impact on
healthcare facilities and services.2 5 '
PRC law provides for nine years of compulsory education. According
to the UNDP, public education expenses from 1998 to 2000 amounted to
2.1% of GDP, of which 37.4% was for primary education, 32.2% for secon-
dary, and 15.6% for tertiary.2 52 According to official sources, the ratio of
education expenditure to GDP has increased five years in a row, from 2.5%
in 1997 to 3.41% in 2002.253 In 2001, adult literacy was 85.8%, up from
gress in China's Human Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, ch. IV (Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights).
248. See Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 to the Cove-
nant-Addendum People's Republic of China, U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.N.
Doc. E/1990/5/add.59, at 11 (2004) [hereinafter Implementation of the ICESCR].
249. Id.
250. UNDP, supra note 229.
251. Id. See generally RICHARD JACKSON & NEIL HowE, THE GRAYING OF THE MIDDLE
KINGDOM: THE DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMICS OF RETIREMENT POLICY IN CHINA 3 (2004),
available at http://csis.org/gai/GrayingKingdom.pdf (noting that while other countries
became affluent societies before they had an aging problem, China remains a low-
income country).
252. UNDP, supra note 229.
253. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, supra note 124, at
3.
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78.3% in 1990. Youth literacy is even higher, at 97.9%.254 The govern-
ment has proudly noted that according to UNESCO in 2003, China made
the most progress in eliminating illiteracy in the past decade among the
forty countries surveyed.
25 5
However, illiteracy rates are higher among women, minorities and in
rural areas. As recently as 1999, nearly 100 million mostly rural women
were illiterate. 25 6 In response, the government initiated Project Hope to
assist children in poor districts and the Spring Buds Scheme to promote
girls' enrollment or return to school to complete their primary education.
According to the Ministry of Education, the proportion of females receiving
education at all levels has risen and the overall educational level of women
has improved. From 1990 to 2000, the illiteracy rate among women has
decreased from 32% to 13.5%, and the total population of female illiteracy
has decreased from 159 million to 62 million. Less than 5% of young and
middle-aged women are illiterate, despite higher overall rates of female illit-
eracy. 25 7 In 2000 the primary school enrollment rate of female students
reached 99.1%. Even in the economically less-developed Western regions,
the rate of school enrollment of female students reached 95%. At present,
the proportion of female students in China's primary schools is 47.2% and
that in colleges and universities is 43.95%. In general, 97% of primary
school graduates go to junior high school, 58.3% of junior high school
students go to senior high school, while 15% go on to college.
25 8
Despite such achievements, the U.N. Special Rapporteur (SR) on the
Right to Education issued a critical report that challenged some of the data
and offered a number of recommendations for improvement.2 59 The SR
noted that many public schools had begun to charge tuition and impose
other fees, which the poor are not able to afford. She recommended that all
fees be eliminated and that the budgetary allocation for education be
increased to the "internationally recommended" minimum of 6% of GDP,
though few countries actually meet that level. 2 60 She also noted ongoing
problems with gender equality and with education for minorities, includ-
254. Id. In its report to the ICESCR Committee, China cited 2000 census data that
showed adult literacy at 91.3% and literacy for those under forty at 95.2%. Implementa-
tion of the ICESCR, supra note 248 220.
255. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. IV (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
256. Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N.
General Assembly, 45th Sess., 257, U.N. Doc A/54/38 (1999) (citing statement from
China's representative).
257. Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003, supra note 5, at ch. V (The Rights and Interests of Women and
Children).
258. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, supra note 124, at
5.
259. The Right to Education, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Katarina
Tomaevshi, U.N. ESCOR Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., Agenda Item 10, ' 9, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1 (2003).
260. Id. at cl 16; see Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 21 (noting that of
countries in the study, only Malaysia met the 6% level).
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ing the lack of bilingual education. In addition, she recommended a clarifi-
cation of the rights of young unmarried people to sex education and
family-planning services and to self-protection against sexually transmitted
diseases and AIDS.
The government responded with a scathing critique, accusing the SR
of being politically biased, distorting the facts, and discounting China's
achievements. 26 1 Beijing complained that the SR ignored information pro-
vided by the government, relying instead on materials from overseas
sources and organizations. The government pointedly observed that
although the SR did not visit Tibet, she nevertheless made "biased and irre-
sponsible comments" on education in Tibet.
To some extent, the divergence in perception of China's educational
progress lies in the difference between the government's approach, which
relies on regulations and general statistics, and the approach of the SR and
other human rights organizations, which highlights individual cases or
relies on accounts of oftentimes disgruntled parties about how the laws are
implemented in practice. For instance, on the issue of school fees, the gov-
ernment noted that the State Council has issued regulations requiring that
schools charge only a single fee and that fees be waived for indigent stu-
dents. However, as with other types of laws, local governments often
ignore or modify central regulations.
In other cases, the difference seems to be more one of spin or interpre-
tation, or due to the tendency of human rights advocates to hold up idealis-
tic standards that cannot be achieved given China's current level of
development and regional variations. The SR, for example, accused China
of backing away from its commitment to universal nine-year compulsory
education. 262 The government acknowledges that nearly 10% of the popu-
lation lives in regions where universal education can only be provided at
the primary level or even only up to the third or fourth year of primary
school. Moreover, while the national dropout rate in 2000 was 0.55% for
primary schools and 3.21% for junior middle schools, the dropout rate in
some rural areas is high. In light of significant regional disparities, the
government has adopted a pragmatic approach that involves different plans
in different regions and seeks to promote compulsory education progres-
sively by realizing six-year universal compulsory education first. However,
the government adamantly denied that it was backing away from universal
nine-year compulsory education as a long-term goal. 26 3
The rights of migrant workers have also been a source of contention.
The influx of migrant workers and the rise of laid-off urban workers have
261. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, supra note 124, at
2-3.
262. The Right to Education, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Katarina
Tomasevski, supra note 259, cl 9 & 11.
263. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, supra note 124, at
3-4.
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led to concerns about social order, aggressive begging, the rise of slum
towns, and increased crime in urban areas. Until June 2003, authorities
relied on a system of administrative detention known as "detention and
repatriation." The system served humanitarian purposes and protected
social order in urban areas by providing relief, education, and resettlement
to migrants and urban poor. According to one report, upwards of 2 million
people were subject to detention and repatriation each year, including a
"substantial proportion" of children.2 64 In June 2003, the State Council
repealed the 1982 regulation and issued new regulations that continued to
provide social welfare to vagrants, but removed the compulsory detention
component. 2 65 The new provisional rules require relief centers to provide
food and shelter to those in need, send them to hospitals for medical treat-
ment, contact their relatives, and arrange for transportation to their
homes. 266 The authorities are no longer allowed to force anyone to go to a
relief center, and relief centers cannot hold anyone against their will. The
regulations require local governments at the county level and above fund
the centers on an as-needed basis. Reflecting widespread concerns about
past abuse, the regulations strictly prohibit relief centers from asking for
payment from the families of those who seek assistance.26 7 Nor may the
centers require those seeking relief to work in exchange for room and
board.268 In addition, the regulations provide for sanctions, including
criminal punishment, for those who beat, defraud, sexually abuse, or oth-
erwise mistreat relief recipients.
However, early signs suggest that some retrenchment will occur. Not-
ing that the repeal of detention caused an increase in crime and abuse of
the relief centers by non-indigents, the Ministry of Public Security issued
the "Notice Regarding the Strengthening of Current Social Order Manage-
ment in Accordance with Law."'2 69 The Notice orders public security to
increase its attacks on deviant behavior such as interfering with traffic
when begging, disturbing the public order by aggressive public begging,
soliciting for prostitution in public places, and interfering with government
activities when petitioning officials for relief.270 Concerned about the
264. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, NOT WELCOME AT THE PARTY: BEHIND THE "CLEAN-UP" OF
CHINA'S CITIES-A REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION UNDER "CUSTODY AND REPATRIA-
TION" 13 (1999).
265. See Chengshi Shenghuo Wuzhao de Liuliang Qitao RenyuanJiuzhu Guanli Banfa
[State Council Administrative Measures for Assistance to Indigent Vagrants and Beggars
in Urban Areas] (2003); Chengshi Shenghuo Wuzhao de Liuliang Qitao RenyuanJiuzhu
Guanli Banfa Shishi Xize [Ministry of Civil Affairs Detailed Implementing Rules for the
Administrative Measures for Assistance to Indigent Vagrants and Beggars in Urban Areas
1 (2003).
266. State Council Measures on the Administration of Aiding Vagrants and Beggars
Having No Means of Livelihood in Cities, supra note 264, at art. 7.
267. Id. at art. 10.
268. Id.
269. Ministry of Public Security, Notice Regarding the Strengthening of Current Social
Order Management in Accordance with Law, Doc. No. 52 (2004).
270. The Notice also calls on public security officers to punish activities of hooligan-
ism that disrupt public order despite exhortations to halt such activities, such as pan-
handling; camping in the open; provoking disturbances; and inciting crowds to fight in
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impact of the national regulations on local coffers and social order, several
local governments have also rushed to pass regulations that attempt to shift
some of the financial burden to others and to clarify many of the difficult
operational issues resulting from the new policy, in some cases by impos-
ing limits on stays in the centers.2 7 1
More generally, the constitution provides for citizens' rights to work,
rest, education, scientific research and cultural activities, material assis-
tance from the State for aged, ill, or disabled citizens, and ownership of
lawfully obtained property. Constitutional rights are generally not directly
justiciable in China without implementing legislation. Moreover, like else-
where, many economic rights because of their aspirational nature, vague-
ness, or policy implications with respect to distribution of resources are
not considered to be justiciable. Nevertheless, a number of cases have
arisen in relation to some of these rights, particularly the right to educa-
tion. In fact, the first case to directly invoke the constitution as a basis for a
claim absent implementing legislation involved the right to education.
2 72
One subsequent case involved a student who successfully sued her school
for damages for failing to inform her about her college entrance exam
scores in time to apply to university, while in another education case a
student sued the school and various individuals for allowing someone else
to appropriate her name and score to enter university.
273
In still another case that combined the right to education with a dis-
crimination claim, three students from Qingdao sued the Ministry of Edu-
cation for its admissions policy that allowed Beijing residents to enter
universities in Beijing with lower scores than applicants from outside Beij-
ing.2 74 The plaintiffs filed the suit directly with the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court has the discretionary power to hear impor-
tant cases in the first instance, it opted not to exercise the power, rejecting
the case on jurisdictional grounds and advising the plaintiffs to file suit in
Intermediate Court. Facing a number of serious legal obstacles, including
or around such public places as offices, schools, hospitals, public squares, movie thea-
ters, and famous scenic spots.
271. For details, see Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at
1005-06.
272. See Reply of the Supreme People's Court on Whether Persons Who Infringe
upon the Basic Right of Citizens to Receive Education Protected by the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China by Means of Infringing upon the Right of Personal Name
Shall Bear Civil Liabilities (Supreme People's Court, July 24, 2001), at http://www.isino-
law.com/jsp/ji/JLPart Content.jsp?IsPart=0&LanglD=0&IndexlD=108&CatD=73 .
273. WANG LEI, XuANzI XIANFA [To CHOOSE CONSTITUnONAL LAW] 61-67 (2003).
274. For details, see Yu Meisun, Cong Jiaoyubu Dang Beigao de Liangan, Kan
Zhaosheng Zhidu Chuangxin de Poqiexing [On the Exigency of Renovating the College
Recruiting System, Judging From the Two Cases Where the Ministry of Education is the
Defendant], EPOCHTMES.COM, Apr. 23, 2004 (also reporting another case where a student
who did not meet the requirements to take the graduate student exam, but was neverthe-
less permitted to do so, was rejected by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences even
though others who did not meet the minimal score were admitted. After losing in
administrative reconsideration and in both the Beijing Intermediate and High Courts,
the student took his case to the Supreme Court, where it is pending), at http://
www.epochtimes.com/gb/4/4/23/n519496.htm.
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that the Administrative Litigation Law permits challenges to the legality of
specific administrative acts but not generally applicable administrative reg-
ulations, the students withdrew the case. The students claimed a moral
victory in that their suit called attention to the unfairness of the current
policy, and led the Ministry of Education to reconsider, although not yet
change, the policy.
D. Good Governance and Rule of Law
Critics are often quick to attribute any failure in governance-whether
the belated response to SARS, widespread corruption, or shortcomings in
the implementation of rule of law-to China's political system, while down-
playing similar problems in democratic states. However, China out-
performs other countries in its income category, including many
democracies, on core good governance indicators, as indicated in Tables
4.1 and 5.1.275 "Political stability and absence of violence" combines sev-
eral indicators that measure the likelihood that the government will be
overthrown or destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, including
terrorism. 276 It is included as a good governance measure because politi-
cal instability and violence not only affect the ability of the ruling regime to
govern but deprive citizens of the ability to peacefully select and replace
those in power. "Government effectiveness" measures the provision of pub-
lic services, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and indepen-
dence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government's policy
commitments.2 7 7 Whereas government effectiveness focuses on the insti-
tutional inputs required to implement policies effectively, "regulatory qual-
ity" focuses on the policies themselves. 2 78 It includes measures of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision,
as well as perceptions of excessive regulation of foreign trade and business
development. "Rule of law" measures the extent to which people have con-
fidence in and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the
rules are, and how well property rights are protected.2 79 The indicators
include perceptions of incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predict-
ability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. "Control of cor-
ruption" measures perceptions of corruption, the effects of corruption on
business, and "grand corruption" in the political arena. 28 0
China beats the average for lower-middle income countries in political
stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption.
It is about average for regulatory quality, which is biased toward neo-liberal
economic principles, and falls far short on the voice and accountability
index, which measures civil and political rights.28 1
275. See infra Tables 4.1 & 5.1.
276. KAUFMAN ET AL, supra note 120, at 3.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Id.
281. See infra Table 5.1.
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To be sure, there are still many problems with China's legal system and
governance. 28 2 However, both have improved remarkably in the relatively
short time since reforms began in 1978. Moreover, as rule of law is highly
correlated with wealth, we can expect that the legal system will continue to
improve as China becomes richer. 2 83 Many of the shortcomings in the
legal system are the type of systemic problems faced by many developing
countries, 28 4  and will require time and additional resources to
overcome.
28 5
E. Law and Order
Chinese leaders as well as leaders of other Asian states, such as Lee
Kuan Yew, Singapore's prime minister from 1959-90, have often been criti-
cal of the high crime rates, rampant drug use, and social disorder in eco-
nomically advanced Western liberal democracies. Rather, they champion
family and communitarian values, social stability, and law and order.
Tables 6.1 and 7.1 demonstrate that there are significant differences
between Asian and Western countries in terms of crime rates and other
indicators of social order.
Crimes rates must be used with caution because of differences in defi-
nitions of crimes, the willingness of rape victims to report rapes, broad
yearly fluctuations, and differences in the level of economic development.
In addition, demographic differences such as the percentage of rural popu-
lation and youths also affect crime rates. Notwithstanding such qualifica-
tions, the results are striking: Asian countries, especially in the higher
income brackets, tend to have much lower crime rates relative to their level
of economic development, industrialization and urbanization. For
instance, the total crime rates for high-income countries France and the
United States are two to ten times the rates in Japan, Singapore and Hong
Kong.28 6 The much higher crime rates hold across the board for property
offenses such as theft and burglary, violent crimes such as murder (which
282. For a discussion of the theoretical and practical issues relating to the conceptual-
ization and implementation of rule of law in China, see generally PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S
LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39.
283. See Peerenboom, Show Me the Money, supra note 21. For a discussion of the
relationship between economic growth and rule of law, generally and in China, includ-
ing a survey of the numerous and consistent empirical studies that show rule of law is
associated with economic growth, as well as the argument that there is a push and pull
relationship between growth and rule of law, with growth stimulating demand for rule of
law and the establishment of rule of law contributing to economic growth, see PEER-
ENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at 450-512.
284. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE
OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND
THE U.S 1, 26 (2004) (noting problems common to developing countries involving
access to justice, inefficient and expensive courts, judicial corruption and judicial
incompetence).
285. For a discussion of the different conceptions of rule of law in China, and the
extent to which ideological and political factors will hinder the development of rule of
law, see PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
10-12, 24, 25 & n.30, 55-102, 166-238.
286. See infra Table 6.1.
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are generally considered to suffer from fewer problems in reporting and
data collection), and drug offenses. The United States suffers from partic-
ularly high levels of violent crime, especially rape.
2 87
The lower-income countries such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia,
India and Vietnam have lower crime rates than the wealthier countries.
Data collection is particularly problematic in low-income countries, mak-
ing comparisons more difficult. However, it would appear that crime is a
greater problem in India than in China, Vietnam, and Thailand. 288 in
short, despite a rising crime rate, China still maintains a relatively stable
social order. Walking the streets of Beijing alone late at night does not fill
one with the sense of trepidation that comes from a similar stroll through
the streets of New York or Los Angeles. A 2002 nationwide survey of
100,000 people found that 80% felt safe due to the strike-hard
campaign.28 9
Countries vary widely in how they deal with criminals. The U.S. has
the dubious distinction of the highest rate of incarceration in the world, as
well as some of the most severe punishments. In contrast, France and
Japan have low rates of incarceration relative to their crime rates, and tend
to place more emphasis on noncustodial sanctions, and in Japan's case on
rehabilitation. 290 In general, however, Asian states with the exception of
Japan rely on heavy punishments. 291 China is no exception. In 2001,
25% of verdicts in criminal cases resulted in a sentence greater than five
years (including life imprisonment and the death penalty). 292 This number
is already down from the high thirties and low forties in previous years. 293
China also carried out more capital punishments in a three-month period
in 2001 than were carried out globally in three years.294
Although there are now more than 40,000 protests per year,295 violent
clashes between protesters and the police are still relatively rare. The
authorities often attempt to defuse potentially destabilizing protests by
throwing money at the problem, while pressuring or arresting key leaders.
Police have also sought to develop less confrontational and brutal methods
for dealing with protests as the number of protests has grown and the tac-
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Highlights of Major Beijing-Based Newspapers, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Oct. 30,
2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File.
290. See infra Table 6.1.
291. Japan favors rehabilitation to punishment, and fines to incarceration. Peer-
enboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 1055.
292. Id. at 1033.
293. FALO CHUBAN SHE [LAw PUBLISHING HOUSE], ZHONGGUO FALO NIAN JLAN [CHINA
LAw YEARBOOK] 144 (2002); cf. id. at 145 (claiming 31% of those convicted received a
sentence over five years). In the past, the percentage of punishments over five years was
even higher. HAROLD TANNER, STRIKE HARD: ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS AND CHINESE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 1979-1985, at 98-99 (1999) (noting that during the first strike-hard campaign
from 1983 until 1987, 38% of those convicted received a punishment of five years or
more).
294. Amnesty International, 'Striking Harder' Than Ever Before, supra note 101.
295. See Tanner, supra note 208 (describing recent growth in protests and changes in
the tactics employed by protesters).
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tics have changed to include larger scale, cross-industry and cross-regional
demonstrations, which are often fronted by strategically placed elders,
women and children. 296 More generally, the government has allowed a
steady rise in the number of social organizations, and yet still has sought to
ensure some accountability through registration requirements, as noted
above.
Other indicators of social order such as suicide, divorce, and young
mother rates are less clearly tied to a country's level of wealth.297 Suicide
rates are highest in Japan, followed by France, and then a cluster of coun-
tries including China, South Korea, and Hong Kong, followed by the U.S.
and India. 298 Thailand and the Philippines, perhaps because of religious
influences, have very low rates. 29 9 However, other reports have indicated a
much higher rate for China, particularly among rural women. 300 The high
rate of suicide among Chinese women reflects their low economic and
social status, the high incidence of violence, and limits on their ability to
escape and pursue a more desirable life.
3 0 1
Divorce rates have been growing in China, more than doubling in fif-
teen years from 0.9% in 1985 to 1.9% in 1999.302 Nevertheless, China still
has a much lower rate than other countries, including the United States
and South Korea. Again, there is wide regional variation, with coastal and
more developed areas experiencing a higher rate of divorce. According to
the People's Court Daily, nearly a quarter of marriages in the coastal prov-
inces end in divorce. 30 3
Births to young mothers is not a problem in China due to family plan-
ning regulations that encourage later marriages and limit births. Of
course, China's one-child policies, relaxed recently, have been much criti-
cized both for violating the right to procreate and the coercive manner in
which they have been carried out.
F. Women's Rights
China, proud of its record on women's rights relative to other coun-
tries, hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Judged by
the standards of the UNDP Gender-related Development Index,30 4 China
296. Id.
297. See infra Table 7.1.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
301. About 500 Chinese women commit suicide a day, a rate that the World Bank
estimates to be five times the global average. Id.; Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, 59th
Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), 963, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1 (2003).
302. See State Statistics Bureau, National Population and Family Planning Commission
of China, http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/data/sfpcdatamar3.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
303. Zhang Hong, It Is Difficult Not To Be Confused About Extramarital Affairs, RENMIN
FAYUAN BAO [PEoPLE's COURT DAiLYI (Internet edition), at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=2171 (Mar. 29, 2001).
304. The GDI is a composite indicator that measures the average achievement of a
population in the same dimensions as the HDI. However the GDI adjusts to take into
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does reasonably well relative to its income. Again, as the index is highly
correlated with wealth (r=.93), a country's performance should be judged
in comparison to other countries in its income class. Thus, while China
scores much lower on the GDI (.72) than high-income countries such as
the United States (.94), Japan (.93), Singapore (.88), and much higher than
low income countries such as India (.57), Zimbabwe (.49), and Egypt (.63),
it is comparable to other lower-middle income countries such as Iran (.70),
the Philippines (.75), and Romania (.77).305
Despite steady and significant progress in improving women's lives,
the government acknowledges that a number of serious problems remain.
There is still a gap between male and female literacy rates especially in
some rural areas and among some minorities, although female literacy
rates are rising and the difference among young males and females is very
small overall. With women holding just 5% of ministerial positions in
2000 and constituting 22% of the NPC, the proportion of women in politi-
cal positions is low. However, while the numbers of women in ministerial
positions is low relative to other countries, the number of female legislators
is high.30 6
Although economic reforms have greatly improved the lives of many
women, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market econ-
omy has also increased poverty for some citizens, including a dispropor-
tionate number of women. Women have been laid off in greater numbers
than men and have more difficulty finding new jobs.30 7 They also suffer
from gender segregation of the labor market, with an over-concentration in
the low-paying service sector. Nevertheless, compared to other countries,
including many other wealthy countries, Chinese women enjoy higher
rates of employment, better jobs, and a higher ratio of female to male
income earned. 30 8 Indeed, as indicated in Table 9.1, the female to male
income ratio in China is higher than in the U.S., and much higher than in
India, Iran, Chile, and Singapore. 30 9
account gender inequalities in the level of achievement in the three basic aspects of
human development. The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI, disaggregated by
gender. For additional details, see http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/
faq.html#31 (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
305. See infra Table 8.1.
306. Id.
307. Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 256, '1 257.
308. As of 2001, women constituted 39% of the non-agricultural work force. UNDP,
supra note 229, at 203. See also ZHiu LING, Poverty Alleviation During the Transition in
China, in POVERTY, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND WELL-BEING IN AsIA DURING THE TRANSIION
107, 111 (Aiguo Lu & Manuel F Montes eds., 2002) (noting that studies in 1988 and
1995 show that differences in male and female poverty are not substantial, and that
relative female poverty has not increased significantly in the 1990s).
309. See infra Table 8.1. In general, socialism has a positive impact on women's sta-
tus and earning power. Cal Clark and Janet Clark, The Status of Women and the Quality
of Life in Developing Societies, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AssocIATION ANNUAL MEEING,
(2004) ("Many of the greatest overachievers in terms of the status of women are commu-
nist and former communist countries.") (on file with author)..
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Violence against women is a major issue, including domestic violence
and marital rape, sexual violence while in custody, sexual harassment in
the workplace, trafficking of women, and forced prostitution. A 2000 sur-
vey by the All China Women's Federation (ACWF) found violence occurs
in 30% of Chinese households, of which 80% involves spousal abuse.310
Although more common in rural areas, domestic violence occurs through-
out China and at all socioeconomic levels.
China's population policies have been criticized for their effects on
women, including forced abortions and sterilization, and female infanti-
cide.311 Although genetic testing that determines the sex of the fetus is
prohibited, it has become a lucrative underground business that contrib-
utes to abortions of female fetuses and an unusually high ratio of males to
females. The male/female imbalance may contribute to kidnapping and
trafficking of women, many of whom end up forced into marriage with
males in poor villages.
While the problems are clear, the solutions are either not clear or diffi-
cult to implement. Several factors complicate the task of devising and
implementing effective solutions. As the CEDAW Committee recognized,
China's size and diversity pose special challenges to the realization of gen-
der equality. 312 Differences in the experiences of urban and rural women
require different solutions. The general conflict in the international
human rights movement between women's rights, often interpreted in light
of the experiences of women in Western developed countries, and the cul-
tural and religious beliefs and practices of minority groups in non-Western
developing countries, further complicates policymaking and undermines
efforts to implement state policies aimed at promoting the rights of
women. As is true elsewhere, progress on promoting women's rights is
hindered by deeply embedded traditional views about the proper role of
women in the family, in society, and in relation to men. The CEDAW Com-
mittee has observed that "the persistence of prejudice and stereotypical
attitudes concerning the role of women and men in the family and in soci-
ety, based on views of male superiority and the subordination of women,
constitutes a serious impediment to the full implementation of the Conven-
tion."313 The Committee also noted that the government has focused on
protecting women through numerous labor regulations that protect women
rather than empowering them. 314
The Committee suggested the government should adopt a more
empowerment-oriented approach, encourage a national dialogue on atti-
tudes toward women and campaign publicly to change traditional atti-
tudes. 3 15 A number of more targeted reforms have also been proposed for
310. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Conse-
quences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, supra note 301, at 1 959.
311. Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 256, 1. 299-301, at 33.
312. Id. 11 276, 278, at 30.
313. Id. '1. 277, at 30.
314. Id. . 280, at 31.
315. Id. 281, at 31.
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each of the specific issues.
For example, in response to lower female literacy rates, the CEDAW
Committee recommended that the government abolish school fees and
allocate adequate resources to ensure universal literacy and primary educa-
tion, something easier said than done in most developing countries.
3 16
The Committee also recommended revision of textbooks and the curricu-
lum to eliminate gender stereotypes and to include the achievement of gen-
der equality as a societal goal, reflecting the importance of consciousness-
raising and the rather optimistic belief that if only those responsible for the
problems understood the negative consequences for women they would
change their behavior. 3 17 The Committee on the Rights of the Child sug-
gested that local leaders be invited to take a more active role in supporting
the efforts to prevent and eliminate discrimination against girls and to pro-
vide guidance to communities, although it is not clear to what extent the
mostly male leaders support the goals of reform. 3 18
In response to the low levels of women in top positions of government,
the CEDAW Committee recommended affirmative action and reservation
of a specified number of seats for women delegates in people's con-
gresses.3 19 The Committee also called for more gender balance in the com-
position of village committees. However, the Committee ducked the
controversial issue of whether to impose affirmative action quotas on the
open, competitive process of democratic elections at the village level. Nor
is it clear that China is legally or morally obligated to support the long
terms prospects of women by sacrificing the short term interests of villag-
ers, both male and female, by potentially forcing them to settle for less-
qualified village leaders.
Concerned about the consequences of women's loss of employment,
or of interrupted employment, and on women's rights to housing, health
care, and social security, the CEDAW Committee urged the government "to
analyse, from a gender perspective, the effects of its economic policies, and
to take steps to mitigate and counteract their negative effects on
women."3 20 In addition to enforcing existing labor laws, the Committee
encouraged the Government to increase women's redress against discrimi-
nation and inequality at work by promoting the recognition of women's
right to participate in workers' organizations and their right to strike. The
Committee also recommended more participation of women in govern-
ment policymaking for rural areas and for small businesses and other
income-generating projects. 3 2 1
316. Id. 295, at 32.
317. Id.
318. Concluding Observations Adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
China, U.N. Convention on the Rights of Child, 12th Sess., ' 34, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.56 (1996).
319. Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 256, c 293, at 32. The Committee recommending using the talent bank of the All
China Women's Federation to increase the percentage of women in all public bodies. Id.
320. Id. cl 298, at 33.
321. Id. 303, at 34.
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The CEDAW Committee responded to the high rate of suicide by rec-
ommending that the government pay urgent attention to the issue, research
the causes of the high rates, provide better mental health services, and
ensure that women have equal enjoyment of land rights independent of
their marital status. 3 22 However, as most of the problems occur in poor
rural areas, adequate mental health services are not likely to be available
for some time. Adequate healthcare of any type will only be available when
China reaches a much higher stage of wealth, at which point women will
have more options and be less inclined to commit suicide in the first place.
Attempts to address the land rights of women through the amended Mar-
riage Law and other regulations have run into resistance at the local level,
where the rules conflict with social norms.
Efforts to combat violence against women have included public cam-
paigns aimed at changing traditional values, the establishment of govern-
ment and non-government bodies devoted to domestic violence and related
issues, the tightening of provisions in the criminal law relating to various
forms of violence against women, amendment of the Marriage Law to make
reference to domestic violence, and the passage of local regulations
addressing in greater detail domestic violence issues.323 Nevertheless, a
great deal remains to be done to change deeply entrenched attitudes, par-
ticularly in rural areas. Further efforts are needed to establish hodines,
shelters and support networks for battered women, and to improve the
legal framework. Future legal reforms are expected to include a stand-
alone law on domestic violence that clarifies the issues of spousal rape and
psychological abuse and strengthens remedies for victims of spousal abuse,
sexual harassment in the workplace, and human trafficking.3 24 Unfortu-
nately, as demonstrated by the experiences of many other countries, hav-
ing laws against domestic violence, sexual harassment and human
trafficking on the books does not ensure that the police and the judiciary
will enforce them if the laws are radically at odds with social norms and
practices.
Prostitution has become widespread with the transition to a market
economy. The CEDAW Committee recommended that prostitution be
decriminalized, 32 5 although prostitution itself is technically not a crime
under the current PRC criminal law. Only pimps and brothel owners are
subject to criminal sanctions. Prostitutes are subject to administrative
detention and fines. Imposing fines however usually results in the women
322. Id.
323. See Ronald Keith et al., The Making of a Chinese NGO: The Research and Interven-
tion Project on Domestic Violence, 50.6 PROBS. POST-COMMUNISM 38 (2003).
324. See Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 256, '11 285-86, at 32 (calling on the government to enhance services for
survivors of domestic violence, including domestic workers, with a view to their empow-
erment and rehabilitation, including through psychological counseling, legal aid, tempo-
rary shelter, and appropriate health services, and recommending that the government
monitor the links between the presence of migrant women, prostitution, and trafficking
in women).
325. See id. 1 289, at 32.
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going back to work as prostitutes to earn the money needed to pay the
fines. Ironically, many human rights organizations and advocates, includ-
ing former Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson, have called for
the elimination of administrative detention.3 26 The most likely result of
eliminating "Detention and Education," the form of administrative deten-
tion used to detain prostitutes, would be to subject prostitutes to criminal
punishments. 3 2 7
The Committee is on more solid ground in calling for greater attention
to health services for prostitutes and for measures to facilitate rehabilita-
tion and reintegration of prostitutes into society. At present, the recidivism
rate for prostitutes is extremely high. Some PRC scholars claim that a 30%
recidivism rate for prostitutes subject to Detention and Education would be
a success. 3 28 It is difficult to rehabilitate those who do not believe they
have done anything wrong. According to one study, 88% of women
detained in Jiangsu in 1985 to 1986 on charges of prostitution did not
regard their behavior as criminal.32 9 While lengthy detentions likely will
fail to effectively achieve the goal of education and rehabilitation, as the
currently high recidivism rates indicate, short-term administrative deten-
tion to conduct health checks could curb the exploding rate of sexually
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. In the long run, economic growth will
result in greater economic opportunities for women, although prostitution
is likely to remain a permanent part of society, as it is elsewhere.
The CEDAW committee recognized "that population growth is a genu-
ine and severe problem and legitimate concern and that considerable pro-
gress has been made in providing family planning services."3 30
Nevertheless, the manner in which population growth is controlled leaves
much to be desired. Despite laws that prohibit forced abortions and sterili-
zation, local officials whose career prospects hinge on meeting family plan-
ning targets often turn a blind eye or encourage the practices. However,
changing demographics have resulted in a relaxation of the one-child pol-
icy, and market reforms and greater wealth have decreased the impact of
economic disincentives for those who want more than one child.
The failure to use adequate birth control leads to many abortions. The
CEDAW Committee has noted "with concern that only 14 per cent of men
use contraceptives, thus making contraception and family planning over-
whelmingly a woman's responsibility. In the light of the fact that vasec-
tomy is far less intrusive and costly than tubal ligation, targeting mainly
326. See Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire, supra note 56, at 992.
327. See id.
328. See Sarah Biddulph, The Production of Legal Norms: A Case Study of Administra-
tive Detention in China, 20 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 217, 234 n.91 (2003).
329. TANNER, supra note 278, at 149. In part, this may reflect the broad definition of
prostitution, which includes sex-related occupations such as hostessing, nude dancing,
and those who work in massage parlors or saunas where the range of service goes
beyond certain ill-defined limits. But it may also simply reflect the view among those
with limited economic prospects that prostitution is a lucrative profession.
330. See Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 256, 11 299, at 33.
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women for sterilization may amount to discrimination." 33 1 The Commit-
tee recommended consciousness-raising and education to encourage more
men to take responsibility for birth control.
The Committee also recognized that male children are still expected to
support the elderly, particularly in the countryside, contributing to the
preference for boys. The Committee encouraged the government to
address the linkages between economic security in old age and family plan-
ning, and to expand educational and employment opportunities for rural
women in order to eliminate son preference. The Committee further sug-
gested that the government improve its enforcement of laws against sex-
selective abortion, female infanticide, and the abandonment of children. 3 3 2
However, as a developing country, China is hard-pressed to provide an ade-
quate welfare net for urban residents, much less for the many hundreds of
millions more living in rural areas.
The Committee further noted that current laws provide insufficient
legal safeguards for women's rights and insufficient remedies for rights vio-
lations. 33 3 Since the first round of recommendations from the Committee
in 1999, the government has carried out extensive publicity campaigns to
increase awareness among women of their legal rights and to educate gov-
ernment officials and the general public about women's issues. The gov-
ernment has also passed a number of laws and amended others to clarify
issues and improve legal remedies, has enhanced access to the justice sys-
tem by expanding legal aid, and has overseen the build-up of a network of
governmental and non-governmental entities devoted to the promotion of
women's rights. However, legal aid centers remain underfunded, the legal
system continues to suffer from the systemic problems mentioned above,
and women's groups have had little impact on changing deeply held atti-
tudes, particularly in rural areas.
G. Cultural and Minority Rights
The study of cultural rights is complicated by the fact that China is a
large country, with fifty-five different ethnic groups constituting approxi-
mately 8% of the population. 33 4 The legal regime is complex, with numer-
ous autonomous zones,3 3 5 preferential policies and a wide range of local
regulations. Accordingly, different minority groups or even members of
the same minority group are subject to different rules depending on where
they are located. In addition, international law and domestic law are not
331. Id. I 299(a).
332. Id. 301.
333. Id. 1 284, at 32.
334. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2004, at 770 (2004).
335. As of 1998, there were five autonomous regions, thirty autonomous prefectures,
120 autonomous counties, and 1256 ethnic townships. Among the fifty-five ethnic
minorities, forty-four have their own autonomous areas, with a population of 75% of the
total of the ethnic minorities and an area of 64% of the area of the whole country.
Information Office of the State Council of China, Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minority,
in NATIONAL MINORITIES POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE (2000), available at http://
www.china.org.cn/e-white/4/4.3.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
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clear on many points relating to the rights of minorities. Moreover, many
issues are not resolved through the formal legal system. 33 6 There are also
different values at stake, and sharply divergent views among Hans and eth-
nic groups on many issues, including empirical issues.
The government claims that it has greatly improved the living stan-
dards of minorities, affords them considerable political autonomy and
opportunities to participate in national and local governments, offers them
preferential treatment in education, employment, and family practices, and
protects cultural sites and practices, including religious practices so long as
they are non-political. On the other hand, the SR on Racism and Racial
Discrimination expressed concerns in his 2002 report that Tibetans in the
TAR suffer various forms of systematic and institutional discrimination in
the fields of employment, health care, education, housing, and public
representation. 3
37
There is no doubt that China's minority regions are wealthier than in
the past, and that the standard of living has improved for the vast majority
of individuals. However, mostly rural minority regions are remote and gen-
erally still poorer than the Han-dominated Eastern region. In response, the
government listed poverty relief for relatively small ethnic minorities as a
focus of the State's development-oriented poverty reduction program,
adopting special policies to help 630,000 members of twenty-two ethnic-
minority groups each with a population less than 100,000.338 In 2003, the
government channeled 400 million yuan in development funds to ethnic
minorities, and spent another 600 million yuan to develop trade and local
businesses as part of preferential policies. 3 39
336. One reason the legal system has not played a major role in struggles over cultural
rights is that individuals in special autonomous regions presumably realize that to chal-
lenge local regulations at odds with generally applicable laws would be pointless
because judges presume that the NPC has already reviewed any such deviations and
given its approval. Judges therefore simply follow the local regulations.
A more common scenario is where generally applicable laws and regulations conflict
with non-codified local customs. For example, some acts considered to be serious
crimes under PRC law may not be considered serious crimes or crimes at all in some
localities. Areas of conflict include property rights and disputes over access to land,
grazing rights, and inheritance rights; marriage laws and disputes over dowries,
arranged marriages and bigamy; and criminal law, including what constitutes rape and
what count as mitigating circumstances in homicides. Outcomes in such cases differ
widely, from strict application of the law to wide deference to local customs. See gener-
ally Liang Zhiping, Xiangtu Shehui Zhong de Falu yu Zhixu [On Law and Order in Rural
Societies], pts. I & 11, available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wkwzdetails.asp?id=
1351 and http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk-wzdetails.asp?id=1352 (posted on Nov. 19,
2001).
337. See Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination,
Report by Mr. Maurice GIeIe Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. ESC Human
Rights Commission, 58th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/24
(2002).
338. Information Office of the State Council of China, supra note 5, at ch. VI (Equal
Rights and Special Protection for Minorities).
339. Id.
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Critics claims that economic policies have disproportionately bene-
fited Hans living and working in minority areas, that some projects favored
Hans, especially for technical and senior positions, and that minorities
have less access to credit and financing.340 The government counters that
minorities hold the majority of positions in local governments, that all 55
ethnic groups are represented in the NPC, with minority candidates consti-
tuting 14% of NPC delegates even though they represent only 9% of the
population, and that minorities hold key Party posts. Nevertheless, minor-
ities tend to have more positions in government, whereas Hans continue to
hold relatively more positions in the Party, which remains the ultimate
authority.341 In addition, there are relatively few minority persons in the
most powerful positions of government or the Party. Critics also allege
that development has upset traditional living patterns and led to reloca-
tion. Such complaints are perhaps inevitable in the march toward eco-
nomic development and modernization. However, allegations of genocide
based on an influx of Hans into Tibet and Xinjiang and the destruction of
cultural practices are overstated. 342 Hans tend to congregate in the large
cities, which generally tend to be better off than rural areas. 343 Being on
average more educated, Hans also tend to have higher paying jobs, and
thus can afford better housing.
340. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 45 (citing complaints that of 38,000
people hired to work on the Qinghai-Tibet railroad, only 6000 were Tibetans).
341. Mackerras, supra note 104.
342. See generally Sautman, supra note 142 (noting that cultural genocide and ethno-
cide are not crimes defined by and grounded in international law). Even the Dalai Lama
no longer claims that the conflict in Tibet is genocide as defined in international law.
Id. at 205. The author further notes:
[I]nclusion of the concept of 'cultural genocide' as a stock in trade of Tibetan
emigre ideology is meant to be provocative and incitory, rather than an intellec-
tually appropriate conceptual framework for assessing PRC state policy as it
affects culture in Tibet. Designed to bolster the legitimacy of the emigre ethno-
territorial movement, much of the emigre discourse on cultural genocide is a
systematic misreading of the effects of the cultural transformation that attends
social and economic change in Tibet.
Id. at 177.
343. MacKerras, supra note 104. See also Andrew Martin Fischer, Urban Fault Lines in
Shangri-La: Population and Economic Foundations of Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Tibetan
Areas of Western China 2 (2004) (arguing that concerns about social exclusion and
Tibetans being overrun by Hans reflects an urban-centric viewpoint as Hans concentrate
in cities, and that within cities "the critical factors generating exclusion and fuelling
conflict are the differentials between groups, such as urbanisation rates and education
levels, rather than base line characteristics, such as population shares or poverty
levels."), available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wp42.pdf (last visited
Dec. 22, 2004). On the whole, Hans tend to be better educated and have higher skill
levels, and thus are able to capture the best opportunities and highest salaries in mana-
gerial and technical positions. However, higher educated Tibetans are able to take
advantage of expanding opportunities, with Tibetans claiming over 70% of staff and
worker positions in state-owned units, including cadres, in the TAR. Id. at 20. Tibetans
with at least a secondary school education level are generally able to compete with Hans.
But at the lower end of the economic spectrum, Hans in urban areas, attracted by subsi-
dies, outcompete Tibetans because of higher education and better skills. Id. at 22.
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In terms of education, illiteracy has been greatly reduced among
minorities, but remains significantly higher than the national average in
some minority areas. According to government statistics, 32.5% of the
population in the TAR was illiterate in 2000,34 4 although the rate for young
and middle age people is less than 3%.345 Enrollment for children in the
TAR is 86% (compared to 93% nationally). Illiteracy among young and
middle-aged Uighars in Xinjiang is less than 2%.346
Native language and bilingual education have also been a concern of
rights groups, with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion recommending that children in all minority regions should have the
right to develop their own language and culture.3 4 7 However, this goal is
difficult to achieve given that there are over twenty-five different languages
used in China, with many minorities dispersed throughout the country or
living in predominantly Han areas. The Education Law and other laws
provide that schools with a majority of ethnic students may use the oral
and written languages of the ethnic group. Tibetan is the main language in
60% of middle schools in Tibet.348 There are also Tibetan curriculum high
schools, although most offer classes in Chinese as well. Minority students,
who benefit from affirmative action in entering colleges, are able to take
the national entrance exam in their own language. On the other hand,
while Tibetan and other minority languages may be used in courts and
official business within the particular minority region, Chinese is often a
requirement for economic and social advancement both within the region
and the rest of the country. Thus the desire to promote Tibetan culture by
emphasizing Tibetan language in schools is at odds with the need to learn
Chinese to succeed in the broader society. Accordingly, Tibetan parents
favor bilingual education for their children even at the primary school
level, as is also true for Tibetans living in India. 34 9
In a controversial move, the SR on Education recommended that
China allow religious education. This drew a sharp retort from Beijing,
which claimed that while people enjoy freedom of religion, and parents are
free to instruct their children in religious beliefs at home during non-
school hours, China adopts the policy of separating education from relig-
344. Information Office of the State Council of China, Tibet's Modernization Achieve-
ments, Nov. 2001, at ch. II (Tibet's Modernization Achievements), available at http://
www.china.org.cn/e-white/20011108/3.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
345. Comments by the Chinese Government on the Report on the Mission of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education to the People's Republic of China, supra note 124, at
6.
346. Information Office of the State Council of China, History and Development of
Xinjiang, May 2003, at ch. VI (Progress in Education, Science and Technology, Culture
and Health Work), available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/6.htm.
347. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: China, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 18 1 245 U.N. Doc. A/56/18 (2001).
348. U.S. DEP"T OF STATE, supra note 52. In 1996, Tibetan was main language in 98%
of TAR primary schools. See Sautman, supra note 142, at 221. Virtually all Tibetans in
the TAR speak Tibet and over 90% of Tibetans outside of the TAR speak Tibet, while
only about 5% of Tibetans in the TAR speak Mandarin. Id. at 225.
349. Id. at 222-23.
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ion.35 0 Accordingly, the Compulsory Education Law provides that no
organizations or individuals may use religion to interfere with public edu-
cation. In keeping with this policy, authorities closed down the Ngaba
Kirti Monastic School in Sichuan, which was built with private funds, and
provided traditional monastic education to rural Tibetans. 35 l Anyone
below the age of eighteen is also not allowed into Mosques or other places
of worship, although in practice this policy may be relaxed in areas where
unrest is not an issue.
H. Summary: Rights Performance by Area Within a Comparative
Context
Although Chinese citizens enjoy greater rights to participate in govern-
ance and more freedoms than ever before, the authorities continue to
impose severe limitations on civil and political rights whenever the expres-
sion of such rights is perceived to threaten the regime or social stability. In
terms of subject matter, calls for democracy and the overthrow of the Party
or government; advocacy of independence and greater autonomy for Xinji-
ang, Tibet and Taiwan; religious practice outside officially sanctioned
bounds by "cults" or in-house churches; labor activism; and exposes of cor-
ruption at high levels are subject to restraints depending on the circum-
stances. The authorities are particularly likely to intervene when the
manner of exercising such rights involves social organization especially
across regions, large scale and well-coordinated demonstrations, exposure
to a wide and unidentified audience through the mass media and Internet,
and links to foreign entities. In contrast, individuals, academics, and gov-
ernment officials can generally express their views in private or even pub-
licly to a limited and defined audience, although some liberal academics
have been fired from their university posts.
China's level-4 PTS rating seems to overstate the degree of "political
terror" and to be the result of reporting practices by the foreign media and
human rights organizations that focus on egregious individual cases that
are not representative of the system as a whole.35 2 While imprisonment of
political dissidents and physical abuse of detainees in prisons and adminis-
trative detention centers are deplorable and merit attention, the reality is
that only a tiny fraction of the prison population could possibly be
described as political prisoners. Unfortunately, the egregious cases
latched onto by the media often create a distorted picture abroad, feeding
into the stereotypical image of China as a repressive, authoritarian police
state-an image constantly reinforced by the repeated playing of the now-
350. See P.R.C. CONST., supra note 32, at art 36 (discussing the right of Chinese citi-
zens to the freedom of religion without government interference or involvement).
351. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52. However, other reports suggest that schools
run by religious organizations are tolerated in some cases.
352. A. Tom Grunfeld, Human Rights and the People's Republic of China, 9 TOURO INT'L
L. REv. 71, 72 (2001) (arguing that media reporting on China generally, and human
rights in particular, is so negative and unrealistic that many Americans hold highly dis-
torted views on modern China).
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graying footage of an individual citizen blocking the path of a tank more
than fifteen years ago in Tiananmen. First-time visitors to China are often
bewildered when they don't see machine-gun toting soldiers in military
fatigues on every corner or find ominous-looking public security agents in
black trenchcoats lurking suspiciously in alleyways and Internet cafes.
The power of horrific, individual cases to drive human rights policies
toward China should not be understated. 35 3
The overwhelming majority of criminal law and administrative deten-
tion cases are not political.35 4 Criminals may upset the social order, but
they do not directly challenge the Party's right to rule. Criminal law differs
from other areas in that there is little public support for criminal law
reforms because most people see such reforms as harming rather than fur-
thering their interests. As has occurred elsewhere, modernization, indus-
trialization, urbanization and the turn to capitalism have led to spiraling
crime rates. The government has responded to the fears of the public and
citizens' demand to crack down on crime by doing just that. The crack-
down has taken the form of much publicized campaigns to "strike hard" at
crime. China's weak legal institutions have been unable to stand up to the
combined pressure coming from an angry public demanding heavy pun-
ishments to deter criminals, and a political regime seeking to shore up its
legitimacy by pandering to the public's appetite for vengeance. Cultural
preferences for social stability, a tendency to favor the interest of the group
over the individual, and the lack of a strong tradition of individual rights
further undermine significant efforts in recent years to strengthen the crim-
inal justice system and better protect the rights of the accused.
Assessing the performance of any criminal justice system is a problem-
atic exercise. People attach different weights to competing values, such as
the rights of individual suspects and the importance of assuring that no
innocent person is wrongly convicted on the one hand, and social order
and the freedom and interests of individuals who may be victims of crime,
even violent crime, if suspects are not detained or are acquitted on "techni-
calities" such as the exclusion of tainted evidence, on the other. People
also disagree about the purposes of the criminal justice system and the
relative weights assigned to deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, ven-
geance, education, and incapacitation. And they disagree about the causes
of crime and hence the relative effectiveness of different ways to confront
it. 3 5 5 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that China's policies have been
successful in curtailing crime.
Despite the recent increase in crime rates, China still has much lower
murder, rape and burglary rates than the United States, France, and Ger-
many, though the murder and rape rates are now higher than in Singapore
and Japan.3 56 China also has lower murder, rape, and burglary rates than
353. Pettit, supra note 21.
354. The following discussion can also be found at Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and
into the Fire, supra note 56, at 995-96, 1056-59.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1058-59.
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other lower-middle income countries like the Philippines and Romania.
To be sure, there are still numerous shortcomings in the criminal jus-
tice and administrative detention systems, and many possible reforms that
would strengthen the protection of the rights of the accused while making
the systems more just and fair.
Moving beyond criminal law to the legal system more broadly, China's
legal system scores higher on the World Bank's rule of law index than the
average country in its income class. 35 7 Again, there are many shortcom-
ings, and the government is expending considerable energy and resources
to address them, often in conjunction with foreign government and devel-
opment agencies.
Analysis of social and economic rights is hindered by the basic prob-
lem encountered in most legal systems: social and economic rights are gen-
erally not justiciable. Accordingly, we are forced to fall back on general
laws, policies, and statistics, supplemented by a few cases on rather nar-
row issues. Unfortunately, the statistics and facts are often unreliable or
contested. Even the proper standards for measurement are heavily con-
tested: scholars disagree over the utility and significance of different mea-
sures of poverty, for instance. Moreover, national data often masks wide
regional variations. In addition, there is a conflict between the starry-eyed
utopianism of human rights activists who expect wonders despite the real-
ity of limited resources, and those who would set more realistic standards
consistent with China's level of development and priorities for government
spending.
Notwithstanding such qualifications, China does well both absolutely
and relative to its income level in housing, feeding, and clothing its vast
population. It also does well relative to its income level in education and
access to medical care. However, China is a relatively poor country, with
wide regional disparities and a rapidly growing income gap not only
between rural and urban areas but within cities as well. The new leader-
ship of Hu and Wen has shown sensitivity to issues of social justice, imple-
menting a number of policies to ease the hardships of those who have lost
out in the transition to a more competitive capitalist economic system. In
so doing, they are able to draw on a rich tradition of "people as the basis,"
stretching back to Mencius, that requires leaders to ensure the material and
spiritual wellbeing of the people. While such traditions are grounded in a
357. See infra Table 5.1. To be sure, we are now at a point where generalizations
about the legal system are likely to conceal as much as they reveal. While we cannot
avoid referring to the legal system at a whole in some cases for comparative purposes,
for most purposes we need to disaggregate the legal system, especially when it comes to
a discussion of the courts. What parties can expect from courts differs widely depend-
ing on: (i) the level of court; (ii) the location of the court; and (iii) the type of issue
before the court, which determines the division within the court that will hear the case.
Typically higher level courts are better than lower level courts. Couts located in major
cities, and in the East, tend to be better than courts in rural areas and in the middle and
Western regions. Judges handling commercial cases, including foreign investment and
intellectual property cases, and criminal cases, tend to be more qualified than judges
handling enforcement actions or smaller claims.
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non-liberal paternalistic worldview, they nonetheless provide a normative
basis for social, economic, cultural, and collective rights claims today.
Women's rights also present a mixed picture, as is generally true eve-
rywhere. China has made undeniable progress in improving women's
lives. Nevertheless, the government's representative acknowledged in his
report to the CEDAW Committee in 1999 that despite the government's
efforts to include women in the nation's development, many rural women
are still poor, many are still illiterate, and many women workers have been
laid off during the economic transition.358 The participation of women in
political life is still low, especially at higher levels of government; domestic
violence still occurs frequently; and social ills such as female trafficking
and infanticide remain problems.359 The spokesperson emphasized, how-
ever, that the government is determined to continue its efforts, and wel-
comed the support of the international community. Yet further progress is
likely to be slow. Gender issues are deeply embedded in a society's tradi-
tions and lifeforms, and thus require a holistic approach involving funda-
mental changes in social norms and structural changes in the economic,
political and legal orders.
China has made considerable efforts to improve the lives of its many
ethnic minorities through a series of policies to stimulate economic growth
and a complicated regulatory framework that establishes special autono-
mous zones for Tibet, Xinjiang, and other ethnic regions, and provides
preferential treatment in employment, education, and family planning to
minorities. Nevertheless, as in other countries, ethnic divisions, often
based on religious identities, have led to tensions between the Hans and
other ethnic groups and have precipitated calls for greater autonomy and
even secession. Conflicting views about the effects of government policies,
conflicting interpretations of the facts, and normative differences have
resulted in widely different assessments of China's record on cultural
rights between Hans and members of the various minority groups. Due in
part to efforts to improve the living conditions of minorities and in part to
the implementation of tight controls, China has managed for the most part
to avoid large-scale ethnic conflicts. However, sporadic bombings and
other acts of violence have occurred. The government has responded with
force, and by tightening control on possible sources of dissent.
More recently, the government has had to deal with the no-win situa-
tion of North Korean refugees. 360 Neither government leaders nor most
Chinese want a massive influx of poor North Koreans seeking greater eco-
nomic opportunities. Nor does the government want to further complicate
its relationship with North Korea at a time when Kim Jong-I1 is developing
nuclear weapons. However, refugees continue to flood across the border,
often seeking asylum in embassies in Beijing or slipping into local commu-
nities, where many women end up in prostitution or being trafficked as
358. Report of Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 256, 7 257, at 29-30.
359. See id. '1 285 & 291, at 32; c 299, at 33.
360. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
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brides to poor areas.361
1. Causes of Rights Problems and General Constraints on Improved
Performance
Economic factors go a long way toward explaining both the improve-
ments in rights performance in recent decades and the continuing
problems, many of which are directly or indirectly related to poverty and
lack of resources. Ongoing deficiencies in access to food, clean water,
medical care, and education are most directly related to China's relatively
low level of economic development, although a weak tax system and poli-
cies that fail to redistribute resources from China's increasingly wealthy
high-income earners exacerbate the problems. Economic growth is there-
fore necessary but not sufficient to sustain improvements in social and eco-
nomic rights and other indicators of human wellbeing. Wealth, or the lack
thereof, also contributes to ethnic tensions and even a higher incidence of
violations of personal integrity and civil and political rights: economically
well-off people generally do not take to the streets to protest, favoring less
confrontational channels for advancing their interests that do not threaten
social stability or challenge the State to the same degree. Indeed, China's
nouveau riche tend to be politically conservative and supportive of the
regime, if only out of fear that demands for faster political reforms will lead
to political instability and social chaos, thus undermining their steady
incomes and threatening their comfortable lifestyles. In contrast, most
protests result from economic injustices, often by people who have little to
lose. The elderly are the most likely to protest, largely because many of
them are desperate and need their retirement funds to survive, although
they also take to the streets because of a genuine sense of grievance that the
State has violated the previous social contract whereby they would work for
low wages in exchange for lifetime employment and cradle-to-grave social
welfare. 362 Many other main areas of conflict are also fundamentally eco-
nomic in nature, including the problems associated with laid-off workers
and labor activism, government takings and relocation, migrant workers,
and urban crime -the majority of which is committed by migrant workers
with little money in their pockets.
Population size is relevant in several ways. First, China's huge popula-
tion is directly tied to quality of life as reflected in social and economic
measures because limited resources are spread thin over large numbers.
Second, as elsewhere, population size is a proxy for ethnic diversity, which
leads to conflicts between minority groups and the government, between
minorities and the majority Hans, and among minorities.363 Such con-
flicts may result in restrictions on civil and political rights, especially in
361. Id.
362. See HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 219 (2003) (discussing recent
protests by retired workers), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k3/asia4.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2004).
363. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 343 (discussing the Tibetan conflicts with the State,
with Hans, and with Muslims).
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Xinjiang and Tibet, and complicate the issue of cultural rights. Third, the
sheer size of the population results in a "large" number of violations of
physical integrity rights and civil and political rights, though proportion-
ally the number is small.36 4 Fourth, and more substantively, the size of the
population makes control more difficult and instability more likely; thus,
the expected danger value, calculated by multiplying the likelihood of
instability by the consequences of chaos, is also higher. In a country the
size of China, even the most radical anti-government movements and
bizarre cults attract significant followings, especially now that the Internet
has facilitated long-distance communications.
Political, ideological and cultural factors also explain some of the
results, particularly with respect to the tight restraints on civil and political
rights.36 5 China's leaders do not apologize for not being liberals. Clearly
statist socialism influences the government's general position on human
rights and as well as the outcome in particular cases. Liberal democracies
are frequently characterized by a neutral state in which the normative
agenda for society is determined by the people through elections and a
limited state with an expansive private sphere and robust civil society inde-
pendent of the State.3 6 6 In contrast, China's statist socialism is defined by
single party rule, elections at only the lowest level of government and at
present a nomenklatura system of appointments whereby the highest level
personnel in all government organs including the courts are chosen or
approved by the Party. Rather than a neutral state, the Party in its role as
vanguard sets the normative agenda for society. In addition, there is a
smaller private sphere and a correspondingly larger role for the state in
supervising and guiding social activities.
Political views in China are not limited to either support for statist
socialism or liberal democracy. 3 67 There is also considerable support for
neo- or soft authoritarianism, and for various forms of communitarian-
ism.3 68 Neo-Authoritarians prefer single party rule to genuine democracy.
They would either do away with elections, or were that not politically feasi-
ble, limit elections to lower levels of government. If forced by domestic or
international pressure to hold national elections, they would attempt to
control the outcome by imposing limits on the opposition party or through
364. See supra notes 89-90.
365. Cultural factors are evident in women's issues, including domestic violence, the
rights of the child, female infanticide and the preference for male children, the reliance
on the family to pick up the slack left by a poor state welfare system, and in preferences
for group over individual interests across a range of issues.
366. The following discussion can also be found at Randall Peerenboom, Let One
Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23
MIcH. J. INT'L L. 471, 492-93 (2002).
367. For a more extensive discussion of the views of statist socialists, neo-authoritari-
ans, communitarians and liberal democrats regarding politics, the economy, rights, and
rule of law, see PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39,
at 71-90. 1 also include polling data that demonstrates the existence and strength of
these viewpoints on a number of issues.
368. The following discussion can also be found at Peerenboom, supra note 366, at
492-96.
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their monopoly on major media channels. Like the Statist Socialists, they
reject the neutral state and favor a large role for the government in control-
ling social activities. Nevertheless, they would tolerate a somewhat smaller
role for the government and a correspondingly larger civil society, albeit
one still subject to restrictions and characterized by corporatism.
In contrast, Communitarians support genuine, though not necessarily
immediate, multiparty democratic elections at all levels of government.
Urban communitarians fear chaos, and distrust the rural population. Con-
sequently, many are willing to postpone national elections in favor of a
more gradual process where elections are permitted at successively higher
levels of government. Like the Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians,
they believe state leaders should determine the normative agenda for soci-
ety, and hence allow a larger role for the state in managing social activities
than in a liberal democratic state. However, they prefer a somewhat more
expansive civil society. Although some groups, particularly commercial
associations, might find close relationships with the government helpful,
other more social or spiritual groups might not. Communitarians would
permit these spiritual groups to operate without state involvement, pro-
vided they are not seen as challenging public order or morality.3 69
In terms of rights, liberal democrats favor civil and political rights over
economic, social and cultural fights. Rights are often conceived of in deon-
tological terms as distinct from and normatively superior to interests. 3 70
Rights are considered to be prior to the good (and interests) both in the
sense that rights "trump" the good/interests and in that rights are based
not on utility, interests or consequences but on moral principles whose
justification is derived independently of the good.3 71 To protect individuals
and minorities against the tyranny of the majority, rights impose limits on
the interests of others, the good of society and the will of the majority.
Substantively, freedom is privileged over order, individual autonomy takes
precedence over social solidarity and harmony, and freedom of thought
and the right to think win out over the need for common ground and right
thinking on important social issues. 3 72 In addition, rights are emphasized
rather than duties or virtues.
In contrast, Communitarians endorse a communitarian or collectivist
interpretation of human rights that emphasizes the indivisibility of rights.
Greater emphasis in placed on collective rights and the need for economic
369. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOwARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
78.
370. See also Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in
China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (1995),
371. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOwARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
78. See also JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30-33 (1st ed. 1971) (discussing the
priority of rights and utilitarianism); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
94-100 (1st ed. 1977) (discussing the relationship between rights and utility).
372. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOwARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at
78. See also Randall Peerenboom, Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought: The Right
to Think Versus Right Thinking, in CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 234, 253 (Wm The-
odore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998).
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growth, even if at the expense of individual civil and political rights.
Rather than a deontological conception of rights as antimajoritarian
trumps on the social good, rights are more often conceived of in utilitarian
or pragmatic terms as another type of interest to be weighed against other
interests, including the interests of groups and society as a whole. Accord-
ingly, stability is privileged over freedom; social solidarity and harmony
are as important, if not more so, than autonomy and freedom of thought;
and the right to think is limited by the need for common ground and con-
sensus on important social issues. Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians
and Statist Socialists also pay more attention than Liberal Democrats to the
development of moral character and virtues and the need to be aware of
one's duties to other individuals, one's family, members of the community
and the nation.373
As with Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians and Statist Socialists
view rights in utilitarian or pragmatic terms. However, unlike Com-
munitarians, they favor a more central role for the State. 374 Statist Social-
ists are especially likely to view rights as grants received from the State and
useful tools for strengthening the nation and the ruling regime. Conse-
quently, they are more likely than Neo-Authoritarians to invoke State sover-
eignty, "Asian Values" and the threat of cultural imperialism to prevent
other countries from interfering in their internal affairs while overseeing
the destruction of the communities and traditional cultures and value sys-
tems that they were allegedly defending. Nevertheless, Communitarians
and Neo-Authoritarians in China are also likely to object to strong-arm
politics and the use of rights to impose culture-specific values on China or
to extract trade concessions in the form of greater access to Chinese mar-
kets. Moreover, like Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians and Statist
Socialists favor order over freedom. They go even farther than Com-
munitarians, however, in tilting the scales toward social solidarity and har-
mony rather than autonomy, and are willing to impose more limits on
freedom of thought and speech.375 While Neo-Authoritarians prefer to
restrict the right of citizens to criticize the government, Statist Socialists
prefer broader restrictions, drawing a clear line at public attacks on the
ruling party or challenges to single party socialism. 376 Despite recent soci-
etal changes that have reduced the effectiveness of "thought work," Statist
Socialists continue to emphasize its role in ensuring a common consensus
on important social issues.
On some issues, there are clear preferences among the majority of citi-
zens, notwithstanding the general differences among the various camps.
There is for example a clear preference for stability and economic growth,
even if that means postponing democracy and tolerating for the time being
greater restrictions on civil and political rights. At the same time, there is
373. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TowARD RULE OF LAw, supra note 39, at
78-79.
374. See id. at 79.
375. See id.
376. Id.
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little support for political dissidents or for liberal democrats who push for
liberal interpretations on many rights issues or for immediate
democratization.
Similarly, there is wide support for the war on crime. Polls in 1995,
1996, and 1997 found that social stability and crime topped the concerns
of urban residents. 3 77 The public has strongly supported the government's
periodic strike-hard campaigns. One poll of 1000 residents in Guangzhou
found that 81% felt social order had improved in 2001, and that 73%
believed the strike-hard campaign contributed significantly to the improve-
ment.378 The People's Daily reported that 90% of Beijing citizens believed
that the campaign in December 2001 improved their safety. 379
There clearly is widespread public support for heavy punishments,
including the death penalty. In a 1995 survey of 5006 citizens, less than
1% believed that the death penalty should be abolished. 380 In fact, more
than 22% believed that there were too few death sentences. 38 1 Although
public opinion polls about crime may sometimes be misleading in that the
questions fail to distinguish between serious crime and petty crime, in
China the public's support for heavy punishments runs the gamut from
violent crimes to property and economic crimes to drug use and morality
crimes. 38 2 In the Guangzhou poll, almost two-thirds remained seriously
concerned about theft and robbery and hoped that the government would
take additional steps to deal with these crimes.38 3 Meanwhile, a 1997 sur-
vey of 1200 Beijing residents found that 90 percent believed drugs would
become a major menace to morality and the nation if effective measures
were not taken, and urged the government to impose heavier punish-
ments.38 4 Where there is such a clear majority preference, reforms that go
against the tide are not likely to be passed into law; even if they do become
377. See U.S. Embassy Beijing, Beijing Environment, Science and Technology Update,
Nov. 3, 2000, at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/estnews1103.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2004). Interestingly, in 2000, a poll of 3000 urban residents in ten cities
found that social stability and crime ranked fourth, behind environmental issues, unem-
ployment, and children's education. Id.
378. See PRC Survey: Most Guangzhou Residents Satisfied with Public Order, XINHUA,
Dec. 14, 2001. The approval rate was some 35% higher than the year before. Id.
379. Beijing Succeeds in Crackdown on Crimes, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2001, at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/01/eng20011201_85738.shtml (last visited
Nov. 4, 2004).
380. Hu Yunteng, Application of the Death Penalty in Chinese Judicial Practice, in IMPLE-
MENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 247, 255 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds.,
2002).
381. Id. See also Amnesty International, The Death Penalty in China: Breaking Records,
Breaking Rules, Aug. 1, 1997, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/
ASA170381997 (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
382. See BORGE BAKKEN, THE EXEMPLARY SOCIETY: HUMAN IMPROVEMENT, SOCIAL CON-
TROL, AND THE DANGERS OF MODERNITY IN CHINA 395 (2000) (noting that a survey of
15,000 people showed that almost 60% thought the state was too lenient in handling
criminals, while only 2% thought it was too strict).
383. See PRC Survey: Most Guangzhou Residents Satisfied with Public Order, supra note
378.
384. See Residents Eager for Drug Fight, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Aug. 18, 1997.
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law, there is a good chance that the laws will not be implemented in
practice.
Institutional factors also inhibit the protection and advancement of
rights. Although China has various official and quasi-official human rights
research centers, there is no national human rights commission or
ombudsmen for the promotion of human rights. Nor is there an Asian
regional system comparable to that in Europe, the Americas or Africa that
could serve as a source for rights promotion or the development of juris-
prudence. Of course, given its sovereignty concerns, China is not likely to
accept the jurisdiction of a regional court adjudicating issues arising in
China or between China and other member states.
China's domestic legal system remains relatively weak, although it has
greatly improved in many ways over the last twenty years. Courts are able
to handle most cases competently and independently. Party organs rarely
intervene in individual cases. 385 Nevertheless, the judiciary still lacks the
authority to decide many controversial political and social cases indepen-
dently, as suggested by the long delays before issuing verdicts in some of
the civil and political rights cases discussed previously.
Even when courts do decide cases independently, they are obligated to
apply non-liberal laws, such as those that recognize only registered social
organizations and require prior authorization to demonstrate, while giving
the authorities broad grounds to deny applicants permits and wide discre-
tion in interpreting vague laws on state secrets, endangering the State, and
disturbing the public order. The lack of a constitutional review body
arguably also impedes the protection of rights, although such a body
would most likely not be all that liberal and effective given the current
circumstances.
Due process violations continue to be a problem in run-of-the-mill
criminal cases as well as politically sensitive cases. Criminal defense law-
yers have been harassed, with more than 400 having been detained since
1997.386 Recent regulations and reforms have attempted to strengthen the
position of criminal defense lawyers.3 8 7 However, the persisting influence
385. While Party intervention has declined, judges continue to receive pressure from
a variety of other sources, including local government officials, people's congresses and
members of society who have an interest in the case and connections within the court.
See PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 39, at 18.
386. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52 (citing the All China Lawyers Association).
The lawyer for Du Daobin apparently had his license to practice cancelled as a result of
his efforts, although the details of the case are unclear. The sentencing of well-known
Beijing defense lawyer Zhang Jianzhong to two years for fabricating evidence in a cor-
ruption case led to a protest petition signed by 600 lawyers. Shanghai housing advocate
Zheng Enchong was also sentenced to three years for revealing state secrets. Zheng faxed
an article from an internal publication for government officials to an overseas human
rights organization, noting the source on the fax. The court's judgment states that
Zheng confessed, and that he knowingly sent the internal document to foreign organiza-
tions in part to enlist support in his struggle to get the local justice bureau to renew his
license to practice. The court does not discuss why Zheng would have encountered
problems renewing his license. Id.
387. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Yinfa Guanyu Renmin
Jianchayuan Baozheng Lushi zai Xingshi Susong Zhong Yifa Zhiye de Guiding de
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of the inquisitorial approach with its limited role for defense counsel, the
public's desire to strike hard at crime, and problems within the legal pro-
fession itself suggest that criminal lawyers will be fighting an uphill battle
for some time to come.
III. Why China Is Held to a Double Standard
Notwithstanding many problems, China does fairly well relative to
income level on most human rights measures, with the exception of civil
and political rights. There has been improvement over the last twenty years
in every category, albeit more limited progress in the area of civil and politi-
cal liberties. Unlike the situation in many countries, most citizens are
happy with their lives, optimistic about the future, and relatively satisfied
with the government on the whole, largely because the government has
been successful at maintaining stability and improving the living standards
of most people. 38 8 Nevertheless, virtually every year the United States and
its allies mount a high-profile campaign to censure China in Geneva,
although every time, including in 2004, the motion is defeated. Why?
A. Bang for the Buck: China's Large Size Justifies All the Attention
Critics claim that improving the rights situation in China would bene-
fit one-fifth of the world's people, and thus focusing resources on China is
justified. However, India also received a level-4 PTS rating, and suffers
from much more severe poverty than China, with twice as many people
living on less than $1/day and twice the rate of infant mortality, while its
good governance rankings, with the exception of voice and accountability,
are similar to those of China.38 9
Moreover, while India and China both received level-4 PTS ratings, vio-
lations of physical integrity rights in India appear to be more severe.3 90 In
2001 and 2002, security forces killed an average of 1600 militants per
Tongzhi [Regulations to Guarantee the Lawful Practice of Lawyers in Criminal Cases,
Supreme People's Procuracy], Feb. 10, 2004.
388. Some 65% of Chinese are optimistic about the future and think their lives will
improve in the next five years, compared to only 8% who anticipate being worse off. Pew
Global Attitudes Project, supra note 40. In addition, 51% are satisfied with their house-
hold income, 82% are satisfied with their family life, and 63% are satisfied with their
job. Almost half of Chinese and almost 70% of Vietnamese are satisfied with the govern-
ment, whereas between 75% and 92% of citizens are dissatisfied with the government in
democratic Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Id.
389. See infra Tables 1.1 & 2.1 and Figure 2.1. India is a low income country, while
China is a lower middle income country. Hence, China would be expected to have a
worse record than India for these indicators. Like China, India actually does better rela-
tive to the average country in its income class on most good governance indicators. See
infra Table 5.1 Whereas China scores poorly on civil and political rights (voice and
accountability), India scores highly. However, China does much better in terms of polit-
ical stability. See infra Table 4.1.
390. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices, India-2003, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27947.htm (Feb. 25,
2004).
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year.391 Some of those killings occurred in "fake encounters," where the
security forces summarily executed suspected militants and other civilians
offering no resistance. The bodies of many of those killed showed signs of
torture and bore multiple bullet wounds. 392 Estimates of unexplained dis-
appearances in Kashmir and Jammu alone since 1990 range from nearly
4000 according to government sources up to 8000 according to NGOs. 3 9 3
Security forces reportedly used civilians as human shields while patrolling
and in searching for landmines. Military and paramilitary troops also
engaged in abduction, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention. Death in cus-
tody for both suspected militants and ordinary criminals is common. In
2001, there were over 1300 deaths in custody nationwide. 394 The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture has claimed that security forces systemati-
cally tortured suspected militants to coerce confessions and to obtain infor-
mation.395 The authorities also tortured detainees to extort money or as
summary punishments. Rape while in custody is common. 396 In addition,
prison officials reportedly use prisoners as personal servants and have
sold female prisoners to brothels. Yet few members of the security forces
are ever held accountable. Antiterrorism and national security laws have
been used to detain people for long periods of time, without judicial
review, while permitting the use of testimony obtained under duress. 39 7
Thousands of ordinary criminal suspects remain in detention without
charge, which is a violation of Indian law.398 India's legal system, plagued
by corruption and a lack of resources, is overburdened and unable to try
civil or criminal cases in a timely manner.399 As of July 2002, there were
13 million cases pending in lower courts, and 3.5 million cases in high
courts. 40 0 Some 75% of detainees were unconvicted prisoners waiting
completion of trial. 401 In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely
functions due to threats against judges and witnesses and tolerance of the
government's heavy-handed crackdown on terrorists.40 2
The U.S. State Department also notes "occasional" limits on freedom
of the press and freedom of movement,4° 3 as well as
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. The report claims that there were no political detainees. However, the report
also notes that several people were arrested for expressing support for the banned LTTE
terrorist group, even though the Supreme Court has held that mere moral support for a
terrorist organization does not constitute an offense under the Prevention on Terrorism
Act. Id.
398. Id.
399. See id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Restrictions on freedom of speech and the press in India include the use of crim-
inal defamation laws against journalists and occasional beatings, detentions and harass-
ment of journalists, which has resulted in some self-censorship. The government has
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harassment and arrest of human rights monitors; 40 4 extensive societal vio-
lence against women; 40 5 legal and societal discrimination against women;
forced prostitution; child prostitution and female infanticide; discrimination
against persons with disabilities; serious discrimination and violence
against indigenous people and scheduled castes and tribes;40 6 widespread
intercaste and communal violence; religiously motivated violence against
Muslims and Christians; widespread exploitations of indentured, bonded,
and child labor; and trafficking in women and children. 40 7
Despite such problems-which taken together are at least as serious as
the problems in China without even considering China's better perform-
ance at reducing poverty and economic rights generally-the U.S. and its
Western allies never once sponsored a motion to censure India for rights
violations during the period 1990-2004, when China was subject to eleven
also sought to influence the media by threatening to revoke state advertising. In addi-
tion, the government bans books, including Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, and
prohibits objectionable content on satellite channels, notably morally inappropriate
tobacco and alcohol advertisements. The government also limits access to the Internet,
and has arrested people on conspiracy charges for posting articles. The government
restricts academic freedom, most notably by regulating academic partnerships between
Indian and Western universities in line with Hindutva philosophy, which advocates a
higher profile for Hindu cultural norms in public education. Some advocates of
Hindutva oppose conversion from Hinduism and believe all Indian citizens should
adhere to Hindu values, including resisting changes to the caste system. Religious ten-
sion between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians threatens the secular foundation of the
State, and has led to bombings, rioting and murders. Accordingly, the Religious Institu-
tions (Prevention of Misuse) Act prohibits the use of any religious site for political pur-
poses. Foreign Christian missionaries, who must obtain permits, have not been allowed
access to Northeastern states because of concerns about political stability. Although
freedom of assembly is generally respected, permits are required to demonstrate, and
separatist groups are routinely denied permits. Furthermore, the police have used force
to maintain control. Id.
404. Human rights organizations were not allowed to move about freely in Jammu
and Kashmir due to fear of attacks by security forces and militants. Several individuals
have documented abuses in these areas, including lawyers and journalists, and have
subsequently been attacked or killed. The government's investigation of the 2002 kill-
ing of human rights lawyer Naveleen Kumar has yet to produce any results. The govern-
ment also refused a visa to the Secretary General of Al after Al issued a critical report
regarding the government handling of the religious-based violence in Gujarat. The gov-
ernment refused to allow the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial
Killings to visit in 2002. Id.
405. Domestic violence is widespread. Shockingly, even 56% of women claim that
domestic violence is justified. Upper caste gangs engaged in mass rapes of lower caste
women as part of a strategy of intimidation, and gang rapes were used as punishment
for adultery or as coercion or revenge in rural property disputes. However, police rou-
tinely refuse to arrest rapists, while the courts fully adjudicate only 10% of rape cases.
This creates a culture of impunity for rapists. Dowry disputes remain common.
Although banned, Sati-the burning of widows on their husbands' funeral pyre-contin-
ues in some areas. Id.
406. Dalits or "untouchables", the lowest caste, make up the majority of bonded labor,
face segregation in housing and marriage, and tend to be malnourished, poor, and illit-
erate. Brahmins, the highest caste, make up 78% of the judiciary and 50% of the parlia-
ment, even though they constitute just 3.5% of the population. Id.
407. Id.
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motions. 40 8 Nor has the U.S. State Department cited India as a country of
political concern, despite condemning China for "egregious, systematic
ongoing abuses of right of religious freedom," even though the Commis-
sion on International Religious Freedom, an independent nine-member
advisory body established by Congress, urged it to do so. The Commission
cited among other serious problems fatal attacks against Muslims and
Hindus and the government's failure to address adequately the killing of as
many as 2000 people in Gujarat in 2002.409
Population size may matter, but apparently not when it comes to even-
handed treatment of rights violations. Even if, as critics allege, China mer-
its additional attention because of its size, there is no excuse for distortions
of the factual record or for failures to provide a balanced view that presents
China's rights performance within a comparative context. If anything, the
extra attention and resources spent on China should lead to more careful
study, a better understanding of the local context and the issues, and ulti-
mately more nuanced and higher quality reports.
B. Emphasis on Civil and Political Rights Violations and Bias Against
Non-Democracies
A more likely explanation than pure size for all the attention paid to
China is that there is some truth to Beijing's complaint that the human
rights regime is biased toward liberal democracy and does not want to see a
non-liberal democratic regime succeed. The bias of the human rights
regime and the media against non-liberal democratic regimes is longstand-
ing. 4 10 U.N. resolutions for systematic government violations of human
rights have overwhelmingly been meted out against a handful of
nondemocratic developing countries with poor civil and political rights
records, even though they may do relatively better on other human rights
measures and indicators of wellbeing, including physical integrity viola-
tions.4 1 1 A study of the U.N. Human Rights Commission from 1982-1997
408. See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 81. As Wheeler's study ended in 1997, 1 have
updated the results through 2004.
409. Press Release, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Religious
Freedom Commission Cites Countries of Particular Concern, (Feb. 18, 2004) (on file
with author).
410. Jay Ovsiovitch, A Distorted Image? Factors Influencing the U.S. Media's Coverage
of Human Rights, 4 POL'Y STUD. & DEv. NATIONS 85, 91, 93 (1996) (finding bias against
communist regimes and that the presence of a bureau in the country leads to more
reports of human rights violations).
411. In 2002, China, which received a 4 on the PTS scale, was targeted for criticism
for systematic violations in Geneva, while only Afghanistan among the eight countries
with the worst PTS rating of 5, was targeted. The democratic or semi-democratic states
of Israel, Liberia, and Colombia, all of which had a PTS rating of 5, were not targeted for
systematic violations, although Israel was subject to criticism with respect to the human
rights situation in occupied Palestine. Indeed, China was one of only four countries
with a level-4 rating to be targeted for systematic government violations. Even though
there were 22 countries with a level-4 rating, almost half of them democracies or semi-
democracies, all four targeted countries were non-democracies, with the possible excep-
tion of Iran, which arguably might be classified as a semi-democracy. Furthermore,
three out of the four countries with a PTS rating of 3 or 2 that were subject to a motion
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found that "most draft resolutions which target governments for systematic
human rights violations are introduced by Western states and place a
heavy emphasis on civil and political rights which are lacking in many
Third World states."4 12 The report also acknowledged the legitimacy of
complaints of bias on the part of China and other developing countries:
It is true, as some Third World states complain, that Western states are sel-
dom targeted in Commission resolutions and that none has been targeted
for domestic human rights violations of any kind. That the Commission has
been unable to pass even a single resolution addressing human rights condi-
tions in a Western state reduces its credibility as a representative of human
rights for the entire international community and gives rise to criticisms,
such as China's, that developed states 'have made every effort to attack
developing countries with so-called human rights abuses while turning a
blind eye to their own inglorious human rights record. In fact, they have
turned the Commission into a "court" where they put developing countries
on trial.'4 13
Much of the reporting on China continues to be framed by the narra-
tive of "good dissidents" battling the "evil oppressive state" in a noble quest
for democracy and social justice. Indeed, the Western press still treats
each passing of June 4th as a major event, while within China the broad
public has already moved on, and the day is often passed without notice.
Moreover, in reporting on the annual roundup of dissidents and
Tiananmen Mothers, the Western press usually applies the same distorting
lens of a broad-based struggle for democracy as in the first round. In 1989,
the press, reflecting its own concerns rather than the actual concerns of
the demonstrators, managed to take the incoherent and conflicting
demands of students, which merged with popular dissatisfaction over infla-
tion and corruption, and transform the hodgepodge into a movement for
democracy. Today, the calls for reversal of the government's verdict on
Tiananmen and justice for those who lost relatives are portrayed as a popu-
lar uprising for democracy. However, supporters of a reversal on
Tiananmen, who already appear to constitute a minority of the citizenry,
do not necessarily support democracy. In any event, whatever the views
for systematic government violations were non-democracies, the exception being semi-
democratic Cambodia. If Iran and Cambodia are considered non-democracies, then all
of the motions for systematic government violations in 2002 were against non-democra-
cies, even though many democracies or semi-democracies had worse or equally poor
records with respect to personal integrity violations.
412. Wheeler, supra note 1, at 75, 86. Observing that only twenty-two governments
have been the subject of resolutions for systematic rights violations, the report pointed
out that "only a few offenders have been designated in resolutions for any type of
human rights violations, generally those states with insufficient political clout to mobil-
ize regional opposition to their passage .... Id. at 98. Among the notable absentees on
the list of countries targeted by resolutions for systematic rights violations is U.S. ally
Saudi Arabia. Less explicable is the absence of Cambodia during the Pol Pot years. See
also Jack Donnelly, Human Rights at the United Nations, 1955-1985: The Question of Bias,
32 Irr'L STUD. Q. 275, 288 (1988) ("[Cjertain countries are singled out, for partisan
purposes, to the exclusion of other, no less reprehensible regimes.").
413. Wheeler, supra note 1, at 99 (citing China Accuses Developed Nations of "Confron-
tation" at UN Human Rights Forum, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Mar. 16, 1997).
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about democracy among those who believe Tiananmen should be revisited,
support for dissidents, liberals and democracy in the form of general elec-
tions is limited among the broader public. Most people continue to focus
mainly on improving their standard of living, which is entirely understand-
able in a country in which 46% of the populace lives on less than $2/
day.4 14
Human rights NGOs have historically targeted civil and political
rights violations, and continue to devote most resources to such issues.
4 15
Reports of dissidents being arrested, newspaper editors being sacked, pris-
oners being tortured-these might seem to be the kind of stories one can
sink one's teeth into, as opposed to dry statistics about increases in Gini
coefficients and the wage differentials between men and women sorted by
industrial sector. But one should just as easily be able to relate to stories of
children living in shacks without water, of families so poor that they can-
not afford to take dear-old grannie to the hospital, or of gray-haired pen-
sioners forced to take to the streets in protest over not being paid their
paltry retirements benefits. 4 16 The emotive appeal of the issue alone can-
not explain the difference in coverage.
Perhaps part of the fascination with civil and political rights is that
they seem to be real rights-legal entitlements enforceable in courts. There
is the drama of a court case, where the lone individual goes up David-like
against the all-powerful state, aided only by his sidekick, the high-minded
lawyer out to ensure justice despite the odds. Since most countries, includ-
ing China, continue to treat most social and economic rights as non-justici-
able, advocates are forced to fall back on statistics and to make policy
arguments about how resources are to be allocated. They must work
through the legislative and administrative channels, a process that requires
more consensus-building than social activist litigation and is at odds with
the confrontational and accusatory style of many human rights NGOs.
Civil and political rights issues might also seem easier to solve. While
the distinction between civil and political rights as negative rights and
social and economic rights as positive rights is easily overstated, the dis-
tinction is still significant. The latter arguably do require more resources
and involve larger scale resource allocation decisions, even allowing that it
is not cheap to run a democracy and establish a functional judiciary that
meets the requirements of rule of law, as evidenced by the empirical stud-
ies that show a high correlation between wealth, democracy, civil and polit-
ical rights and rule of law.
414. See infra Table 1.1.
415. See generally U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. 2, 1 466, at 82, U.N. Doc. E/1993/
22E/C.12/1992/2, (1993) (criticizing the emphasis on civil and political rights at the
expense of economic, social and cultural rights). Amnesty International and other
NGOs have traditionally excluded economic rights from their mandate, although they
have recently begun to focus more on poverty and economic development issues. See
Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 619 (1996).
416. To give credit where credit is due, the general media does often cover such stories
of economic hardship.
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Moreover, emphasizing social and economic rights leads directly to
questions about globalization, global inequality, and who benefits from
neoliberal trade policies. Perhaps citizens in developed countries simply
prefer to blame evil governments for depriving people of civil and political
rights rather than consider their own responsibility for starving children or
the tendency of rich countries to exploit technological advantages for profit
through an intellectual property regime that keeps life-saving medicines
out of the hands of the sick and dying in developing countries.
Whatever the reasons for the greater attention paid to civil and politi-
cal rights and democracy, the nature of the reports regarding rights issues
tends to skew the picture. Most reports focus on individual civil and politi-
cal rights cases, often either ignoring or paying short shrift to China's
accomplishments in raising living standards, improving the legal system,
and negotiating the difficult transition to a market economy without major
chaos. Discussions of human rights in China rarely provide a comparative
framework that would put China's record as a lower-middle income transi-
tional country in perspective. Given the correlation between wealth and all
types of rights, holding China to the standards of wealthy countries such
as the U.S. simply leads to the foregone conclusion that China's rights per-
formance falls far short of that of the United States. Perhaps this allows
Americans to feel morally superior, and to avoid the uncomfortable fact
that the U.S. fares poorly relative to other countries in its income class on a
number of human rights measures. But it misses the crucial point that
when placed in a comparative perspective, China outperforms the average
country in its income class on all major human rights indicators except
civil and political rights.
The U.S. State Department reports for China as well as other countries
invariably start with a description of the nature of the political regime, as if
that were the most significant determinant for rights in the country. To be
sure, the reports only discuss civil and political rights, in itself a clear indi-
cator of bias. The 2004 report on China begins: "The People's Republic
China . . . is an authoritarian state in which ... the Chinese Communist
Party ... is the paramount source of power." 4 17 Imagine it began instead:
"Human rights and other indicators of wellbeing across the board are
highly correlated with wealth. China outperforms the average country in
its lower-middle income category on every major indicator except civil and
political rights (as is generally true for other East Asian countries)."
Since empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that wealth is a
more important factor than regime type even with respect to civil and polit-
ical rights, beginning with a statement of China's income level and a com-
parison to the average country in its income class would go a long way
toward placing China's performance within a more meaningful compara-
tive context, and presumably better serve the legislative intent behind the
reports by allowing members of the U.S. congress to better assess China's
rights performance. It might also diminish the feeling among Chinese that
417. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 52.
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China is being singled out for particularly harsh criticism because of its
nondemocratic nature.
Notwithstanding China's overall steady progress across a range of
human rights indicators, State Department reports in 1999, 2000 and
2001 claimed that the human rights situation deteriorated or worsened. 4 18
Every year the reports have painted a dismal picture, with reports from
1995 to 2001 claiming "widespread" violations, and reports from 2002 to
2004 claiming "numerous" and "serious" abuses. In 1998, when the Clin-
ton administration decided to forego a motion to censure in favor of con-
structive engagement, the report began with a positive statement that
progress had been made, but then immediately qualified that claim by not-
418. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001 (2002); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2000 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 COUNTRY
REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999 (2000). In her testimony before the U.S. Congress, Hom,
supra note 84, stated:
Although there have been areas of improvement-increased average living stan-
dards, access to information, greater government participation in the interna-
tional human rights regime-the human rights situation is generally worsening
in other respects for the vast majority of China's people .... [T]he human rights
situation has overall deteriorated seriously and is marked by growing social ine-
qualities and poverty; massive unemployment; and environmental degradation
reaching crisis dimensions; severe restrictions on freedom of expression, includ-
ing crack-downs on ethnic minorities, religious groups (Falun Gong, under-
ground churches), independent political parties or unions, independent media;
use of torture and mistreatment of prisoners, arbitrary detentions and arrests.
Lawyers taking on cases that are politically sensitive may find themselves intimi-
dated or themselves the target of prosecution.
Id.
Whereas claims of steady deterioration in "human rights" are usually based on
increased violations only in some areas of civil and political rights, Hom suggests a
broader deterioration. Id. There may be ups and downs with respect to some issues and
new problems may arise from time to time, as is true everywhere. Nevertheless, claims
of deterioration across the board for the vast majority of Chinese citizens are not consis-
tent with the empirical evidence showing generally steady improvement in the last
twenty-five years in all main categories, albeit with more limited and less consistent pro-
gress on civil and political rights. Despite problems with unemployment, growing
income differentials and even environmental degradation, the vast majority of Chinese
citizens are far better off as a result of economic reforms during the last two decades. As
demonstrated, infant mortality rates are down, education enrollments are up, people are
living longer, and poverty has been reduced. Moreover, the international human rights
regime has not yet recognized a right to a particular distribution of wealth. Nor have the
rights to employment or to particular environmental standards become justiciable in
most countries. Perhaps more importantly, the proposed solution is unclear. No doubt
Chinese leaders would prefer full employment, a clean environment and zero poverty.
However, the transition from a poor, underdeveloped country with an economy domi-
nated by rural agriculture and state-owned enterprises to a modern, affluent, industrial-
ized society with a large urban population and a market-based economy is always
accompanied by growing unemployment, widening income differentials and environ-
mental degradation. See also KENNETH CHRISTIE & DENNY Roy, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA 219, 232 (2001) (noting that while serious problems remain, "the
CCP can truthfully claim that the average Chinese is better off than before the establish-
ment of the CCP regime, and indeed the total human rights situation (that is, including
socioeconomic as well as civil/political rights) today is the best in China's history").
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ing that serious problems remained and China continued to commit wide-
spread human rights abuses. 419 The only other year to begin with a
positive statement was 1994.420 In addition, brief positive statements are
sometimes included in the introductory section, including praise for legal
reforms, rising living standards, public sector reforms, expansion of the
private sector, or government decisions to release dissidents and allow vis-
its from the Dalai Lama and U.N. rights monitors. The 2001 State Depart-
ment report even noted that many Chinese now have more individual
choice, greater access to information, and expanded economic opportu-
nity.421 However, the few clipped phrases of faint praise are buried in a
long and much more detailed litany of problems and violations.
Although most obvious in the area of civil and political rights, the bias
against non-liberal democratic regimes is also evident in discussions of
rule of law and good governance. As noted, China outperforms the average
in its income class on rule of law and good governance. Yet mentioning
rule of law in relation to China often meets with wide-eyed disbelief and
derision. Some knowledgeable legal commentators even argue that China
lacks a legal system.422 One of the main reasons China's efforts to imple-
ment rule of law are so summarily dismissed is that commentators con-
flate rule of law with liberal democracy. For the same reason, many liberal
human rights critics claim that Singapore lacks rule of law, even though
Singapore's legal system is routinely ranked among the best-if not the
best-in the world.423 To be sure, the U.S. has long enjoyed a reputation as
a country in which the rule of law reigns supreme despite the upholding of
slavery laws, regulations that discriminated against women and denied
them the right to vote, sedition laws that imposed severe limitations on free
speech and rulings that led to the internment behind barbed wire of Ameri-
can citizens of Japanese descent. However, the rise of the human rights
movement, the preference for democracy, and a liberal interpretation of
rights obscure the historical lesson that rule of law and liberal democracy
need not go hand in hand.
The bias against nondemocratic regimes is also reflected in the appli-
cation of intellectual property-related trade sanctions. Throughout the
1990s and still today, China and Russia have been guilty of widespread
419. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998).
420. U.S. Dep't of State, Oversight of the State Department's Country REPORTS on
Human Rights Practices for 1993 and U.S. Human Rights Policy (Feb.i, 1994).
421. 2000 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 418.
422. For a discussion, see PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH ToWARD RULE OF LAW,
supra note 39; see also Randall Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of
China's Alien "Legal System", 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 37 (2003) (suggesting a
broad historical and comparative perspective to analyzing Chinese legal developments,
rather than an outmoded excessively negative approach).
423. For a discussion of rule of law in Singapore, see Li-ann Thio, Rule of law Within a
Non-Liberal "Communitarian" Democracy: The Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES
OF RULE OF LAw, supra note 237, at 183.
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and roughly comparable intellectual property violations. 4 24 Yet while
China was designated a Priority Foreign Country four times, Russia never
made the list.4 25 Members of the U.S. Congress defended the differential
treatment on the ground that the U.S. needed to cut the fledgling democ-
racy in Russia some slack.4 26
C. Human Rights as Power Politics: A Grand Strategy of Containment?
A popular view among Chinese citizens is that other countries are
holding China to a double standard and being excessively critical of China
on human rights issues as part of a grand strategy of containment. There
is no doubt that in some cases concerns about China's growing power
leads to the demonization of China as a godless regime that brutally
oppresses its people. For some critics, China has now taken over for the
Soviet Union as the evil empire whose opposition helps define and affirm
their own identity. For these new post-Cold War warriors, China must be
prevented from becoming so powerful as to challenge American
supremacy. China's ascendancy should be fought at every juncture: eco-
nomically, politically, and militarily. Chinese concerns about containment
are not then purely a figment of their collective imagination.
Nevertheless, the underlying logic of the popular view that criticism
on human rights issues is part of a grand strategy of containment is not
immediately apparent: how will criticizing China on rights issues serve the
purpose of containing China and prevent China from emerging as a
superpower?
The direct effect on China of criticism of its record on rights seems to
be minimal. To be sure, the U.S. has linked trade benefits such as MFN
status and access to WTO to human rights violations. However, concerns
over human rights violations did not prevent China from obtaining MFN
status or from joining the WTO. Moreover, sanctions have been too limited
424. Russia's software piracy rate was actually slightly higher than China's in 2003
(93% to 92%). See USTR 2004 "Special 301" Decisions on Intellectual Property: IIPA's
2003 Estimated Trade Losses Due to Copyright Piracy and Piracy Levels In-Country, availa-
ble at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA USTR_2004_Special-301DECISIONSFINAL_
050304.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
425. Russia was put on the Priority Watch List. But only a Priority Foreign Country
designation allows for the imposition of sanctions after an investigation. Martin Kos-
tadinov Dimitrov, Administrative Decentralization, Legal Fragmentation, and the Rule of
Law in Transitional Economies: The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Laws in China, Russia, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic 87-90 (2004) (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Department of Political Science, Stanford University) (on file with the Stanford
University Library).
426. Id. Less noble concerns over economic self-interest may also have played a role:
intellectual property violations in China cost U.S. companies more than similar viola-
tions in Russia, and American businesses stand to gain more from access to Chinese
markets than to Russian markets. The USTR estimates copyrights violations in China
result in losses of US$2.5 billion per year, as compared to $1.1 billion in Russia. These
numbers rely on the absurd assumption that people in a low-income country such as
China would actually pay full price for products they now purchase at a tenth or twenti-
eth of the full price. See USTR 2004 "Special 301" Decisions on Intellectual Property,
supra note 424.
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to have much of an impact on China's economy, and thus to have much of
a long-term effect in slowing down China's rise to power. Furthermore,
attempts to impose sanctions are offset by other efforts to assist China in
revamping its economic system and achieving growth.
U.S. support for Taiwan reflects to some extent concerns about
China's human rights record, and what would happen if Taiwan were to
come under direct rule by Beijing. But to argue that the U.S. support for
Taiwan is ultimately based on the United States' own geopolitical interests
seems somewhat of a stretch, While a friendly and armed Taiwan may be
useful geopolitically to the U.S., Taiwan is not so important to U.S. security
interests that the U.S. would risk confrontation with China for that reason
alone. A genuine concern about the rights of people in Taiwan were the
island to come under direct rule by Beijing is at least part of the explana-
tion for U.S. policies. Having made promises to Taiwan in the past, the
U.S. must also worry about the message it would send to other countries if
it failed to live up to its commitments.
The U.S. and E.U. have also supported an arms embargo and limita-
tions on sale of dual use technology in part by citing China's poor record
on human rights. Such limitations fit more easily with a containment
strategy, and it is true that some politicians use human rights violations as
an excuse to justify the embargo. However, the E.U. was prepared to termi-
nate the embargo until the Bush regime pressured Tony Blair to reverse
course and oppose the change on the ground that such arms could be used
against the U.S. if it ever found itself defending Taiwan against a PRC
attack.4 27 But by themselves, the limitations do not seem sufficient to sup-
port a strong link between human rights criticisms and a strategy to keep
China in its place.
One seemingly far-fetched conspiracy theory is that the criticism of
China for civil and political rights violations will lead to significant policy
changes, which will in turn lead to chaos, thus setting China back for
years. Advocates of containment may believe that a democratic China
would pose less of a threat, and might believe the economic growth will
lead to a demand for civil and political rights, which will in turn lead to a
demand for democracy and regime change. However, the notion that even
China's harshest critics would wish for chaos to stall China's march toward
power is hard to take seriously given the negative consequences for every-
one if China becomes unstable.
Another possibility is that criticizing China on human rights deprives
China of legitimacy and "soft power" on the international level, thus mak-
ing it more difficult for China to persuade others to join it in pursuing
policies that serve China's interests. China has spent time and political
resources fending off motions to censure. However, China has also man-
aged to pursue a number of bilateral and multilateral relationships, includ-
ing a stronger alliance with Russia and a stronger ASEAN. Indeed, the
427. See Charles Bremner, Britain Aims to Lift Arms Ban on China, TIMES (London),
June 1, 2004, Home News Section, at 1.
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charm offensive of the Hu and Wen regime is widely perceived to be more
effective in winning over allies in the Asian region than Bush's war on ter-
ror-driven, "either you are with me or against me," policies. Notwithstand-
ing such diplomatic successes, the demonization of China may have
impeded China's international influence to some extent.
The views of Chinese government leaders and the majority of citizens
on a number of issues differ from those held by government leaders and
the majority of citizens in the U.S. and Western Europe. China's positions
may be seen as threatening the normative and intellectual hegemony of
liberal democracy and liberal rights. Although China has criticized the
human rights movement for being biased toward liberalism and has begun
to strike back at the U.S. by issuing its own critical report of human rights
in the U.S., it has done so mainly as a defensive measure, on the theory
that the best defense is a good offense. It did not, for example, rush to join
Singapore and Malaysia at the forefront of the debates over Asian values,
even though many of its positions were compatible with the Asian values
platform. 4 28 Rather, China has sought to portray itself as a responsible
member of the international community through increased participation in
the international human rights regime. One day, when China is economi-
cally on a par with the U.S. and Western Europe, there may very well be a
battle for the hearts and minds of the global public based on differing ide-
ologies and competing conceptions and interpretations of rights. Chinese
citizens have tremendous pride in Chinese civilization. Some day Chinese
citizens may very well support their government's efforts to champion a
rights policy that is less liberal and more collectivist or communitarian,
offers states a wider margin of appreciation on contested issues, and rejects
a neo-Kantian deontic justification for rights in favor a more pragmatic
approach. But that day remains far off. Given the rapid evolution of
human rights norms and practices in the last fifty years and possible
changes in geopolitical circumstances, who knows who will be advocating
what positions at that time. It is therefore unlikely that critics are attack-
ing China today as a preemptive strike for a battle that might come several
decades down the road, or might never occur.
Generally, countries gain little by making a major issue of human
rights violations in other countries-which is why they rarely do it. Why
then do the United States and to a lesser extent European countries risk
upsetting economic relations with China by constantly raising human
rights issues? The most likely explanation is that most Americans and
Europeans genuinely believe democracy and liberal rights are best for eve-
ryone, including Chinese. The spread of democracy and freedom has been
part of American political culture for a long time, and central aspects of the
foreign policies of presidents from Wilson to Carter to Reagan and now to
Bush, who has an almost messianic devotion to spreading our way of life
428. See generally PEERENBOOM, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving
Debates about "Values in Asia, supra note 39 (discussing the politics of the debates over
Asian values).
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around the globe.429 European countries are equally committed to a world
of democracy, human rights and rule of law, though generally less heavy-
handed in their approach.
Of course, even when the criticisms of China are motivated by good
intentions, those in China who do not share the same ideals or who do not
believe they are appropriate for China now may still perceive the efforts to
promote such values as a form of hegemony, albeit a well-intentioned
hegemony. 430
429. See e.g., Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum, 27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 29,
29-30 (2003) ("War is now portrayed not as a means of imperial aggrandizement or
bending others to American will, but a necessary liberating force."); President George
W. Bush, Remarks at the Graduating Class of 2002 at the United States Military Acad-
emy, May 23, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020601-3.html (visited Aug. 12, 2004) ("Our nation's cause has always been larger
than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace-a peace that
favors human liberty... Building this just peace is America's opportunity and America's
duty."). America's National Security Strategy states:
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the
United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right
and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no
nation is exempt from them. ... America must stand firmly for the nonnegoti-
able demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of
the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women;
religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3
(2002), available at http://www.whitehous.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (visited Aug. 12, 2004).
Suffice it to say that not everyone shares "the American" conception - as if there were
one unified American view - or more particularly the Bush's regime's conception of
justice, liberty or rule of law, or of what constitutes proper restrictions on free speech, or
how the principles of religious and ethnic tolerance are to be squared with the need to
preserve order in the face of ethnic violence and secession movements.
430. See Randolph B. Persaud, Shades of American Hegemony: The Primitive, the
Enlightened, and the Benevolent, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263 (2004). Persaud helpfully dis-
tinguishes between three forms of American hegemony. Primitive hegemony, closely
associated with neoconservative thinking and containment theories, maintains that it is
natural and appropriate for the U.S. to pursue its own interests at the expense of other
countries or the international order. If necessary, the U.S. should set aside international
law and rely on the threat or use of coercive force to achieve American goals. Enlight-
ened hegemony, which makes more concessions to liberal thought, emphasizes that
America does not have the power to achieve its interests alone in this increasingly inter-
dependent world, and thus attaches more importance to peace, cooperation and multi-
lateralism. Benevolent hegemony is more cultural and based on the missionary zeal to
do good in the world by bringing American values and way of life to everyone. Ameri-
cans, reconstructed as a single harmonious people with common values, are the chosen
people whose mission, should they accept it, is to save the world. Whatever the differ-
ence in methods and motives, all three share a conviction that capital markets, democ-
racy, rule of law, and liberal rights are superior and universally desirable. They all
assume Americans know what is best for other people.
The First Gulf War was estimated to have resulted in 100,000 civilian deaths. Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws
of War, 35 HAv. INT'L LJ. 49, 50 (1994). In response to the criticism that 4000-5000
children were dying every month in Iraq due to U.S. sanctions, Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright declared "we think the price is worth it." Marjorie Cohn, The Myth of
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF Kosovo: THE DANGERS OF HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION 121, 124 (2003). According to U.S. human rights reports, a ruler who
claims the right to decide what is best for the people is considered a dictator. A country
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To be sure, the zeal of some American politicians for exporting liberal
democracy is not necessarily shared to the same degree by the broad pub-
lic. Despite a moral streak in American political culture, there is little pub-
lic support for a moral crusade abroad in the name of human rights. 43 1
For most Americans, promoting democracy and human rights trails pro-
tecting U.S. jobs, safeguarding the interests of U.S. businesses abroad,
securing adequate supplies of energy, and defending the security of our
allies. 43 2 The commitment to democracy and rights for everyone is broad
but shallow. As a result, American human rights policy is inconsistent and
incoherent. Despite all of the political grandstanding, harsh criticisms of
China's record and calls for sanctions cannot obtain the support of the
majority when confronted with the costs in terms of U.S. business interests
and other foreign policy objectives. In the end, U.S. actions fall short of the
high-minded rhetoric, and human rights concerns take a back seat to the
war on terrorism, the need to secure China's cooperation in resolving the
Korean peninsula crisis, and increased opportunities for American compa-
nies to do business in China. But linking human rights criticisms with
issues of outsourcing and the budget deficit appears to many Chinese as
nothing more than a cynical manipulation of human rights to further U.S.
economic and geopolitical interests.
D. The Government's Own Shortcomings
Although reporting on China may reflect a bias against non-liberal
democratic regimes, the PRC government has itself to blame for much of
the bad press. While the government has acknowledged and been reasona-
bly open with respect to problems in areas other than civil and political
rights, it continues to hide behind broad claims of state secrets and
national security to prevent public debate in many politically sensitive civil
and political rights cases. If government leaders believe that the regime's
general positions on human rights issues as well as the outcomes in spe-
cific cases are defensible, then they should permit all but the rare politi-
cally sensitive case that genuinely involves state secrets to be tried in
public, with the defendant afforded all of the due process protection prom-
ised by PRC and international law.4 33 The international community
would then have a better sense of the facts and the relevant issues, legal and
otherwise.
where citizens are not allowed to participate in the decision-making process over life and
death matters is considered authoritarian. Paradoxically, the U.S., the leader of the free
world, decides for others what is in their best interests and imposes the costs of its
decisions on them in the name of democracy.
431. See generally Ole Holsti, Public Opinion on Human Rights in American Foreign
Policy, in THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKING INWARD AND OUTwARD 131,
131-55 (David Forsythe, ed., 2000) (discussing a decline in the public's interest in the
state of human rights abroad since the end of the Cold War).
432. See generally id.
433. The government should also disclose as much information as possible and hold
parts of the trial open even when state secrets and national security issues are involved.
Cornell International Law Journal
Given the potential for instability and other circumstances such as
majoritarian value preferences that fall within a reasonable margin of
appreciation, the government in all likelihood will impose more restric-
tions on civil and political rights than do economically advanced, politi-
cally stable Western liberal democracies. Undoubtedly, there would still
be disagreements over the outcomes of particular cases, the wisdom of par-
ticular policies and the legality under international law of certain acts, just
as there are debates over these issues in other countries. The government
could then address these concerns through its White Papers on human
rights. Academics and citizens could also debate the issues. As heads of
an emerging superpower and responsible member of the international
community, Chinese leaders should have the courage of their convictions,
be willing to subject their decisions and actions to international and
domestic scrutiny, and revise their policies as appropriate. The lines for
what is permitted and what is not should be clarified, and the rules should
be enforced consistently, fairly and in a transparent manner, without
recourse to torture or coerced confessions or harassment of defense
counsel.
IV. Conclusion: The Benefits of Avoiding a Double Standard
To recognize that China is being held to a double standard is not to
excuse human rights violations or to diminish the urgency of addressing
the problems.43 4 On the contrary, acknowledging that China is subject to
a double standard clears the way for a more effective engagement with
China on human rights issues. Apart from the inherent desirability of
greater fairness, a more even-handed and accurate assessment of China's
human rights situation within a broader comparative perspective will
soften the aggressive defensiveness of the government. So doing will allow
all sides to work together in a more cooperative fashion to achieve feasible
solutions consistent with China's level of economic development and con-
tingent circumstances.
Acknowledging the areas in which China has made considerable pro-
gress also highlights the areas where progress has been slower. Govern-
434. This article no doubt will lead to charitable criticisms that I am unwittingly
serving as an apologist for evil tyrants and to less charitable denunciations that I have
sold my soul to the devil. In some cases, the latter criticism will be meant literally, as in
the suggestion that I must be a paid lobbyist for the PRC government or else that I am
motivated by the desire to maintain good relations with the authorities so that I can
conduct academic research or engage in the lucrative representation of foreign clients. I
am happy to state for the record that I am a lobbyist for no one, and that I had no
personal stake one way or the other in the outcome of the empirical inquiry as to
whether China has been subject to a double standard, although as a normative matter I
believe we would all be better off if China were not subject to a double standard. In any
event, such criticisms suffer from a serious flaw: they go to the (alleged) motivations of
the speaker rather than addressing the substantive reasons and evidence. I have criti-
cized this approach elsewhere. See Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Apologia: Respecting
Legitimate Differences of Opinion While Not Toadying to Dictators (response to Richard
Rorty), 50 PHIL. E. & W. 92-96 (2000).
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ment leaders have reached out to the foreign community for assistance on
many rights issues. However, there has been greater reluctance to accept
the advice of foreign parties when it comes to civil and political rights.
Government leaders might be more willing to revisit sensitive issues regard-
ing free speech, religious freedoms and the rights of minorities if they felt
their concerns were taken more seriously, and the difficulties that many
countries face on these issues were acknowledged. Even if the balance
drawn between individual liberties and stability, national security, and
state interests remains contested, a more balanced approach would help
clarify the areas of genuine disagreement.
A more balanced approach on human rights issues would facilitate
cooperation on other issues from nuclear proliferation to international ter-
rorism to environmental degradation. It would also help take the aggres-
sive edge off of a growing politics of resentment and nationalism, and thus
may contribute to a less confrontational relationship between China and
Western powers as they attempt to negotiate a new balance of power in
keeping with China's growing economic, political, and military influence.
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Figure 1.1: Physical Integrity Rights 2002
Zimbabwe (LI)
Indonesia (Li)
India (LI)
Egypt (LM)
China (LM)
Brazil (UM)
South Africa (UM)
South Korea (UM)
Philippines (LM)
Malaysia (M)
Iran (LM)
United States (HI)
Vietnam (LI)
Thailand (M)
Tanzania (LI)
Singapore (HI)
Romania (LM)
Poland (UM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Japan (HI)
France ((HI)
Chile (UM)
Taiwan (UM)
0 12 3 4 5
Amnesty International Political Terror Scale
Source:
Gibney M., Political Terror Scale Scores, at http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/
faculty-staff/gibney docs/pts.xls (accessed 15 April 2004).
LI refers to lower income countries; LM to lower middle income; M to middle
income; UM to upper middle income; HI to high income. I have used World Bank
income categories; however, the following countries have been ranked differently
according to the World Bank and the UNDP:
Country World Bank UNDP
Taiwan HI UM
South Korea UM HI
Malaysia M UM
Brazil UM LM
South Africa UM LM
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Figure 2.1 Civil and Political Rights: Voice and Accountability, 2002
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Voice and Accountability, 2002
Source:
World Bank, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002
(2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata
2002 (accessed Apr. 15, 2004).
Figure 3.1 Social Economic Rights: UNDP HDI Ranking, 2003
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Source:
United Nations Development Programme Human Development Indicators (2003),
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/presskit/HDR03_PKEHDI.pdf
(accessed Dec. 26, 2004).
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Table 1.1: Poverty Index
Human HPI-1 rank
Country and Human poverty Population below income minus
Development index poverty line income
Indicator Rank (HPI-1) (%) poverty rank
National
Value $1 a day $2 a day poverty line
Rank (%) 1990-2001 1990-2001 1987-2000
26 Hong Kong (HI) .. .....
30 South Korea (HI) .. .. <2 <2 .
58 Malaysia (UM) . <2 9.3
43 Chile (UM) 3 4.1 <2 8.7 17.0 1
28 Singapore (HI) 6 6.3 .
65 Brazil (LM) 18 11.4 9.9 23.7 -8
74 Thailand (LM) 24 12.9 <2 32.5 13.1 12
104 China (LM) 26 14.2 16.1 47.3 4.6 -13
85 Philippines (LM) 28 14.8 14.6 46.4 36.8 -6
106 Iran (LM) 31 16.4 <2 7.3 18
112 Indonesia (LI) 33 17.9 7.2 55.4 27.1 5
109 Vietnam (LI) 39 19.9 17.7 63.7 -4
121 Nicaragua (LI) 44 24.3 82.3 94.5 47.9 -34
120 Egypt (LM) 47 30.5 3.1 43.9 16.7 18
111 South Africa (LM) 49 31.7 <2 14.5 31
127 India (LI) 53 33.1 34.7 79.9 28.6 -9
160 Tanzania (LI) 59 36.2 19.9 59.7 41.6 5
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 90 52.0 36.0 64.2 34.9 14
Sources:
Columns 1-2 (Human poverty index): UNDP, Human and Income Poverty: Developing Countries,
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/pdf/hdr03_table-3.pdf (last visited Dec. 26,
2004). HPI rank is determined on the basis of the HPI-1 values. The HPI value is a composite score
based on standard of living measurements including life expectancy (probability of death before age
40, education level (adult illiteracy rate), access to water (population without sustainable access to
water), and access to food (children underweight for age). The aggregation rule is specified in
Technical Rule 1 of the UNDP 2003 report, at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/
hdr03_backmatter_- 2.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2004).
Column 3-5 (Poverty below income poverty line): World Bank. 2003, World Development
Indicators (CD-ROM, current through 2003), also available at . http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/
2003/pdf/hdr03_backmatter_2.pdf (last accessed Dec. 26, 2004). The final column is calculated on
the basis of ranking data in columns 1 and PPP$1 data in column 3. A positive final column figure
indicates that the country performs better in income poverty than in human poverty, a negative the
opposite.
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Table 2.1: Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy, and Primary School
Enrollment
Net Primary School
Infant mortality rate Life expectancy at birth Enrollment Rate
(per 1000 live births) (years) (% eligible age children)
2001 2001 2000-01
Hong Kong (HI)
Japan (HI)
Singapore (HI)
France (HI)
South Korea (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
United States (HI)
Poland (UM)
Malaysia (UM)
Chile (UM)
Romania (LM)
Thailand (LM)
Philippines (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
Brazil (LM)
China (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
Iran (LM)
Egypt (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
South Africa (LM)
India (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Tanzania (LI)
Japan (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
France (HI)
Singapore (HI)
United States (HI)
Chile (UM)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (HI)
Poland (UM)
Malaysia (UM)
China (LM)
Romania (LM)
Iran (LM)
Philippines (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Thailand (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
Egypt (LM)
Brazil (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
India (LI)
South Africa (LM)
Tanzania (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
81.3
79.7
78.7
77.8
76.9
75.8
75.6
75.2
73.6
72.8
70.6
70.5
69.8
69.5
69.1
68.9
68.6
68.3
67.8
66.2
63.3
50.9
44
35.4
Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (HI)
Poland (UM)
Malaysia (UM)
Brazil (LM)
United States (HI)
Vietnam (LI)
Singapore (HI)
Romania (LM)
Philippines (LM)
China (LM)
Egypt (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
Chile (UM)
South Africa (LM)
India (LI)
Thailand (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Iran (LM)
Tanzania (LI)
Sources:
Column 1 (Infant Mortality Rate): UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), The State of the
World's Children (2003), available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc03/tables/tablel.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2004). For Hong Kong's infant mortality rate see CIA World Factbook, Field Listing-
Infant Mortality Rate, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2091.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
Column 2 (Life Expectancy at Birth): U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, 2003. World Population Prospects 1950-2050: The 2002 Revision. Database, available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdrO3-HDI.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
Column 3 (Net Primary School Enrollment Rate): UNESCO Institute for Statistics,. Correspondence
on Adult and Youth Literacy Rates. January. Montreal (2003), also available at UNDP, Basic Indicators
for Other UN Member Countries (2003), http://pooh.undp.org/maindiv/hdr..dvpt/statistics/data/
indic/indic 291_1 1.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2005); Earth Trends, Country Profiles: Population,
Health, and Human Well-Being-Singapore, at http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdflibrary/country-
profiles/Pop cou_702.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005) (displaying Singapore data from 1999).
Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau, available at http://
www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbasO3/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
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Table 3.1: Income Inequality
Country and Human Share of Income or Richest 20% to Gini Index
Development Indicator Consumption (%) Poorest 20% (%)
Rank 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001
Poorest 20% Richest 20%
9 Japan (HI) 10.6 35.7 3.4 24.9
72 Romania (LM) 8.2 38.4 4.7 30.3
112 Indonesia (LI) 8.4 43.3 5.2 34.3
30 South Korea (HI) 7.9 37.5 4.7 31.6
35 Poland (UM) 7.3 42.5 5.8 31.6
17 France (HI) 7.2 40.2 5.6 32.7
29 Taiwan (UM) 6.7 41.1 6.2 34.5
120 Egypt (LM) 8.6 43.6 5.1 34.4
109 Vietnam (LI) 8.0 44.5 5.6 36.1
127 India (LI) 8.9 41.6 4.7 32.5
160 Tanzania (LI) 6.8 45.5 6.7 38.2
104 China (LM) 4.7 50.0 10.7 44.7
7 United States (HI) 5.4 45.8 8.4 40.8
28 Singapore (HI) 5.0 49.0 9.7 42.5
106 Iran (LM) 5.1 49.9 9.7 43.0
74 Thailand (LM) 6.1 50.0 8.3 43.2
26 Hong Kong (HI) 5.3 50.7 9.7 43.4
85 Philippines (LM) 5.4 52.3 9.7 46.1
58 Malaysia (UM) 4.4 54.3 12.4 49.2
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 4.6 55.7 12.0 56.8
43 Chile (UM) 3.3 62.2 18.7 57.1
111 South Africa (LM) 2.0 66.5 33.6 59.3
121 Nicaragua (LI) 3.6 59.7 16.8 55.1
65 Brazil (LM) 2.0) 64.4 31.5 59.1
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD-ROM, current through 2003), also available
at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic 133_1_1.html (Column 1), http://hdr.
undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic 134_1 .html (Column 2), http://hdr.undp.org/
statistics/data/indic/indic137_1_1.htm (Column 3), http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/
indic/indic_138_1_1.html (Column 4).
For Taiwan data see Report on The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan Area,
Republic of China, available at http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/doc4/eng/conte91.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2004). Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
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Table 4.1: Quality of Governance (Percentile Rank, 2002)
Country and Human
Development Indicator
Rank
7 United States (HI)
9 Japan (HI)
17 France (HI)
26 Hong Kong (HI)
28 Singapore (HI)
29 Taiwan (UM)
30 South Korea (HI)
35 Poland (UM)
43 Chile (UM)
58 Malaysia (UM)
65 Brazil (LM)
74 Thailand (LM)
72 Romania (LM)
85 Philippines (LM)
104 China (LM)
106 Iran (LM)
109 Vietnam (LI)
111 South Africa (LM)
112 Indonesia (LI)
127 India (LI)
120 Egypt (LM)
121 Nicaragua (LI)
145 Zimbabwe (LI)
160 Tanzania (LI)
Voice and
Accountability
90.9
79.3
88.4
53.5
65.7
74.2
67.7
83.3
84.3
42.4
58.1
57.1
61.1
54.0
10.1
18.2
10.6
70.7
34.8
60.6
22.2
52.0
7.1
37.9
Political Government
Stability Effectiveness
56.2 91.2
90.3 84.5
70.8 90.7
85.4 88.7
91.9 100.0
70.3 82.5
60.5 79.4
69.7 71.1
85.9 86.6
61.6 80.9
48.1 50.0
62.7 64.9
58.4 46.4
29.7 55.7
51.4 63.4
25.9 39.2
61.1 48.5
42.7 69.1
12.4 34.0
22.2 54.1
34.1 46.9
47.6 17.5
8.6 22.2
35.7 36.1
Regulatory Rule of Control of
Quality Law Corruption
91.2 91.8 92.3
78.9 88.7 85.1
85.6 87.6 89.2
90.7 86.6 90.2
99.5 93.3 99.5
80.9 80.9 77.3
76.3 77.8 66.5
71.1 70.6 69.1
90.2 87.1 90.7
68.6 69.6 68.0
63.4 50.0 56.7
65.5 62.4 53.6
55.7 54.1 45.4
57.7 38.1 37.6
40.2 51.5 42.3
8.2 33.5 44.3
25.3 44.8 33.0
69.1 59.8 67.5
26.3 23.2 6.7
43.8 57.2 49.5
38.1 57.7 47.9
39.7 32.0 39.7
4.1 5.7 6.2
33.5 38.7 15.5
Source: World Bank, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (2003), at http:
//www.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/sc country.asp (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
Table 5.1 Quality of Governance: China
CHINA (2002)
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Governnent Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Lau
Control of Corruption
0 25 50 75 100
Conparison uith income category average (Lower Middle Incone) (louer bar)
Country's Percentile Rank (0-108)
Souce:
D. Kaufmann, A. Kragy and M. Mastruzzi, 2003: Governance Matters III: Govern-
ance Indicators for 1996-2002 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/
govmatters3.html)
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Table 6.1: Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002
Country and Human
Development Total Drug Incarceration
Indicator Rank Crime Murder Rape Theft Offense (per 100,000)
7 United States (HI) 4160.51 5.61 31.77 3804.58 539.92* 715
9 Japan (HI) 2300.77 1.10 1.85 1871.13 21.68 58
17 France (HI) 6932.26 4.07 17.63 4224.57 182.19 95
26 Hong Kong (HI) 1085.64 1.03 1.41 623.16 36.77 189
28 Singapore (HI) 703.84 0.8 2.81 415.5 85.08* 382
29 Taiwan (UM) 2179.03 5.13 10.16 1473.03 111.13 248
30 South Korea (HI) 1664.06 2.18 4.29 386.31 8.97 125
35 Poland (UM) 3634.84 3.15 6.09 1727.46 93.65 210
43 Chile (UM) 1496.92 4.54 9.97 705.66 16.68 204
58 Malaysia (UM) 729.71 2.1 5.78 581.43 78.95 161
65 Brazil (LM) 927.41 22.98 8.5 - 46.29 160
72 Romania (LM) 2207.05 7.44 8.34 1028.33 2.04 184
74 Thailand (LM) 245.53 8.07 6.17 90.00 438.13 340
85 Philippines (LM) - 7.85 4.21 10.21 14.53 94
104 China (LM) 133.82 2.16 87.75 3.92 119
106 Iran (LM) - - - - 194
109 Vietnam (LI) 83.56 1.08 31.41 11.26 71
111 South Africa (LM) 8176.04 114.84 121.13 3565.81 111.85 402
112 Indonesia (LI) 63.48 0.8 0.73 45.26 3.77 38
120 Egypt (LM) - - - - 121
121 Nicaragua (LI) 1372.27 24.03 26.03 579.97 22.79 143
127 India (LI) 671.2 3.93 1.6 44.01 2.25 29
145 Zimbabwe (LI) 6560.61 10.15 38.38 1958.11 57.03 160
160 Tanzania (LI) 1647.98 7.95 10.05 194.11 13.39 116
Source:
Column 1-5: Interpol, International Crime Statistics: Country Report, at http://www.interpol.int/Public/
Statistics/ICS/ (also on file with author); Column 6: International Center for Prison Studies, School of Law
at King's College of the University of London, World Prison Brief, at http://www.prisonstudies.org/. Some
Taiwan, U.S. and Singapore data came from compilations by national statistic offices. Taiwan HDI rank is
an estimate.
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Table 7.1: Social Order. Divorce Rates, Suicide Rates, Young Mothers
Country and Human
Development Indicator
Rank
United States (HI)
Japan (HI)
France (HI)
Hong Kong (HI)
Singapore (HI)
Taiwan (UM)
South Korea (HI)
Poland (UM)
Chile (UM)
Malaysia (UM)
Brazil (LM)
Romania (LM)
Thailand (LM)
Philippines (LM)
China (LM)
Iran (LM)
Vietnam (LI)
South Africa (LM)
Indonesia (LI)
Egypt (LM)
Nicaragua (LI)
India (LI)
Zimbabwe (LI)
Tanzania (LI)
Divorce Rate
(per 1,000)
1996-2000
4.19
1.98
1.98
1.95
1.20
2.52
1.09
0.42
0.60
1.40
1.9
0.81
0.85
1.17
0.59
Suicide Rates
(per 100,000)
1991-2002
10.85
25.3
17.75
13.25
9.45
13.59
13.55
15.4
5.8
4.2
12.35
4.0
2.1
13.9
0.2
0.05
3.45
10.65
7.9
Births by Mothers
Between Age 15-19
(per 1000 population
1995 to 2000)
9.14
0.70
1.58
1.08
1.07
0.50
0.63
4.12
10.19
4.06
19.05
7.93
12.41
11.80
0.97
13.86
6.51
21.28
15.10
14.36
45.06
12.52
31.25
39.30
Source:
Column 1 (Divorce Rate): UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 2000, at 590 (2002). China's
divorce rate is for 1999, from the State Commission on Population and Family Planning, http://
www.sfpc.gov.cn, based on data in the 2000 Yearbook of China Statistics, published by the State
Statistics Bureau.
Column 2 (Suicide Rate): World Health Organization, Suicide Rates (Table), at http://www.who.int/
mental.health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2004). The suicide rate
statistics assume that the ratio of females to males in a given country is 50/50.
Column 3: UNDP, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database, at http://
esa.un.org/unpp/.
Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
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